Synthetic data methods for disclosure limitation by Huckett, Jennifer C.
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2008
Synthetic data methods for disclosure limitation
Jennifer C. Huckett
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Statistics and Probability Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Huckett, Jennifer C., "Synthetic data methods for disclosure limitation" (2008). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 15787.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/15787
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE TO USERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This reproduction is the best copy available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Synthetic data methods for disclosure limitation
by
Jennifer C. Huckett
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Major: Statistics
Program of Study Committee:
Michael D. Larsen, Major Professor
Petrutza C. Caragea
Craig Gundersen
Stephen B. Vardeman
Cindy L. Yu
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
2008
Copyright c© Jennifer C. Huckett, 2008. All rights reserved.
3307105
 
 3307105
 2008
ii
DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my mom Sara and my sisters Anna and Nora, to my
brother Ben, my dad Steve and my step-dad Brian, to my aunt Leah and my grandma Pat,
and to my friends Monica, Joy, Brie, Sarah, Casi, and Eden, and to my wonderful Wayne.
My efforts during graduate school, to do this research and to complete this work, have been
supported with the constant love that these people have given me. Each of them is inspir-
ing to me and each of them contributes to who I am and how I have done this. Through
laughing with me and urging me to live well, I have accomplished a doctorate degree with you.
Mike Larsen has been the best advisor I have had as a student and I thank him for
his support. The time and energy and thoughtfulness he has given toward my research and
development as a Statistician are invaluable, as is his tolerance for down to the wire revising.
I hope to one day fill an adivising or mentoring role this well.
Joanne Wendleberger urged me to study Statistics seven years ago and I am happy with
where I am because of it. Professionally, I’ve learned a lot about Statistics and about learn-
ing itself. Personally, I’ve gotten a little tougher and am better for it. Thank you Joanne
for continuing to give me advice, I value it very much.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The importance of confidentiality protection and disclosure limitation . . . . 1
1.2 Approaches to statistical disclosure limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Limiting access to data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2 Limiting data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Synthetic data as an approach to disclosure limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Quantile regression synthetic data generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5 Hot deck imputation and rank swapping as a method to complete data records 10
1.6 Application at the Iowa Department of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.7 Application at the U.S. Census Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.8 Dissertation outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHAPTER 2. PROPOSED SYNTHETIC DATA METHODS . . . . . . . . 14
2.1 Quantile regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.1 Fundamentals of estimation and prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.2 Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.3 Quantile regression for synthetic data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Hot deck imputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1 Imputation for missing value problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 Hot deck techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.3 Hot deck imputation for synthetic data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Rank swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.1 Rank swapping for disclosure limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.2 Rank swapping for synthetic data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Proposed synthetic data method: a combination of techniques . . . . . . . . 31
iv
CHAPTER 3. DISCLOSURE RISK AND DATA UTILITY . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1 Disclosure risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.1 Introduction and background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.2 Disclosure risk framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1.3 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1.4 Probabilistic risk measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Disclosure risk for the proposed synthetic data method . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.1 Intruder knowledge and decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.2 Component formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.3 Formulation of components for the SDL intruder . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.4 Formulation of components for the NAIVE intruder . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.5 Formulation of components for the AVERAGE intruder . . . . . . . . 72
3.2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 Data utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.1 Visual measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3.2 Quantitative measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
CHAPTER 4. APPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1 Iowa Department of Revenue application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1.1 Individual income tax return data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1.2 Models and procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 U.S. Census Bureau application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.1 American Community Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.2 Models and procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Public Use Microdata Sample application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3.1 Models and procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.1 Proposed method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.2 Disclosure risk measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.3 Data utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.4 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.5 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
vLIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Notation for use in disclosure risk formulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 3.2 Extended notation for use in disclosure risk formulation. . . . . . . . 44
Table 3.3 Intruder knowledge and decisions for disclosure risk formulation. . . 55
Table 3.4 Variable types in hypothetical data set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 4.1 Linear regression results for predicting l.wages from synthetic and
original American Comunity Survey veterans data sets. . . . . . . . 94
Table 4.2 Variables in the U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Sample
(PUMS) sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Table 4.3 Recode variables Veteran’s Period of Service (VPS) and educational
attainment (SCHL) from U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata
Sample (PUMS) data set into new variable SCHL/VPS. . . . . . . . 98
Table 4.4 Linear regression results: YAGE = YSCHL/V PSβAGE + AGE. . . . . . 111
Table 4.5 Linear regression results: logYRET = YSCHL/V PSβRET + RET . . . . . 113
Table 4.6 Linear regression results: logYSSI = YSCHL/V PSβSSI + SSI . . . . . . 114
Table 4.7 Linear regression results: YTAX = YSCHL/V PSβTAX + TAX . . . . . . 115
Table 4.8 Linear regression results: YTAX = YSCHL/V PSβTAX + TAX . . . . . . 116
Table 4.9 Linear regression results: Y = YAGEβ + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Table 4.10 Target records in the original and synthetic U.S. Census Burea Public
Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data sets. Values for the unique,
rare, and common targets are give. Original values are on the left.
Synthetic values are on the right. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Table 4.11 Disclosure risk for the synthetic U.S. Census Burea Public Use Mi-
crodata Sample (PUMS) data set for three targets (unique, rare, and
common) for three intruders (SDL, average, naive). . . . . . . . . . 129
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 An illustration of the original data set and STEP ONE of the creation
of the synthetic data set. The original data set contains variables X
and Y. In step one, the nonsensitive variables X are copied directly
into the synthetic data set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 2.2 An illustration of the original data set and STEP TWO of the creation
of the synthetic data set. The original data set contains variables X
and Y. In step two, the sensitive variables Y1, ..., Yf are replaced in the
synthetic data set using quantile regression predictions by variables
Z1, ..., Zf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 2.3 An illustration of the original data set and STEP THREE of the
creation of the synthetic data set. The original data set contains
variables X and Y. In step three, the sensitive variables Yf+1, ..., Ys
are replaced in the synthetic data set using hot deck imputation and
rank swapping by variables Zf+1, ..., Zs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 4.1 Empirical cumulative distribution of age values from original and syn-
thetic Iowa income tax return data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Figure 4.2 Empirical cumulative distribution of log(wages) from original and
synthetic Iowa income tax return data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Figure 4.3 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of log(federal tax) from
original and synthetic Iowa income tax return data. . . . . . . . . . 87
Figure 4.4 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of log(deductions) from
original and synthetic Iowa income tax return data. . . . . . . . . . 88
Figure 4.5 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of age in original and
synthetic American Community Survey (ACS) veterans data. . . . . 92
Figure 4.6 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of log(wages) from orig-
inal and synthetic American Community Survey (ACS) veterans data. 93
Figure 4.7 Box plots of age within Veteran Period of Service (VPS) from original
and synthetic American Community Survey (ACS) veterans data. . 95
vii
Figure 4.8 An illustration of the original U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Micro-
data Sample (PUMS) data set and STEP ONE of the creation of the
synthetic data set. The original data set contains variables Y. In step
one, the nonsensitive variables YSCHL and YV PS are recategorized to
ZSCHL/V PS before being copied into the synthetic data set. . . . . . 99
Figure 4.9 An illustration of the original U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Micro-
data Sample (PUMS) data set and STEP TWO of the creation of the
synthetic data set. In step two, the sensitive variables YAGE, YRET ,
and YSS are replaced in the synthetic data set using quantile regres-
sion predictions for variables ZAGE, ZRET , and ZSS. . . . . . . . . . 101
Figure 4.10 An illustration of the original U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Mi-
crodata Sample (PUMS) data set and STEP THREE of the cre-
ation of the synthetic data set. In step three, the sensitive variables
YSSI , YTAX , and YWAGE. are replaced in the synthetic data set using
hot deck imputation and rank swapping for variables ZSSI , ZTAX ,
and ZWAGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Figure 4.11 Empirical densities for AGE, RET, SS, SSI, TAX, and WAGE from
original and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata
Sample (PUMS) data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 4.12 Empirical densities for RET on the original and log scale from origi-
nal and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Sample
(PUMS) data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Figure 4.13 Empirical densities for SS on the original and log scale from origi-
nal and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Sample
(PUMS) data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Figure 4.14 Empirical densities for SSI on the original and log scale from origi-
nal and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Sample
(PUMS) data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Figure 4.15 Empirical densities for WAGE on the original and log scale from orig-
inal and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Sample
(PUMS) data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Figure 4.16 YAGE = YSCHL/V PSβAGE + AGE: standardized intervals for βˆAGE. . 117
Figure 4.17 YRET = YSCHL/V PSβRET + RET : standardized intervals for βˆRET . . . 118
Figure 4.18 YSSI = YSCHL/V PSβSSI + SSI : standardized intervals for βˆSSI . . . . 119
Figure 4.19 YTAX = YSCHL/V PSβTAX + TAX : standardized intervals for βˆTAX . . 120
Figure 4.20 YSS = YSCHL/V PSβSS + SS: standardized intervals for βˆSS. . . . . . 121
viii
Figure 4.21 YWAGE = YSCHL/V PSβWAGE + WAGE: standardized intervals for
βˆWAGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Figure 4.22 YRET = YAGEβRET + RET : standardized intervals for βˆRET . . . . . . 123
Figure 4.23 YSSI = YAGEβSSI + SSI : standardized intervals for βˆSSI . . . . . . . 124
Figure 4.24 YTAX = YAGEβTAX + TAX : standardized intervals for βˆTAX . . . . . 125
Figure 4.25 YSS = YAGEβSS + SS: standardized intervals for βˆSS. . . . . . . . . 126
Figure 4.26 YWAGE = YAGEβWAGE + WAGE: standardized intervals for βˆWAGE. . 127
Figure 4.27 Risk for SDL intruder for records with SCHL/VPS value equal to the
target. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In this dissertation we address the general problem faced by statistical agencies to provide
data to researchers, policy-makers, and other legitimate data users while upholding respon-
dents’ confidentiality and protecting privacy. In the field of Statistics, this type of research
belongs to the field of confidentiality protection and disclosure limitation. In Section 1.1, we
put this problem into context and discuss the importance of confidentiality protection and
disclosure limitation. Approaches to disclosure limitation are discussed in Section 1.2. This
leads to considering synthetic data methods as an approach to disclosure limitation. An
introduction to synthetic data and a review of current methods used to produce synthetic
data are presented in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4 we propose using quantile regression as
an improved method to produce synthetic data. In Section 1.5, we describe our proposed
use of hot deck imputation and rank swapping to complement quantile regression. The
motivation for addressing this problem and an application at the Iowa Department of Rev-
enue are introduced in Section 1.6. In Section 1.7, we introduce work done to study this
method at the U. S. Census Bureau. An outline of this dissertation is provided in Section 1.8.
1.1 The importance of confidentiality protection and disclosure
limitation
Federal statistical agencies exist in the United States and other countries to inform the
public on matters that affect the welfare of the people, both individually and collectively
(Duncan, Jabine, and de Wolf 1993). Each of over 70 statistical agencies in the United
States was founded in response to specific needs for data about critical areas in public policy
(Duncan, et al. 1993). Policy makers and researchers use data products to study inflation
and unemployment rates and crime and healthcare statistics allowing them to manage the
economy and inform public debate (Doyle, Lane, Theeuwes, and Zayatz 2001). Policy makers
make decisions about fund allocation, monitor social programs, investigate potential effects
of new legislation, and validate or extend theoretical social science models (Fienberg and
2Willenborg 1998). Such research ultimately impacts the competitiveness of the economy by
providing policy makers with complete and accurate information, thereby enabling them to
make decisions (Doyle, et al. 2001).
Statistical agencies aim to collect and disseminate quality data and information to policy-
makers and researchers. Agencies face several challenges to ensure the collection and subse-
quent dissemination of quality data. There are limiting factors. In order to provide quality
data to users, an agency must first collect quality data. Data collection poses challenges
outside the scope of this dissertation. In this work, we assume quality data have been col-
lected. We address the challenge faced by agencies to provide quality information to users
under the constraint that agencies are bound by legal and internal obligations to protect
the confidentiality of individuals and organizations, or respondents, from which data are
collected. This challenge is reflected in most agencies’ mission or policy statements. Such
statements usually include explicit goals to collect and provide quality data and to honor
and protect privacy and confidentiality. Examples can be found on agencies’ websites.
Examples and quotations from three agencies’ websites are provided below. The mission
statement of the U.S. Census Bureau states:
The Census Bureau serves as the leading source of quality data about the na-
tion’s people and economy. We honor privacy, protect confidentiality, share our
expertise globally, and conduct our work openly. We are guided on this mission
by our strong and capable workforce, our readiness to innovate, and our abiding
commitment to our customers (U.S. Census Bureau 2008).
The guiding principle stated in the Mission and Policy on Microdata Dissemination at the
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) states:
NCHS’ authorizing legislation mandates that data be made as widely available as
practicable (Section 308(c)). (1) However, the mandate to make data available
must be guided by NCHS’ role as a federal statistical agency and be balanced
against the need to protect respondent confidentiality and to assure data quality
(U.S. Centers for Disease Control 2002).
At a global level, the United Nations Statistics Division includes definitions of good practices
in their Principles Governing International Statistical Activities (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/statorg
1999). Included are the following statements about data dissemination and confidentiality:
3High quality international statistics, accessible for all, are a fundamental element
of global information systems.
Individual data collected about natural persons and legal entities, or about small
aggregates that are subject to national confidentiality rules, are to be kept strictly
confidential and are to be used exclusively for statistical purposes or for purposes
mandated by legislation (United Nations 2005).
How can agencies attempt to address the issue of providing policy makers and researchers
with complete and accurate information about the populations for which they make deci-
sions while simultaneously protecting the confidentiality of respondents? In particular, how
can statistics play a role? Research and applications concerned with releasing quality infor-
mation and simultaneously protecting privacy and confidentiality is called statistical disclo-
sure control, statistical disclosure limitation, statistical disclosure protection, and statistical
confidentiality, among other names (Fienberg and Willenborg 1998). Statistical disclosure
limitation (SDL), or disclosure limitation, is the term we use in this dissertation. It is our
goal to develop a disclosure limitation method that provides as much quality information to
as many policy makers and researchers as possible while at the same time upholding promises
of privacy and protecting confidentiality at an acceptable level.
Two major approaches or disclosure limitation methods generally are implemented to
achieve data dissemination with disclosure protection. One method is to limit access to the
data. The other is to limit or modify the data themselves (Jabine, 1993). Several methods
can be used to implement each approach. These are discussed in Section 1.2.
1.2 Approaches to statistical disclosure limitation
Statistical disclosure limitation is generally approached using one of two broad tech-
niques: limiting access to the data or limiting the data themselves. We review methods to
limit access in Section 1.2.1, then review methods to limit the data themselves in Section
1.2.2. This leads us to propose a new method to limit the data, which we describe in Section
1.3.
41.2.1 Limiting access to data
Limiting access to data implies exactly that: access to the data is limited by the agency.
The Confidentiality and Data Access Committee (CDAC) of the Federal Committee on Sta-
tistical Methodology (FCSM) produces reports on confidentiality and data access issues. The
reports summarize methods used in several government statistical agencies and are available
on the website at www.fcsm.gov/committees/cdac/resources under “Resources for Confi-
dentiality and Data Access.” Included in the collection of reports is one entitled Restricted
Access Procedures (FCSM CDAC 2008) that gives an overview of methods currently in use
and under development at the U. S. Census Bureau and other agencies.
To access data, generally a user must meet certain demands of the agency before access
is granted. If a user does gain access, it is controlled by the agency. Examples include re-
search data centers (RDCs) and secure servers. RDCs are facilities, remote from the agency,
where an approved user may access the agency’s data. Typically, the agency will allow only
trusted data users into secure facilities. In order for a data user to establish trusted status,
the researcher submits a proposal for work to be done using the agency’s data, undergoes
a security evaluation, signs a contract, takes an oath, and attends an orientation session.
Such a procedure is used by Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada 2008). The trusted user
then accesses data at a physically secure computer facility staffed by a Statistics Canada
employee, several of which are located throughout Canada. No data or research results may
leave the facility without examination and approval. The trusted user promises to produce
a research paper upon completion of the proposed research. Similar protocols are standard
throughout the U. S. Census Bureau, National Center for Health Statistics, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, and other agencies. Their facilities exist in various locations
throughout the United States.
Research data centers provide researchers with a unique opportunity to access highly
detailed, confidential data of high quality. They provide agencies a means to achieve simul-
taneous data dissemination and privacy protection. Some researchers, however, may find
the application process difficult to complete. They also could find that travel to and from
and confinement to working in an RDC cumbersome if not expensive. In order to ease the
burden of using RDCs, the Cornell Institute for Social and Economic Research maintains a
Virtual RDC. The Virtual Research Data Center (VRDC) aims to “assist potential Census
RDC users in preparing their proposals, and to train new users in the operating system en-
vironment, data and software available on the real Census RDC (VRDC 2008).” The idea is
5that researchers can use the VRDC to plan their analyses and work out kinks in preparation
for a visit to the actual RDC. At the RDC, the researchers do their final analysis and obtain
results from the actual data. This approach minimizes time they must spend at the RDC.
Although RDCs and the VRDC provide a means for agencies to disseminate information
while protecting the confidentiality of their respondents, the means may not be the optimal
solution for all users. At present, data sets are available only froma few surveys.
Remote access servers also limit users’ access to the data. Under this scenario, the user
submits a query, or requested analysis, to be done using the confidential data. The query is
accepted or denied, according to constraints imposed to protect confidentiality. If the query
is accepted, the server provides the user with the results of the requested analysis. The user
never sees the actual data. Constraints include refusal to requests for a single record, say,
and mechanisms to monitor requested analyses so that no combination of them by one user
constitutes a disclosure (Gomatam, Karr, Reiter, and Sanil, 2004). Advantages of using a
remote access server are that researchers do not need to travel to an RDC, can work remotely,
and can conduct many analyses. Also, the researcher can use standard analyses which are
based on the original data, and thus have no extra variation or bias introduced from altering,
perturbing, or tabulating the microdata (Reiter 2004). On the other hand, combinations of
analyses the researcher can obtain results for are limited.
Consider an instance in which a data user submits a request for a table containing fre-
quencies of residents with income over $100,000 in each county of some geographic area and
also requests a table containing frequencies of residents with income over $105,000 in the
same counties. If the frequency is one less in the $105,000 table than in the $100,000 table
for a particular county, then the user knows there is exactly one person with income between
$100,000 and $105,000. Adding race as a factor to the tables would allow a user to possibly
identify a member of a race category that contains relatively few individuals in a county with
a certain income using two tables, one for income over $100,000 by county by race and one
for income over $105,000 by county by race. One of these requests may not be a problem
with respect to confidentiality protection, but two or more could be problematic.
Another way to limit access to data is to require users to perform secure analyses on
distributed data bases. Distributed data bases are data bases that have components held
by different individuals or agencies. For example, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
might have income and wealth information on individuals, but Census might have survey
information from the Current Population Survey. Neither agency might be willing to send
6its data to the other agency, but they might under highly controlled circumstances want to
do an analysis merging information. This method is used to address the problems specific
to agencies sharing the richness of the data without actually sharing the microdata them-
selves. Secure analyses essentially encode the results after local computations are done and
merge encoded results. After the merging, the results are decoded and available to one or
more agencies. Data themselves do not go between agencies. Secure analyses on distributed
data provide a method for each agency to obtain results using collective data without any
actual data sharing between agencies. Reports and papers on this topic can be found at the
National Institute of Statistical Science website.
Limiting access to data is an area of statistical disclosure limitation with interesting
topics that deserve much attention. This is not within the scope of our research efforts.
We investigate a new proposal for limiting or modifying the data themselves. A review of
approaches to disclosure limitation by limiting the data themselves follow in Section 1.2.2.
1.2.2 Limiting data
Limiting data is an approach to statistical disclosure limitation in which the data are
altered, or perturbed. In this section, we review methods commonly used to limit data.
There are several existing methods which have been well studied. Still, there are limitations
and there is a desire to provide more informative data.
One approach to limit data is sampling and releasing non-identifying variables. Street
address, name, and other detailed information such as birth date or exact age can be iden-
tifying variables. Zip code and age range are less likely to be identifying. Sampling the
records creates a situation in which a particular record that is released does not necessarily
correspond to a single person in the population. Instead, there possibly are many such indi-
viduals in the data set, but only those that are sampled are released. Sampling weights can
be provided to enable estimation of population quantiles from the sample. The sampling
approach has the advantage of releasing microdata; that is, information at the record level.
Such information is useful for statistical modeling. In some cases, however, sampling is not
viewed as sufficient for protecting confidentiality. As was mentioned, it still is necessary to
limit identifying information. Sampling therefore might be used in conjunction with other
methods.
7A second approach is to restrict the data. Top coding caps the highest value that is
recorded. Bottom coding bounds the lowest value that is reported. Top coding could be
useful for income or other skew right variables. Bottom coding could be useful for losses or
variables that are recorded with negative values, especially if the distribution is skew left.
Interval coding replaces a value with an interval code. Interval coding is used often with
ages, income, and other continuous variables. It also can be used with discrete variables,
especially at the low or high ends of a distribution. Geographic aggregation is the coun-
terpart to interval coding for spatial data. State or county is much less identifying than is
zip code or street name and house number. Coding of variables reduces the risk that any
individual can be identified by someone using the data set, but it can limit the usefulness
of the data set for analysis. The impact on analyses sometimes can be quite severe. Public
use versions of several data sets that are made available online to anyone use rather broad
coding categories to protect confidentiality.
A third approach is to perturb the data by adding random noise or otherwise distorting
the records. For a practically continuous variable such as income or age, one could add a
randomly generated error or other perturbation value to each observations recorded value.
For discrete or categorical values, one can consider randomly changing values on a set of
varaiables from a record in one category to a record in another category. One version of
this, referred to as data swapping, swaps values of variables between pairs of records. When
ranks are used as the basis of swapping values, the method can be called rank swapping;
rank swapping is discussed in more detal in Section 2.3. Swapping can provide confiden-
tiality protection because released values in swapped records do not originally appear in the
original record for that respondent. The impact of swapping on both disclosure risk and
data utility is discussed in two editions of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Domingo-
Ferrer and Franconi (eds.) 2006) and in a collection of papers in Confidentiality, Disclosure,
and Data Access (Doyle, Lane, Theeuwes, and Zayatz 2001). In general, as swapping rates
increase, the risk and utility both decrease. When swapping is done between records with
similar or proximous values, the method can better preserve statistics while still protecting
confidentialiy (Dalenius and Reiss 1978, Schlo¨rer 1981, Reiss 1984).
A fourth approach is to not release microdata but rather to release data in tabular for-
mat. Tables are formed by classifying observations as belonging to categories. Categories
are based on levels of categorical variables or intervals of continuous variables. Cells of the
table contain the frequency of records in each category. They may also contain an aggre-
gate value, or magnitude of a variable of interest. The U. S. Census Bureau, for example,
8produces tables of magnitude and frequency. Prior to tabulation, top and bottom coding,
rounding, interval coding, noise addition, and swapping are applied to record-level data. The
resulting perturbed microdata are then tabulated. Before publishing the resulting tables,
threshold rules are used to assess disclosure risk. Rules are designed to protect sensitive
cells. Cells are sensitive when they contain a small number of records. Consider a table
with a cell with frequency one corresponding to a single unit in the data set. The unit in
this cell corresponds to a record with unique values on the variables used to form categories
in the table. Unique records are assumed to be easily identifiable, or sensitive, and have
high disclosure risk. When sensitive cells are identified, methods including primary and
secondary cell supression, controlled rounding, and recategorization are used to alter tables.
The resulting table is released with adequate disclosure control. Increasing perturbation
before and/or after data are tabulated decreases disclosure risk. The use of these techniques
in government statistical agencies is presented in Statistical Policy Working Papers 2 and 22
(Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology 1994).
Categorical data analyses can be used to analyze data in the released tables. Methods
include assessing independence using Chi-squared tests and analysis of variance. Researchers
can also use logistic regression to analyze effects of variables on the frequency of records in
a category. For example, Shlomo and Young (2006) discuss using results from such analyses
to measure data utility.
A relatively new approach to limiting data for statistical disclosure control is to create
synthetic microdata for release. Synthetic data has become a topic in the field of disclosure
limitation. Challenges and current research in this field include development of methods to
create high quality synthetic data. Measures of disclosure risk and data utility are needed.
Current research in synthetic data methods is reviewed in Section 1.3.
1.3 Synthetic data as an approach to disclosure limitation
Synthetic data is an approach to statistical disclosure limitation in which the original data
set is replicated, so to speak, with original values replaced by synthetic values. Synthetic
values in existing applications typically have been generated using an imputation approach.
Imputations have been generated by drawing values from posterior predictive distributions.
A posterior predictive distribution is the distribution of the data conditional on the observed
data. Intervening between the new, predictive data and the existing, observed data is a sta-
9tistical model. One can conceptualize generating synthetic data from a posterior predictive
distribution in two steps. First, values of the parameters of a statistical model are drawn
from their posterior distribution, i.e., the distribution of the parameters given their prior
distribution and the observed data. Second, values of new data are simulated from the data
models with values of model parameters equal to the drawn parameter values. The poste-
rior predictive distribution should capture multivariate relationships among variables in the
original data set.
In applications to the Longitudinal Employment Household Dynamics program, gener-
alized linear models are used (Abowd and Woodcock 2001, Abowd and Lane 2004). In an
application at the U.S. Census Bureau and Duke University, normal linear regression models,
binomial or multinomial distributions, and Dirichlet-Multinomial models were used to create
synthetic data for the Longitudinal Business Database (Kinney 2007). In an application to
group quarters data, a Dirichlet-Multinomial model was used to generate partially synthetic
data for the American Community Survey group quarters data (Rodriguez and Hawala 2006).
Generalized additive models are also being investigated as a method to generate synthetic
data (Hawala 2008). Creating partial synthetic data sets using classification and regression
tree models are proposed by Reiter (2005).
The best choice often depends on the specific data that agencies wish to make available in
the form of microdata. Often, restrictions must be incorporated to maintain the consistency
of the variables. For example, in a data set containing information on household information,
the synthetic data should not contain a single person with an age of five years and three
dependents. Analytical results based on the synthetic data sets should not differ too much
from those based on the original data sets.
The use of multiple imputation ideas with synthetic data generation was suggested by
Rubin (1993). By creating multiple synthetic data sets using the same posterior predictive
models, one can incorporate and assess the added variability in estimation based on the syn-
thetic data sets. Multiple imputation ideas for use with synthetic data generation are not
studied in this dissertation. In principle, the methods proposed here could be implemented
multiple times, yielding two or more randomly generated synthetic data sets. Future work
could study the use of multiple imputation ideas for variance estimation in the context of
our proposed synthetic data method.
In an application at the Iowa Department of Revenue, records with individual income tax
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return variables contain values with highly skewed, nonstandard univariate distributions and
complicated joint dependencies. Data sets contain continuous and categorical variables. In
order to generate a synthetic data set with these properties, we propose combining quantile
regression models with hot deck imputation and rank swapping to capture the highly skewed
joint conditional distributions. An overview of the proposed method is provided in Sections
1.4 and 1.5. Work done at the Iowa Department of Revenue is introduced in Section 1.6.
Further work done at the U.S. Census Bureau is introduced in Section 1.7.
1.4 Quantile regression synthetic data generation
Quantile regression has been used to study economic data by Roger Koenker and oth-
ers. Quantile regression is analogous to linear regression, which is produced by minimizing
squared prediction errors, and median regression, which is produced by minimizing the ab-
solute prediction errors, but it is used to predict quantiles of a response given predictor
information. The appeal of this type of regression originates with the nature of variables
economists are dealing with. The distributions are often highly skewed, and the relationship
between predictors and the mean of a response cannot sufficiently describe their relationship.
We initially considered quantile regression for these reasons. The values in our applications
that we use to create synthetic distributions have highly skewed, non-standard distributions.
It is often plausible that the effect of predictors is not constant throughout the distribution
of the response. We use quantile regression models to characterize the relationship of several
response variables conditional on several predictors. In fact, we use a series of conditional
models in order to retain the joint distribution among multiple response variables. The pre-
dictions from the estimated models serve as our synthetic values for each response variable.
1.5 Hot deck imputation and rank swapping as a method to
complete data records
We borrow imputation methods from missing data problems to generate values for a set
of variables in the synthetic set. Imputation methods applied to missing value problems
generally involve one data set containing two sets of records: a set of complete records with
values recorded on all variables and a set of incomplete records with values missing on some
variables. The goal is to complete the incomplete records using information in all records.
Using hot deck imputation in particular, the information in all records is used by comparing
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values that are recorded in both the complete and incomplete records and imputing values
to an incomplete record from the closest complete record. It is straight-forward to extended
this method to generate synthetic data by considering the original data as the set of com-
plete records, and the synthetic data up to the point of quantile regression predictions as
the incomplete records.
If we compare values on variables whose values we retained from the original data and
variables that we generated using synthetic quantile regression predictions between the orig-
inal and synthetic data, we can compute distances between synthetic and original records.
Then we can impute values from the closest original record into the synthetic record. Fol-
lowing this procedure for every synthetic record, we generate values for this set of variables
for every record in the synthetic data set. The result is one synthetic data set with origi-
nal values on a handful of nonsensitive variables, quantile regression predictions for a set of
variables, and original values on remaining variables. By comparing values generated thus
far, we hope to retain the joint distribution among the variables we are imputing.
One concern with this method is that imputing values on all remaining variables from
a single original record results in too much information from that record being released.
It is plausible that a researcher or intruder would use record linkage techniques and either
inadvertently or purposefully link the original values with values from the same record from
an outside source, thereby identifying the respondent that the particular record belongs to.
To lower the likelihood of this type of link, we further perturb the values from the original
record using rank swapping.
Rank swapping provides a way to impute values similar to the values of the closest origi-
nal record, so as not to distort the joint distribution between original, synthetic, and imputed
variables. Once the closest original record has been identified, the values on the variables
to impute are ranked. Then instead of imputing the value from the closest original record,
we randomly select a rank from some distribution centered at the sample rank and impute
the value from the original record with the randomly selected rank. The result from doing
this, then, is a synthetic set with original values on some nonsensitive variables, quantile
regression predictions on another set of variables, and hot deck imputations perturbed by
rank swapping on remaining variables.
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1.6 Application at the Iowa Department of Revenue
The project motivating this work in disclosure limitation and confidentiality protection
originated from a problem faced by the Iowa Department of Revenue (IDR) and Iowa’s Leg-
islative Services Agency (LSA). Members of the LSA investigate (presumably, among other
things) the effect of proposed tax law changes on the revenue for Iowa, based on individual
income taxes. Any proposed tax law change corresponds to a change of values in one or sev-
eral lines of an income tax return. Given the values on last year’s records, say, the revenue
for Iowa can be computed by simply altering values in line items corresponding to the pro-
posed change in a tax calculator. If the LSA could manipulate the record-level data and the
tax-calculator, its members could compute the state’s revenue. However, IDR cannot release
individual income tax return data to the LSA because of promises and laws compelling them
to protect the privacy of Iowa tax payers. This forces the LSA to submit proposed tax law
changes to IDR who then computes the resulting revenue based on past years’ data. This
occurs several times per year and is incovenient and inefficient for both the IDR and the LSA.
Considering several approaches with IDR, we are pursuing synthetic data as a solution
to their situation with the LSA. We combine quantile regression, hot deck imputation, and
rank swapping to create synthetic data on several variables. Details of this application are
presented in Chapter 4.1.
1.7 Application at the U.S. Census Bureau
The U.S. Census Bureau is among the several government agencies whose purpose is to
collect and disseminate data to inform the public and policy makers. Census is bound by
strict rules to protect the confidentialitiy of respondent from which data are collected. The
American Community Survey (ACS) is administered to collect demmographic and economic
data on individuals and households. The database contains rich information on veterans
which is of interest to researchers interested in veterans’ circumstances. Disseminating this
information to researchers in microdata form could provide a useful tool in further research.
To address this, we investigated applying the proposed procedure to the ACS data on veter-
ans. Our primary focus was on developing a quantile regression model to accurately predict
values for a synthetic data set. In this application, we faced challenges involving restrictions
on values for multiple, logically related variables in the same synthetic records. For example,
if quantile regression predictions produced a synthetic age value of 17 for a record belonging
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to a veteran of World War II, then the age would obviously be inconsistent with the period
of military service. Details and results are presented in Chapter 4.2.
1.8 Dissertation outline
The proposed synthetic data method that combines quantile regression with hot deck im-
putation and rank swapping is presented in Chapter 2. Section 2.1 is devoted to introducing
quantile regression, discusses estimation and inference, and presents details on its proposed
use to generate synthetic data. Section 2.2 is devoted to hot deck imputation and discusses
its typical missing data applications, techniques of applying hot deck, and the proposed use
of hot deck in creating synthetic data. Section 2.3 discusses rank swapping for disclosure
limitation and its particular use in the proposed synthetic data method. Section 2.4 ties
these three methods together to describe the synthetic data method we propose to use to
generate synthetic records.
Measurements for disclosure risk and data utility are discussed in Chapter 3. An intro-
duction to disclosure risk is presented in Section 3.1. This includes existing risk measures
and notation. The extension to measure risk for a data set generated using the proposed
synthetic data method is presented in Section 3.2. We discuss a collection of tools to assess
data utility in Section 3.3.
Results from applying our proposed synthetic data method are presented in Chapter 4.
An application to individual income tax returns is presented in Section 4.1. Further work
done to generate synthetic values for variables in a data set containing records with in-
formation on veterans is presented in Section 4.2. Finally, an application of the proposed
procedure to a public use microdata set available from the Census Bureau is presented. In
this application, we also assess the disclosure risk associated with the resulting synthetic
data set. Results are presented in Section 4.3.
Chapter 5 is a conclusion. Some ideas for future work are given.
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CHAPTER 2. PROPOSED SYNTHETIC DATA METHODS
Government agencies face demands to release accurate, timely data and to simultane-
ously uphold their promises of privacy and confidentiality to respondents. We study options
for generating synthetic data files for public release. Specifically, we study combining quan-
tile regression and hot deck imputation with rank swapping to produce releasable, usable
synthetic microdata. To capture the complex relationships found in demographic and eco-
nomic data collected by statistical agencies, conditional quantile regression models are used.
Predicted values computed from model estimates and key predictors are generated for sev-
eral confidential variables at random quantiles. Values for other variables are imputed from
the original data using hot deck imputation and further perturbed using a rank swapping
procedure. The quantile regression predictions are combined with the imputed perturbed
values to form a data set with record level data for release that has low disclosure risk and
high data utility.
In Section 2.1, we describe the fundamentals of quantile regression estimation and pre-
diction, inference, and our proposed use of quantile regression to generate synthetic data. In
Section 2.2, we describe imputation as applied to missing data problems, hot deck imputa-
tion techniques, and how it is used in our proposed method to generate synthetic microdata.
In Section 2.3, we describe rank swapping as it is generally applied in disclosure limitation
and its use in our proposed method. In Section 2.4, we present the combination of methods
as the proposed method using quantile regression prediction, hot deck imputation, and rank
swapping to generate synthetic microdata for release.
2.1 Quantile regression
Quantile regression has been developed extensively by Roger Koenker and others since
1978 (Koenker and Bassett 1978a, 1978b). Quantile regression research by these authors was
inspired by problems in economics, where using the mean to describe and model complex re-
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lationships in economics data can be insufficient. Using models for several quantiles can often
improve the understanding of such data (Koenker, Fitzenberger, and Machado 2001; Koenker
2000). Research has addressed aspects of estimating and implementing quantile regression
and the theory behind it in several frameworks. These include linear (Koenker and Hallock
2001; Koenker and Basset 1982) and nonlinear models (Koenker and Park 1996), smoothing
splines (Koenker, Ng, and Portnoy 1994; Koenker and Hendricks 1992), structural equation
models (Koenker and Ma 2006), survival analysis (Koenker and Geling 19), and time series
models (Koenker and Xiao 2006, 2004; Koenker 2004, 1986; Koenker and Zhao 1996). In
several papers and a recent book (Koenker 2005), the authors describe fundamentals and es-
timation of quantile regression models including inference (Koenker and Xiao 2002; Koenker
and Machado 1999), asymptotics (Koenker, Jureckova, Portnoy, and He 1990; Koenker and
Bassett 1978), weighted regression and L-Statistics (Koenker and Zhao 1994; Koenker and
Portnoy 1989, 1987; Koenker and Bassett 1987, 1982), computation (Koenker 1997; Koenker
and D’Orey 1987), and nonparametric approaches. A Vignette with instructions and exam-
ples for using the quantreg package in R software (Koenker 2005) is also available. Additional
contributions to the quantile regression literature, both in collaboration with Koenker and
independently, cover topics that include constructing confidence sets for parameters of linear
models (Zhou and Portnoy 1996), estimating covariance (Buchinsky 1998), generating pre-
diction intervals (Taylor and Bunn 1999), and modeling counts (Machado and Santos Silva
2003).
The work in this dissertation uses developments presented in the above papers and sum-
marized in Koenker (2005). In the following two sections, we present details from Koenker
(2005) to describe fundamentals of quantile regression including estimation and prediction
in Section 2.1.1 and inference in 2.1.2. Technical details that are cited are from this book
unless otherwise specified. In Section 2.1.3, we propose using quantile regression predictions
as a novel method of simulation that can be used to generate synthetic microdata.
2.1.1 Fundamentals of estimation and prediction
Koenker (2005) defines the τ th quantile of Y as F−1Y (τ) = inf{y : FY (y) ≥ τ}, τ ∈ (0, 1),
for random variable Y with right-continuous distribution function FY (y) = P (Y ≤ y).
Koenker and Hallock (2001) provide an alternative definition for sample quantiles from com-
mon definitions based on ordering observations. Quantile regression is a method used to
fit a curve or surface to a quantile of a response variable at combinations of independent
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variables. Similar to least squares regression, in which a curve or surface is fit to the mean
of a response variable by minimizing the sum of squared errors, quantile regression fits a
curve or surface to a particular quantile of the response variable. In quantile regression,
however, the sum of weighted absolute errors, rather than squared errors, is minimized.
Weighted absolute errors are defined in terms of a tilted absolute value function, denoted
ρτ (u) = u(τ − I[u<0]). Consider residual u, where u = yi − yˆi, then the tilted absolute value
function can be thought of as an asymmetrically weighted absolute value for each residual
u. Following the notation in Koenker (2005), we write the τ th quantile as ξτ , estimated by
ξˆτ , the solution to minξ∈<
∑
ρτ (yi − ξ).
The above estimation procedure is extended to estimate the τ th conditional quantile func-
tion, i.e., to estimate the parameters in a quantile regression model. Suppose the τ th quantile
can be expressed as a function of covariates X and parameters βτ by ξ(xi, βτ ) = Xβτ , where
parameters are dependent on the quantile. Then regression parameters, and hence the con-
ditional quantile function, can be estimated by solving minβτ
∑
ρτ (yi − ξ(xi, β)) to obtain
βˆτ , and hence ξˆ(X, βτ ).
Technical details of solving the minimization problem minβ∈<p
∑
ρτ (yi−ξ(xi, β)) involve
reformulating the sum of weighted absolute errors into a linear programming problem. Arti-
ficial variables are introduced to represent positive and negative parts of the residuals, {u, v},
respectively. The problem becomes one of solving min{τ1Tnu+ (1− τ)1Tnv|1nξ+u− v = y},
where 1n is a vector of ones. The process of converting the quantile regression estimation into
a linear programming problem has been automated in the contributed R package quantreg,
authored by Koenker and described in detail in the Vignette (Koenker 2005). The author de-
scribes four automated algorithms that can be used to solve this minimization and produce
quantile regression estimates. They are a modified version of the Barrodale and Roberts
simplex algorithm for l1-regression, the Frisch-Newton algorithm, the Frisch-Newton algo-
rithm with a preprocessing step, and the Fitzenberger implementation of Powell’s censored
quantile regression estimator. A user can also specificy linear inequality constraints on the
fitted coefficients. Details on implementation can be found in the Vignette, Koenker (2002,
2005), and Koenker and Hallock (2001).
With knowledge of the fundamental estimation procedures in hand, we now describe
its typical use. Suppose a data set contains records with observed values on variables X
and Y. Consider modeling the τ th quantile of Y given values of X using the expression
Yτ = ξ(X, βτ ) + τ . Here, ξ(X, βτ ) = Xβτ is a linear function of X, parameters βτ , and τ ,
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independent random errors. Using the methods described above, we can obtain parameter
estimates, βˆτ , for some quantile τ ∈ (0, 1). Further, using βˆτ and X values, predicted values
of Yτ , yˆτ , can be computed where yˆτ = Xβˆτ . If one had several responses y at each value x,
then one could evaluate the predictions of quantiles. For example, suppose that X takes on
many values, but at value x0 there are 1, 000 response values y. If one is interested in, for
example, the 90th quantile, then the quantreg function can be used to estimate β0.90. The
prediction at x0 of the 90
th quantile is x0βˆ0.90. If the model is accurately estimating the 90
th
quantile conditional on X at this value of x, then there should be about 100 response values
y above the predicted value and 900 below.
Statistical inference for regression quantile estimation are presented in Section 2.1.2.
Inference can be performed for the estimated coefficients and for the predicted quantiles
themselves. In Section 2.1.3, we give details of our proposed disclosure limitation method
that incorporates quantile regression as a tool to create synthetic microdata.
2.1.2 Inference
A brief summary of results concerning statistical inference in quantile regression models
is presented here. Details and further results can be found in Koenker (2005). Only those
relevant to our application are presented in this section. If Y1, ..., Yn are identically and in-
dependently distributed random variables with cumulative distribution function F, assuming
F has continuous density f at ξτ and that f(ξτ ) > 0, then for some quantile ξτ = F
−1(τ),
the objective function of the τ th sample quantile is the sum of convex functions and is itself
convex. This implies that its gradient, gn is monotone increasing in ξ, i.e. ξˆτ > ξ if and
only if gn(ξ) < 0, and
P{√n(ξˆτ − ξτ )} = P{gn(ξτ + δ/
√
n)} = P{n−1∑(I[Yi<ξτ+δ/√n] − τ) < 0}.
As Koenker (2005) describes, this implies that the asymptotic behavior of ξˆτ can be re-
duced to a DeMoivre-Laplace central limit theorem problem, which leads to the following
convergence result: √
n(ξˆτ − ξτ )→˜N(0, ω2) as n→∞
where ω2 = τ(1− τ)/f 2(ξτ ). This result means that the estimated quantile in large samples
has a distribution that is approximately normal. The mean is the actual quantile. The
variance is related to a Bernoulli variance (τ(1− τ)) divided by the squared density of Y at
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the quantile, which is analagous to a sample size.
This result can be extended to the approximate asymptotic joint distribution of several
estimated quantiles. Setting ςn = (ξτ1 , ..., ξτm) with estimates ςˆn = (ξˆτ1 , ..., ξˆτm), then
√
n(ςˆ − ς)→˜N(0,Ω) as n→∞
where Ωm×m is a matrix with the elements
(ωij) =
τi ∧ τj − τiτj
f(F−1(τi))f(F−1(τj))
.
The expression τi ∧ τj is evaluated to equal τi when i ≤ j and τj when i > j (Serfling 1980).
In particular, we are interested in distributional properties of predictions based on models
of the form Yτ = Xβτ + τ . If the τ,i have common distribution function F with associated
density f , such that f(F−1(τi)) > 0 for i = 1, ...,m, and Qn = n−1
∑
xix
T
i converges to
Q0, a positive definite matrix, then the m p-variate quantile regression estimates ςˆn =
(βˆn(τ1), ..., βˆn(τm)) are asymptotically Normal,
√
n(ςˆn − ςn) = √n(βˆn(τj)− β(τj))mj=1 →˜N(0,Ω⊗Q−10 ).
Provided the assumptions above are reasonable, one can extend the convergence properties
of ςˆn to quantile regression predictions Yˆτ = Xβ(τ). When τ = (τ1, ...τm), m ≤ n, then
√
n(Xβˆτ −Xβτ )→˜N(0, XTΩ⊗Q−10 X) as n→∞.
Koenker (2002) explains that if the design matrix X is assumed to satisfy Conditions
D1 and D2, then Condition F is a necessary and sufficient condition for the consistency of
quantile estimates βˆ(τ). The conditions are restated here.
Condition F The τ th conditional quantile function of Y given X can be written as Xβ(τ)
and conditional distribution functions of Yi, Fni, satisfy
√
n(an() − τ) → ∞ and√
n(τ−bn())→∞, with an() = n−1∑Fni(xTi β(τ)−) and bn() = n−1∑Fni(xTi β(τ)+
).
Condition D1 ∃d > 0 such that lim inf inf||u||=1{n−1∑ I[|xTi u|<d]} = 0
Condition D2 ∃D > 0 such that lim sup sup||u||=1{n−1∑(xTi u)2} ≤ D
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Condition D1 is needed for identifiability. Condition D2 controls the rate of growth of
{xi}, which is satisfied under the condition that n−1∑xixTi converges to a positive definite
matrix. If these assumptions are too stringent, Conditions D1 and D2 can be relaxed, Con-
dition F can be strengthened, and consistency of βˆ(τ) will still hold. For details, see Koenker
(2002, 2005) and Zhao, Rao, and Chen (1993).
The Conditions D1, D2, and F generally hold for large n. We use these inference results
to develop a measure of disclosure risk in a synthetic data set created using quantile regres-
sion predictions. This is discussed in Chapter 3.
2.1.3 Quantile regression for synthetic data
Here we propose using quantile regression predictions to generate synthetic values for
statistical disclosure limitation. Suppose we wish to release data set with variables X and
Y for public use, but must protect confidentiality. To do so, we wish to generate a syn-
thetic data set for release with properties very similar to the original data. Suppose variable
X is non-sensitive and original values can be released without concern, but that variables
Y1, Y2, ..., Ys are sensitive and must be protected. We propose using quantile regression to
generate synthetic values for Y1, Y2, ..., Ys such that the joint distribution of Y1, Y2, ..., Ys|X
in the original data is preserved.
If we write the joint distribution of Y1, Y2, ..., Ys given X as Y1, Y2, ..., Ys|X, we can
rewrite it using a sequence of conditional distributions as follows:
Y1, Y2, ..., Ys|X = (Y1|X)(Y2|X, Y1) · · · (Ys|X, Y1, Y2, ..., Ys−1).
That is, given distributional assumptions about Y1, Y2, ..., Ys|X and values for X, we could
generate values for Y1 conditional on X, values for Y2 conditional on X and Y1, and so on. For
each variable Yi, we propose to use quantile regression to model the relationship between the
quantiles of variable Yi and variables X and Yj (j < i). Once the coefficients are estimated,
for each observation for variable Yi, we will generate a random quantile (a value between 0
and 1) and the predicted quantile value conditional on values of X and Yj (j < i).
The quantile regression predictions at several quantiles should be able to accurately rep-
resent the original data in the sense that the conditional distributions should be roughly
equivalent. The predictions also should be releasable without compromising confidentiality
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because, except for nonsensitive X variables, no actual values are being released.
The method involves fitting quantile regression models for each variable using conditional
models Y1|X, Y2|X, Y1,..., Ys|X, Y1, Y2, ..., Ys−1, and computing predicted values from the pa-
rameter estimates, values on X, and newly generated synthetic values on variables generated
ealier in the sequence. Specifically, we generate synthetic values for Y1|X first, denoted
Z1 = yˆ1,τ = Xβˆ1,τ . Then, using estimates βˆ2,τ , obtained from fitting Y2 = (X, Y1)
Tβ2,τ + τ ,
we generate synthetic values Z2 = yˆ2,τ = (X, Z1)
T βˆ2,τ , and so on. We fit the models for
each Yl based on values in the data so that our parameter estimates, βˆl,τ , represent the
relationships between Yl and predictors X, Y1, Y2, ..., Yl−1 that appear in the original data
accurately. The synthetic predictions are computed using the parameter estimates and the
sythetic values in order to preserve those relationships in the synthetic data.
A simplification could occur if not all variables are needed in later predictions. In gen-
eral, such simplifications correspond to assumptions of conditional independence between
variables. For example, if Y1 and Y3 are conditionally independent given X and Y2, then
Y3|X, Y2 is a sufficient model to predict Y3. Practically, we may make similar simplifications
when parameter estimation is too computationally intensive for large models. Note that
the sequential procedure is designed to be expedient. An alternative would be to build a
full model for the joint distribution of all variables and simultaneously generate a vector of
values. In most large data sets this will be prohibitively difficult. Future extensions could
examine intermediate options between the sequential procedure adopted here and something
closer to sampling from the full joint distribution.
Up to this point nothing has been said about which quantiles are used to compute syn-
thetic values. We can consider this from two perspectives: accuracy and disclosure control.
On one hand, our goal is to generate synthetic data that accurately represents the original
data. From this perspective, we might consider estimating the quantile of each observation
with respect to the other values on that variable or we could even consider modeling the
quantiles for each variable with respect to other variables in the data set. From the perspec-
tive of disclosure control, we are actually aiming to introduce randomness into the records
so that no one record will be identifiable. Here, we propose randomly selecting quantiles at
which to generate values. In this dissertation, we generate synthetic values at a randomly
selected quantile for each variable on each record. In future work, it would be interesting to
study other approaches to quantile selection, including those listed above.
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The proposal to generate random quantiles for imputation or prediction of variables Y1
through Ys does not mean that nonsensical records will be created. If Y1 was generated
based on a quantile regression involving X as a predictor and Y2 was generated based on
a quantile regression involving only X as well, and if Y1 and Y2 were not conditionally in-
dependent, then nonsensical relationships would reults. If Y1 and Y2 are highly correlated,
then a high quantile of Y1 should be associated with a high quantile on Y2 (for a given values
of X). Our method should achieve this same relationship. If the quantile for Y1 given X
is high, then the values of Y1 will be large relative to other cases with the same value of
X. Then given X and Y1, in general due to positive correlation a high value of Y2 should
be predicted. Within the population of untis with the given value of X and a relatively
high value of Y1, the value of Y2 should be able to vary within the range of the conditional
distribution. On average, the value of Y2 will be at the median of the conditional distribu-
tion given X and Y1. The main point is that our method should preserve correlations and
relationships as long as the proper conditioning is included in the quantile regression models.
To summarize, we propose generating synthetic values for each record using conditional
quantile regression models at a randomly selected quantile on each record for each vari-
able. We denote the original data on non-sensitive variables X and the original data on
sensitive variables Y. Values on variable X are released as they appear in the original data
set. Synthetic values Z are generated for each record on variables in Y. For each variable
Y1, ..., Ys in Y, we randomly select quantiles for each record and denote them as τ
∗
1 , ..., τ
∗
s ,
where τ ∗l = (τ
∗
l1, ..., τ
∗
ln), for variable l, l = 1, ..., s, indices for records 1 through n. Using
quantile regression models for each value in τ ∗l , we estimate parameters in the model(s)
Yl = (X Y1 · · · Yl−1)Tβ(τl) + τl . Using estimates from the fitted models, we compute pre-
dicted, synthetic values Zl, where Zl = yˆl,τ∗
l
= (yˆl1,τ∗
l1
· · · yˆln,τ∗
ln
).
2.2 Hot deck imputation
Imputation methods are typically implemented to deal with missing value problems.
Consider a data set that contains several records with information on a number of variables.
Some of the records are complete, with values recorded for every variable. Some records are
incomplete, with values recorded for some variables but missing for others. Imputation is a
method used to fill in the missing values of incomplete records based on all of the recorded
values in the data set. In Section 2.2.1, we discuss imputation in general, as applied to
missing value problems. In Section 2.2.2, we discuss hot deck imputation in particular. In
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Section 2.2.3, we describe the proposed use of hot deck imputation for statistical disclosure
limitation (SDL).
2.2.1 Imputation for missing value problems
Little and Rubin (2002) give an overview of missing data patterns and techniques used to
address their presence. Missing values might occur according to some mechanism or process
with respect to variables in the data set. Depending on what the mechanism is, appropriate
estimation and inference should be used. As we present our proposal to implement imputa-
tion for SDL in Section 2.2.2, it becomes clear that determining a missing data mechanism is
a topic we are not concerned with. Instead we will be concerned with appropriate analyses
on the synthetic data set and will address this in Sections 2.2.2 and later in Section 3.3 where
we discuss data utility.
Imputation procedures provide a means by which to fill in missing values in incomplete
records based on information from complete records. Little and Rubin (2002) introduce im-
puted values as “means or draws from a predictive distribution.” Computing means and/or
drawing values requires some knowledge and assumptions about the predictive distribution
of the missing values. The authors suggest explicit modeling and implicit modeling as two
approaches to generating values from a predictive distribution. Using explicit modeling,
a predictive distribution is based on a well-known and understood statistical distribution.
Under explicit modeling the missing data might be imputed via mean, regression, or stochas-
tic regression imputation. Using implicit modeling, values are generated from a predictive
distribution implied by some algorithm. Under implicit imutation, missing data might be
imputed via hot deck imputation, substitution, or cold deck imputation. In some situations,
a combination of implicit and explicit modeling might serve to impute in the best way.
To select an appropriate imputation procedure, we consider implementing the procedure,
the information in the original data, and the goal we wish to reach using imputation to fill
in missing values. If we choose to perform regression imputation, our imputed values would
be predicted values obtained from a fitted regression model. Using stochastic regression
imputation, we would again compute predicted values, but also add residuals to predic-
tions to obtain imputed values. Either of these methods would be reasonable and generate
sound imputations, provided the model used accurately reflects the true model the data are
generated from. Under implicit modeling, we fill in values according to some algorithm.
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Using hot deck imputation, values from complete records are imputed to fill in missing val-
ues on incomplete records. Substitution is a method that adds additional respondents to
the data set to substitute these complete records for the original incomplete records. Cold
deck imputation imputes a value from a reference table for each variable with missing values.
Consider our proposed synthetic data method, up to using quantile regression as de-
scribed in Section 2.1.3. We propose to keep values on some variables and to compute
predicted values for a set of sensitive variables. Our predicted values come from quantile
regression models. If we consider our original data as the set of complete records and our
synthetic data as our set of incomplete records, then we can fit the proposed method from
Section 2.1.3 into a missing data framework. Namely, we could describe quantile regression
predictions as regression imputations for the “missing” values on sensitive variables. After
this point, we might consider using an alternate imputation procedure to fill in “missing
values” on the remaining variables.
We chose to generate synthetic values for a set of sensitive variables using quantile re-
gression based on our belief that doing so would accurately reproduce the conditional joint
distribution of the sensitive and non-senitive variables. The quantile regression method is
computationally intensive, so we turn to hot deck imputation, a less demanding procedure to
generate values for remaining variables that will preserve the conditional joint distribution
of variables, though likely not as well as the quantile regression predictions. Our reasoning
and a detailed description are presented in Section 2.2.1. In Section 2.2.2, we describe the
proposed use of hot deck imputation for SDL.
2.2.2 Hot deck techniques
In this section, we consider various options for using hot deck imputation based on Little
and Rubin (2002). Recall the missing data problem described in the previous section: our
data set contains some complete records with values recorded for all variables, and some
incomplete records, with missing values for some variables and observed values on other
variables.
Hot deck imputation relies on matching records based on observed values on all records
in the following way. In Little and Rubin (2002), complete records are referred to as donors
and incomplete records are referred to as candidates. Each candidate is compared to all
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possible donors. The intention is to impute values from the donor that is the closest to the
candidate. There are several approaches to measure closeness between the donors and each
candidate. Closeness, or inversely, distance between records can be measured with respect
to values on either a single variable or several variables. In some highly restrictive situa-
tions we might consider imputing values to a candidate only from donors that exactly match
the candidate on some set of variable values. We could also loosen this constraint to allow
imputing values from donors that match the candidate within some range, or distance of
the candidate. We consider close matches as records with relatively small distances to the
candidate. In this sense, we would identify a donor as an exact match to the candidate if
the distance between them was zero. In situations where exact matching is not an option
or where it is desirable to have more than one options of donor record, we compute posi-
tive valued distances between the candidate and the donors. Measures of distance between
records and selecting the donor to impute from are described in the remainder of this section.
In order to compute the distance between donors and candidates, we require a distance
metric. To choose among several possible donors, we require a selection process. We discuss
possible distance measures and then a selection procedure based on the measures. In gen-
eral, we denote the distance between record i and record j as d(i, j). The closest matching
donor record to the candidate would have the smallest d(i, j) value. An exact match would
have d(i, j) = 0. There are several measures used in hot deck imputation to identify nearest
neighbors, i.e. to define d(i, j).
Three possibilities are given in Little and Rubin (2002) for nearest neighbor matching.
The options define distance based on either the predictive mean of y, yˆ(x), or directly on
values on the observed variables x. The variable y is assumed to be univariate, but the pre-
dictor variable x could be a vector. The predicted values are produced by a model with its
parameters estimated. Estimation of parameters is accomplished using the records that are
complete on variables y and x. Predictions can be made then for all records with x observed.
The three distance measures are as follows:
Predictive mean matching d(i, j) = [yˆ(xi)− yˆ(xj)]2
Maximum deviation d(i, j) = maxk|xik − xjk|
Mahalanobis distance d(i, j) =
√
(xi − xj)TS−1xx (xi − xj), Sxx = cov(X).
Predictive mean distance(and matching based on it) accommodates a vector of predictors
x that contains different types of variables, such as continuous and categorical. Predictor
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variables xk that do not predict y well or do not make much difference in predictions then
have little impact on matching, whereas variables that impact predictions a lot matter the
most. The x variables can be on very different scales as well; the magnitudes of coefficients
adjust based on how x relates to y. Maximum deviation distance makes the most sense to
use when the x variables are on similar scales and are quantitative. Mahalanobis distance
also makes the most sense with quantitative variables. The use of the covariance matrix
means that the x variables can be measured on different scales and can be correlated. Of
course, there are other distance measures that could be employed.
Of these metrics, we prefer Mahalanobis distance because of its generally desirable proper-
ties for measuring statistical distance and because it can accommodate one or more variables.
As opposed to predictive mean distance, one does not have to compute predictions. In our
application, we anticipate taking values on several variables from one donor. As a result,
we do not anticipate wanting to match on only one outcome variable y. In Section 2.2.3, we
describe our proposed use of hot deck imputation for statistical disclosure limitation.
Two further comments can be made concerning hot deck imputation. First, if several
potential donor records have the same distance to the candidate, as could occur with discrete
matching variables x, then one can randomly select a donor from the set of closest potential
donors. Second, if one has a mix of discrete and continuous matching variables, one could
require exact matching on the descrete variables and then compute a distance based on the
continuous variables. This allows exact matching on variables such as gender and state of
residence, but distance-based matching on variables such as age and income.
2.2.3 Hot deck imputation for synthetic data
Consider again our proposed synthetic data method, up to using quantile regression as
described in Section 2.1.3. As we discussed in Section 2.1, after implementing the quan-
tile regression procedure, our synthetic data set contains original values on the handful of
nonsensitive variables and synthetic values for variables that we have generated quantile
regression predictions for. Now, if we vertically merge the original data and the synthetic
data, the result is one data set with several complete records (original data) and several
incomplete records (synthetic set so far). The number of rows of the resulting data set is
twice the original. Once we c omplete the data in the synthetic rows, then we will discard
the orignal data in the top half of the data set. If we consider the remaining variables to
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have missing values in the synthetic, or incomplete records, then we can use the hot deck
procedures described in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 to impute values from the original, complete
records into the synthetic records.
In our synthetic data method, we compute the Mahalanobis distance between each syn-
thetic record and all original records, with respect to the original nonsensitive variables and
the variables for which quantile regression predictions were generated. For each synthetic
record j, we compute d(i, j) =
√
(xi − xj)TS−1xx (xi − xj), where Sxx = cov(X), for every
original record i.
For an application in which we retain original values on categorical nonsensitive vari-
ables, we require exact matching between the synthetic and original values and compute
Mahalanobis distance where the xi represent quantile regression predictions on synthetic
record i and xj represent values on original record j in the formula above. If the categorical
nonsensitive variables have many levels and exact matching on them provides a very small
number of records from which to impute, we might have concern that the record selected for
imputation will be too much like the original record and hence vulnerable to identification.
In this case, we can form broader categories by combining levels of the nonsensitive variables
and then use exact matching within the recategorized nonsensitive variables. This should
provide a larger number of records from which to impute, decreasing the vulnerability of
each record. Alternatively, if we retain values on continuous nonsensitive variables, we could
form intervals and do exact matching based on the interval that the nonsensitive values lie
in, and then compute the Mahalanobis distance between quantile regression predictions and
original values on records with nonsensitive values in the same interval.
With the distances calcluated for record j in the synthetic set, we can imagine imputing
values from record k in the original set if d(k, j) is the smallest compared to all other d(i, j),
i = 1, ..., n. If more than one record has distance equivalent to the smallest, some selec-
tion procedure is necessary to choose a record to impute from. Note that we do not actually
propose imputing all values from a single original record. Details are presented in Section 2.3.
Various selection procedures could be implemented. For synthetic records with several
equidistant original records, additional variables could be used to measure distance. Ran-
dom selection from among the equidistant originals could be employed. In our procedure, we
propose to select an original record randomly from among several closest records. This is a
different procedure than is usually used for missing values implementation. In missing value
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problems, having imiputations as close as possible to the original has advantages. Of course,
in a missing data situation, ultimately we want to produce valid statistical inferences for
population quantities of interest. In statistical disclosure limitation, the added randomness
from random selection from among close donors could provide added confidentiality protec-
tion.
To summarize, we compare original and synthetic records with respect to values on vari-
ables that we generated quantile regression predictions for. From among the closest m
original records, say, we randomly select record k. We refer to record k as the identified
match for synthetic record j. If we imputed values for all remaining variables from matching
record k, the result would be complete record j. However, since our interest is not only in
preserving the joint conditional distribution of sensitive variables, but also in protecting the
confidentiality of respondents, or records, including too many original values from a single
record could result in an increased disclosure risk. With several variables from a single record,
record linkage techniques could be used to link the information on these imputed variables
with outside information. An intruder might perform such linkage and declare identification
of a respondent. Even if synthetic values are not equal to the “identified” respondent’s values
on these variables, the values on the imputed would be [nearly] equal to the respondent’s
and an announced “identification” could be just as harmful to both the respondent and the
agency. As we discuss in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, an ultimate goal of any proposed
statistical diclosure limitation approach is to dissuade any identification, whether true or
false.
Our approach to minimize the likelihood of identifying a respondent is to perform rank
swapping on the original record identified as the hot deck match. Rank swapping is discussed
in detail in Section 2.3. Once all values are imputed for the synthetic data set, we discard
the original data and are left with a synthetic data set containing n records.
2.3 Rank swapping
2.3.1 Rank swapping for disclosure limitation
Rank swapping and swapping in general are methods attributed to Dalenius and Reiss
(1978, 1982). They proposed swapping as a technique to be applied to original data records
for disclosure limitation purposes. Suppose a data set has information on sex of respondent,
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race, county, and income. In some counties, there might be few individuals with a certain
sex.race combination. Releasing a data set with all four variables unaltered could essentially
announce the income of certain individuals. Swapping sex of some respondents could pro-
vide some protection by putting some doubt as to the authenticity of a sexrace combination.
Generally, a certain percent of the data set is randomly selected and values on a variable
are randomly swapped or excchanged between units. The percent is often not too large,
because a large percentage swap would distort the data set too much for inferential pur-
poses. On the other hand, a percentage that is too small will not provide much protection.
Swapping values on records could also be cone for pairs of variables, such as sex and race
simultaneously. Doing so would provide even more protection for individuals with rather
uniqe sex-race values in some counties.
Rank swapping is mostly useful for quantitative variables. For a variable like income,
if two incomes are swapped, then a very large income could be replaced with a very low
income, and the inferential usefulness of the data set could be comopromised. Also, the
apparent inconsistency between a small swapped income and having considerable financial
assets or living in a wealthy area could undo much of the disclosure protection. Instead,
swapping income with individuals whose income is of a similar rank to the original could
provide some disclosure protection without creating so much distortion. Rank swapping then
is the process of randomly swapping values between units with values of similar rank.
The authors consider frequency tables formed using a data base with individual records
on categorical variables, and aim to swap values between records while preserving t-order
statistics from tables formed using the original data, where t is the number of variables
used to compute marginal frequencies. Theorems and proofs are presented to argue that
swapping algorithms that preserve t-order statistics produce data for release that are pro-
tected under various assumptions about the expected number of swaps and the size of the
database. Schlo¨rer (1981) defines Dalenius and Reiss (1978) rank swapping as a multidi-
mensional transformation applied to the original database. Schlo¨rer formulates structural
requirements that permit such transformations. Reiss (1984) expands on original swapping
ideas to consider approximate data swapping, a method used to produce swapped data that
approximately preserves t-order statistics, allowing for less stringent swapping algorithms.
He provides algorithms to perform approximate data swapping and shows that this method
protects data to a specified degree of confidentiality through a simulation study.
In a Census Bureau Report, Moore (1996) extends initial results in Dalenius and Reiss
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(1978) to propose rank-based proximity swapping as an approach to disclosure limitation.
Rank swapping here is designed to satisfy one of the following two constraints:
1. maintain the correlation between two variables, one of which is swapped, to be within
some factor of the original correlation; and
2. maintain each value in a swapped record to be within some specified distance of its
original value.
The author also presents formulas used to compute swapping parameters and to assess com-
putation time, supported by theoretical justification and results from an application to the
1993 Annual Housing Survey (AHS) Public Use File. Data swapping was actually used at the
Census Bureau in the 2000 Census to swap records before creating tables for release. Details
on this can be found in Zayatz (2005, 2007). Working Paper 22 (2005) emphasizes that the
purpose of implementing swapping is to introduce uncertainty so that users or intruders do
not know whether the values in each released record correspond to a particular target with
certainty.
In Confidentiality, Disclosure, and Data Access: Theory and Practical Applications for
Statistical Agencies (2001), Domingo-Ferrer and Torra compare disclosure limitation tech-
niques and find that rank swapping performs quite well in comparison to several other
methods, when the best swapping parameter is chosen. Working Paper 22 (1994, 2005) also
includes swapping and rank swapping as statistical disclosure limitation techniques used by
agencies. In the revised (2005) edition, the authors add that swapping can produce data sets
in which some statistics can be preserved by placing restrictions on swapping parameters.
The report also discusses a web based software package available through NISS, through
which a user can upload their data file which gets swapped through distributed computing
as part of the NISS Web Services, and then download a swapped file. Additional details can
be found in Sanil, et al. (2003) and on the NISS website. Along the same lines of restricted
swapping, Takemura (2002) describes local recoding and record swapping within pairs of
records deemed close. Closeness is evaluated by computing distance between records as a
function of weighted absolute differences. The author also suggests that swapping within
categories, rather than pairs, could improve disclosure limitation but notes limitations due
to optimization associated with minimizing the absolute differences.
A collection of proceedings from the Computational Aspects of Statistical Confidential-
ity (CASC) 2004 conference are published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
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in a volume entitled Privacy in Statistical Databases. In one article, Feinberg and McIn-
tyre review Dalenius and Reiss’ paper introducing swapping and extensions by Dalenius and
Reiss, as well as other variations in the literature. A second edition of Privacy in Statistical
Databases in LNCS was published in 2006. It contains proceedings from the Center of Excel-
lence in Statistical Disclosure Control (CENEX-SDC) conference. In this edition, Trottini,
et al. (2006) present microaggregated swapping, a procedure used to swap values on sensi-
tive variables. Microaggregated swapping permutates the original data and corresponding
sampling weights to produce releaseable data. They apply this method to the Household
Expenditure Survey, collected by the Italian National Statistical Institute. Authors Muralid-
har, et al. (2006) present swapping based on proximity of the ranks of confidential variables.
Using their procedure, each value with rank i on a confidential variable is swapped with the
value in another record, with rank j, where i and j are within some predetermind value, or
swapping distance. The authors also present data shuﬄing as an alternative to swapping,
where instead of swapping values of ranks i and j for release, values are shuﬄed, so that the
value with rank i is substituted for the value with rank j whose value is substituted for the
value with rank k and so on.
In a recent paper by Nin, Herranz, and Torra (2008), the authors argue that standard
rank swapping procedures used for disclosure limitation actually produce data sets that are
subject to greater disclosure risk than previously believed. They develop a record linkage
procedure specifically designed to link records that have been swapped, resulting in more
accurate matching on rank-swapped data than standard linkage procedures had previously
produced. In response to this, they develop two updated rank-swapping procedures that are
more immune to both standard record linkage methodology and their methodology specifi-
cally designed to identify records that had been swapped.
In this literature, swapping is implemented as a primary disclosure limitation method.
In our proposed method, described in detail in Section 2.3, rank swapping supplements hot
deck imputation to generate values for the synthetic data set. Future research could address
other possible swapping techniques and compare our proposed methods to alternatives in
terms of disclosure risk and data utility.
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2.3.2 Rank swapping for synthetic data
Consider our proposed procedure up to this point using quantile regression and hot deck
imputation. At the end of Section 2.2.3, we noted that imputing values on all variables
remaining after producing quantile regression prediction could have the undesirable effect of
increasing the likelihood of a record being linked with some outside information. In order to
introduce randomness into the synthetic data on the variables for which we impute values,
we propose implementing a rank swapping procedure.
Suppose for a single synthetic record, we have identified the original record to impute
values from using the hot deck procedure. Instead of imputing values on all remaining vari-
ables from the single identified record, we compute the rank r of each variable with respect
to values in the original data set. We swap rank r with randomly selected rank r∗ and
impute the value corresponding to rank r∗ in the original records. The rank r∗ is selected
independently for each remaining variable.
We use a proximity swap so that imputed and predicted values have similar joint distri-
butions as the original data. We could specify the proximity in several ways, by fixing the
distance from the original rank, limiting swapping between pairs or larger groups, limiting
swapping within categories, or drawing the swapped rank from within some interval. We
limit swapping to occur within categories defined by the non-sensitive variable values and,
for the sake of introducing another level of randomness to our synthetic data, we randomly
select the swapped rank from an interval centered at the original rank with equal probability,
i.e. r∗ ∼ Uniform(r − δ, r + δ). Other distributions and various values for δ can be used,
depending the desired proximity of the swapped rank. Future work might investigate the
effects that different swapping methods and parameters, such as distribution and proximity
from which ranks are drawn, have on the data utility and disclosure risk of the resulting
synthetic data set.
2.4 Proposed synthetic data method: a combination of
techniques
In Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, techniques for creating synthetic data using quantile regres-
sion predictions, hotdeck imputation, and rank swapping were presented. In this section,
we combine methods to present the entire proposed synthetic data method. The details
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for each portion or step of the proposed procedure are presented in the preceding sections.
Here we tie them together to describe a clear picture of our proposed method. The notation
used below parallels Reiter (2005) used to formulate disclosure risk measures. Details on
disclosusre risk are presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
Suppose we denote our original data set as Y, which contains variables Y0, Y1, ..., Ys, X.
Variables in X are non-sensitive and their original values are released. Variables Y0 are
unique identifiers and are never released in any form. Variables Y1, ..., Ys are sensitive. We
wish to create a synthetic data set Z for release including values for variables Z1, ..., Zs, and
X on every record. Variable Zi is the synthetic (artificially generated or imputed) version of
variable Yi. Suppose we generate values for variables Z1, ..., Zf using the quantile regression
procedure and values for Zf+1, ..., Zs using hot deck imputation with rank swapping. We
describe the details below.
In Figure 2.1, we present an illustration of the original and synthetic data sets. In this
illustration, variables containing information are shaded, and variables for which we will
generate values as clear, or white. Figure 1 shows the first step in our procedure, where we
essentially copy original values on non-sensitive variables X into the synthetic data set using
no disclosure limitation procedure (no SDL). Up to this point, the synthetic set contains
only values for X. In the next step, we generate values for Z1, ..., Zf using quantile regression
predictions (QR).
To generate values for Z1, ..., Zf , we use the sequential conditional models discussed in
Section 2.1.3. We begin by generating values for Z1. We use X and Y1 from the original data
to fit quantile regression models Y1,τ1 = Xβ1,τ1 + τ1 for randomly selected quantiles τ
∗
1 for
each record. Using estimates βˆ1,τ∗1 , we compute synthetic values Z1 = yˆ1,τ∗1 = Xβˆ1,τ∗1 . Simi-
larly, we generate values for Z2, using X, Y1, and Y2 from the original data set to fit quantile
regression models Y2,τ2 = (X, Y1,τ1)
Tβ2,τ2 + τ2 using randomly selected quantiles τ
∗
2 for each
record. Using estimates βˆ2,τ∗2 , we compute synthetic values Z2 = yˆ2,τ∗2 = (X, Z1)
T βˆ1,τ∗1 . We
repeat this to obtain synthetic values on all records for Z1, ..., Zf . The illustration in Figure 2
shows the synthetic data set up to this point. Values have been generated using quantile
regression predictions and appear in the synthetic set (shaded). Variables Zf+1, ..., Zs are
still empty, or missing.
Finally, we generate values for Zf+1, ..., Zs using hot deck imputation and rank swap-
ping. Within categories defined by values of variables in X, we compare synthetic values
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Figure 2.1 An illustration of the original data set and STEP ONE of the
creation of the synthetic data set. The original data set contains
variables X and Y. In step one, the nonsensitive variables X are
copied directly into the synthetic data set.
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Figure 2.2 An illustration of the original data set and STEP TWO of the
creation of the synthetic data set. The original data set contains
variables X and Y. In step two, the sensitive variables Y1, ..., Yf
are replaced in the synthetic data set using quantile regression
predictions by variables Z1, ..., Zf .
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Figure 2.3 An illustration of the original data set and STEP THREE of
the creation of the synthetic data set. The original data set
contains variables X and Y. In step three, the sensitive variables
Yf+1, ..., Ys are replaced in the synthetic data set using hot deck
imputation and rank swapping by variables Zf+1, ..., Zs.
Z1, ..., Zf with original values Y1, ..., Yf using Mahalanobis distance. Suppose for record j
in the synthetic set, we determine record k in the original set has the smallest distance to
synthetic record j, i.e. d(k, j) ≤ d(i, j), i = 1, ..., n. Then for the closest original record
k, we compute the sample ranks of each value yf+1, ..., ys to be rf+1, ..., rs, respectively.
To perform rank swapping, we randomly draw ranks r∗f+1, ..., r
∗
s from Uniform(rf+1 −
δf+1, rf+1 + δf+1), ..., Uniform(rs − δs, rs + δs), respectively, and impute values with ranks
r∗f+1, ..., r
∗
s . In this way, we fill in the remaining variables in the synthetic set, as illustrated
in Figure 3.
In Chapter 3, we study the disclosure risk and data utility of the resulting synthetic data
set. In Chapter 4, we present results from three applications.
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CHAPTER 3. DISCLOSURE RISK AND DATA UTILITY
Statistical agencies go to great lengths to collect high quality data that are representative
of the populations they aim to study. The agencies want to release the data to users for anal-
ysis and study. If the data contain identifying variables, such as Social Security number or
name and address, then obviously the data set cannot be released without allowing someone
to identify the individuals in the data set. In order to release data without violating pledges
of confidentiality to respondents, agencies restrict variables that are released and implement
statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) methods such as those described in Chapter 2. But
which SDL methods should be used? The agencies need to ensure confidentiality protec-
tion. They also need to release data that are of value to researchers. Therefore, quantitative
measures of disclosure risk and the usefulness of data for inferential purposes are needed. A
few authors have proposed measures of the risk of disclosure or violation of confidentiality
agreements. These are reviewed in detail in Section 3.1. The extension of these methods to
the proposed method of disclosure limitation are explicated in Section 3.2. Three types of
intruders, or individuals seeking to identify respondents, are considered. The utility concep-
tually is the degree to which the data enable a researcher to answer questions. Suggestions
for quantifying data utility are presented in Section 3.3.
In general, there is a trade off between reducing disclosure risk and increasing data utility.
At one extreme, releasing no data has zero risk (except for someone physically stealing the
data), but no usefulness at all. At the other extreme, releasing all collected data, including
personal identifying information (or at least everything but explicit personal identifiers),
should be the most useful for researchers, but has the highest potential for harm to respon-
dents. Most traditional methods can be compared in terms of the degree to which disclosure
protection and data utility are achieved. Researchers at the National Institute of Statistical
Sciences and collaborators have called this the R-U Confidentiality Map, where R is a mea-
sure of disclosure risk and U is a measure of data utility. Measures R and U are measured
for potential data sets, those with the lowest risk and highest utility are candidates to be
released. The goal of the research work in this dissertation is to provide a method using
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synthetic data generation that greatly reduces the disclosure risk but maintains a reasonably
high level of data utility.
3.1 Disclosure risk
In order to judge the relative merits of disclosure limitation methods, we need to assess
both the risk of disclosing confidential information and the data utility, or the inferential
worthiness, of the released data set. Released data sets that carry too much disclosure risk or
too little data utility should be avoided. A review of the literature on measures of disclosure
risk and data ultility is presented in this section. Details about the framework developed in
Duncan and Lambert (1986, 1989) and Reiter (2005) are presented here. We use and extend
existing risk measures to measure disclosure risk for a synthetic data set resulting from our
proposed procedure. This is presented in Section 3.2.
3.1.1 Introduction and background
Recall the scenario that was described previously about releasing data on the sex, race,
county of residence, and income of survey respondents. In some counties, for some sex and
race combinations, there could be very few individuals with extreme income. Based on a
release of actual respondent information, someone interested in extorting money or pursuing
economic relations with a wealthy person in the survey could perhaps identify the income or
other financial details about a respondent that the respondent would not want made public.
In Duncan and Lambert (1986), the authors present assumptions under which they de-
velop a framework for measuring the disclosure risk of a released data set based on as-
sumptions about an intruders behavior. The assumptions are that an intruder can combine
information in the released data set with information from external sources to gain informa-
tion about a target. The target can be any respondent to the survey that has data released.
They note that almost any data release can provide new information about a target, im-
plying that total avoidance of disclosure is impossible, but that it is possible to control the
disclosure to be below an acceptable level. Under these general assumptions, the authors
describe a method to quantify the extent of disclosure risk using predictive distributions to
model the information an intruder has both before and after data are released. They mea-
sure the extent of disclosure risk by comparing characteristics of the predictive distributions
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before and after data release.
Duncan and Lambert (1986) propose an indirect probabilistic matching approach to com-
pute the probability of identification, with applications for a target with categorical data or
information released in tabular format. Direct probabilistic matching involves linking re-
leased records to records in external sources. It necessitates collecting those sources as well
as performing the linking procedures and analyzing resulting links. Indirect probabilistic
matching, on the other hand, uses the original and released data to compute probabilities
of identifying a target in the released data. It does not require external data sources and
is flexible to incorporate varying assumptions about the intruder’s knowledge, relationships
among variables, and disclosure limitation techniques used (Duncan and Lambert 1986, 1989,
Reiter 2005). In Duncan and Lambert (1989), the authors focus on matching for continuous
data and also expand the decision theoretic framework in applications allowing the flexibility
to include an intruder’s possible objectives, strategy for compromising the data base, and
information gained by the intruder. They distinguish between identity (who the respondent
is) and attribute (knowing details about the repondent) disclosure in examples of computing
the probability of an intruder linking a record with the target.
Reiter (2005) presents details of working within the Duncan and Lambert framework to
measure disclosure risk based specifically on the following scenario. An agency collects data,
alters that data using some disclosure limitation method, and releases the altered data for
public use. Further, once the data are released, an intruder will attempt to link records in
the released data set using information from external sources in order to identify a target
respondent. The target represents a respondent (an individual or establishment) whose infor-
mation is possibly contained on one record in the agency’s data. The intruder will consider
probabilities of identification to link the target with a record in the released data set based
on both information s/he has from external sources and information in the released data
set. The record(s) with high enough probability will be considered a match with the target
and thus identify the target in the released data set, breaching the promise of confidentiality
made to respondents. Reiter (2005) also presents further details and implementation of the
Duncan and Lambert approach for data sets altered using traditional disclosure limitation
methods such as swapping, recoding and topcoding, noise addition, and combinations of
these methods.
We propose to use ideas and extensions thereof presented in Duncan and Lambert (1986,
1989) and Reiter (2005) to measure disclosure risk of a synthetic data set created using pre-
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dictions from a conditional model and imputed values. In 3.1.2, we present the framework
in Reiter (2005) from which we develop a disclosure risk measure for synthetic data. Section
3.1.3 defines notation. In Section 3.1.4, we present details on probabilistic methods used un-
der various schema of intruder knowledge and disclosure limitation techniques presented in
Duncan and Lambert (1986, 1989) and Reiter (2005). We develop extensions to existing risk
measures for synthetic data in Section 3.2. These extensions are applicable to our disclosure
limitation methodology.
3.1.2 Disclosure risk framework
We develop a measure of disclosure risk under the framework presented in Duncan and
Lambert (1986, 1989) and later extended in Reiter (2005). In this framework, we suppose an
intruder attempts to identify one or several respondents in the released data. The authors
refer to the targeted respondent as a target. Unless the intruder has complete and accurate
information and the released data are not perturbed sufficiently, the intruder cannot identify
the target directly. Instead, the intruder must determine the likelihood of each released
record to belong to the target and select the most likely record. Under the Duncan and
Lambert framework, this likelihood is measured by combining information the intruder has
from an external source prior to any data release with information gained after the data are
released using prior and posterior probability distributions.
Predictive probability distributions
Suppose the original data set contains variables Y1 and Y2. To compute disclosure risk
under the framework being presented here, we aim to compute Pr(Z2|Y1), the probabilitiy
of observing the released values Z2 (synthetic versions of values in Y2) given original values
released for variable Y1. We do so using Bayes’ rule; this is described here. In this context,
a prior predictive distribution describes the assumptions an intruder makes about values in
the original data set. Suppose that prior to any data being released, the intruder knows or
assumes that the association between Y2 and Y1 can be described well using the linear re-
gression model Y2 = β0 +β1Y1 + , where  are independently identically distributed random
variables from a Normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2 , and that accurate
estimates of the regression parameters are available. Then the prior predictive distribution
of Y2 given Y1 is Normal (β0 + β1Y1, σ
2
 ).
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Now suppose that original values of Y1 can be released freely to the public but only
masked or perturbed values of Y2 can be released. An SDL method will be used to perturb the
values of Y2 and obtain releasable values for variable Z2, say. If the intruder has information
about the SDL method used to obtain values for Z2, s/he can assume a posterior predictive
distribution of Z2 given Y2 and Y1 which can be used to compute the probability of observing
released values on Z2, given Y2 and Y1, or Pr(Z2|Y2, Y1). Recall, our goal is to compute
Pr(Z2|Y1). We can do so by using Bayes’ Rule to write Pr(Z2|Y2, Y1) as
Pr(Z2|Y2, Y1) = Pr(Z2, Y2|Y1)
Pr(Y2|Y1) ,
where Pr(Z2|Y2, Y1) is the posterior predictive distribution of Z2, based on the SDL method
used and Pr(Y2|Y1) is the prior predictive distribution of Y2. Solving the above for Pr(Z2, Y2|Y1)
and integrating out Y2, we obtain an expression for Pr(Z2|Y1) :
Pr(Z2|Y1) =
∫
Pr(Z2, Y2|Y1)dy2
=
∫
Pr(Z2|Y2, Y1)Pr(Y2|Y1)dy2.
The following example illustrates the use of predictive distributions described above. The
model is that Y2 is related to Y1 by a normal linear regression model:
Y2|Y1 ∼ N(β0 + β1Y1, σ2 ).
Assume that the value of 2 is perturbed by adding random noise: Z2 = Y2 + e, where
e ∼ N(0, γ2), say. Then Z2|Y2 ∼ N(Y2, γ2) and Z2|Y1 ∼ N(N(β0 + β1Y1, σ2 + γ2).
Duncan and Lambert framework
The theoretical framework in Duncan and Lambert (1986) for measuring the extent of
disclosure for released data is based on two principles:
1. The complete state of a user’s uncertainty about a target before and after data release
is specified by the user’s prior and posterior predictive distributions, respectively.
2. The user’s uncertainty about a target can be summarized by applying a nonnegative
concave function U(·) to the user’s predictive distribution for the target (DeGroot 1962,
1970). Functions U(·) are called uncertainty functions. The larger the value of U, the
more uncertainty.
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The nonnegative concave function U(·) typically will be a function of the predictive prob-
ability distribution and a loss function. The loss function is a loss function for the intruder
regarding the decisions that the intruder can make.
We assume that the intruder attempts to identify a respondent’s record in the released
data set. The authors propose the use of uncertainty functions to express characteristics
of predictive distributions before and after data are released. By requiring constraints on
posterior uncertainty functions, an agency can consider the relative merit of disclosure limi-
tation procedures. Uncertainty reflects the extent of disclosure and is measured with respect
to prior and posterior information or knowledge an intruder may possess. As Duncan and
Lambert discuss, we can consider posterior knowledge as the knowledge an intruder has based
on the released data set. Once the data have been released, the intruder can gain knowledge
from the released data, compared to what was known before. This gain is equated to the
difference between posterior information and prior information. The knowledge gained from
the released data set can also be considered relative to the prior knowledge held before data
were released. This is referred to as the relative knowledge gain. The amount of knowledge
the intruder has is inversely proportional to the intruder’s uncertainty. High uncertainty
reflects little knowledge and low uncertainty reflects more knowledge. Higher uncertainty
indicates a lower extent of disclosure.
Using these ideas about knowledge and uncertainty, disclosure measures based on un-
certainty functions are presented as belonging to one of the following classes: knowledge
U(posterior), knowledge gain U(prior)− U(posterior), or relative knowledge gain,
U(prior)−U(posterior)
U(prior)
. For particular prior and posterior predictive distributions, an agency can
set a threshold level not to be exceeded by relative information gain. Higher uncertainty
after data are released implies higher disclosure limitation, or lower disclosure risk. Methods
proposed to be used to protect data sets can be assessed and compared relative to their their
disclosure measures.
Duncan and Lambert (1986) suggest chosing an uncertainty function U(·) by considering
the information’s potential to compromise confidentiality. This is done under a decision-
theoretic framework in which the intruder’s decision problem is to “identify the target.”
The target wishes to identify the released record i in Z that contains the same identify-
ing information as the target, t0, such that z0i = t0. Recall, however, that information on
identifying variables t0 and Y0 or Z0 is never released, so the intruder must use available
information to make this identification, or link. An intruder can decide to link record i in
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the released data set with the target, or decide to not link any record i with the target (null
link). If the intruder decides to link the wrong record with the target or if s/he decides to
not link any record with the target when the target’s record in in fact released, then the
wrong decision is made, and the intruder is said to incur a loss. Loss is a function of the
decision and the truth, L(·), where the wrong decision corresponds with a positive value of
loss. The decision can be thought of as the value of the link, taking values zi0, i = 1, ..., n
when the intruder decides to link record i with the target and φ for the null link.
Duncan and Lambert (1989) use the loss function
= 0 if link = z0i and z0i = t0
L(link, truth) = l1 if link = φ and t0 ∈ Z0
= l2 if link = z0i and z0i 6= t0.
Zero loss is incurred when a correct link is made. A loss of l1 is incurred when no link is
made, but the target record is released in the data set Z. A loss of l2 is incurred when an
incorrect link is made. Since the goal of the intruder is to identify the target, or make a
correct decision or link, s/he also wishes to minimize the loss. If the truth were known to
the intruder, the best decision, or optimal link could be chosen to minimize loss. Since the
intruder does not know the truth, however, s/he can consider minimizing the expected loss
over all possible decisions or link values.
Suppose an intruder attempts to identify target t in released data set Z. Suppose Z
contains only variable Z1, then an identification, or link can occur for any value z1 that the
intruder believes to be the released value of the target’s variable t1. If the intruder has some
information on the SDL procedure used to produce Z from Y, and some prior information
about the distribution of values on Y, then a posterior predictive distribution p(·) can be
formulated for the values on Z1, call it py(z1) = p(z1|y). Presumably, the target’s value on
t1 has this same distribution. Then the expected loss is the expected value of L(z1, d) under
p(z1|y), or ∑L(z1, d)py(z1) when Z1 is discrete. To minimize the expected loss, then, eval-
uate infd
∑L(z1, d)py(z1), where d are the possible decisions or links (link ∈ {z0i, φ} in the
example above).
The optimal decision is the value of d that minimizes the expected loss. From the in-
truder’s point of view, the smaller , infd
∑L(z1, d)py(z1) is, the more certain s/he can be that
the record containing value z1 belongs to the target. From the agency’s perspective, a less
certain intruder leads to fewer links, so the agency would actually like infd
∑L(z1, d)py(z1),
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or uncertainty, to be large. Duncan and Lambert (1986, 1989) equate this expression with
the uncertainty function, U(p) = infd
∑L(z1, d)py(z1). The agency’s goal to dissuade an
intruder that links can be acheived by maximizing uncertainty, which can be done by con-
trolling the predictive distribution py(z1) through the SDL procedure. Fewer links can be
associated with higher uncertainty which is associated with lower disclosure risk.
In Reiter (2005), the author provides details on measuring disclosure risk under the Dun-
cand and Lambert framework for released data generated using recoding, swapping, and
random noise addition. Notation is presented in Section 3.1.3 and details of disclosure risk
measurement are presented in Section 3.1.4.
3.1.3 Notation
We use the notation presented in Reiter (2005) for data generated using traditional meth-
ods of SDL and extend it to formulate disclosure risk for data generated using the proposed
synthetic data method. Suppose an agency collects data on n respondents. Each record in
the original data set is associated with one respondent, containing values on several vari-
ables. The original data set is referred to as Y, with variables Y0, Y1, ..., Yd. The agency uses
one to several disclosure limitation methods to perturb data on one or more variables. The
perturbed data are released in Z. Data set Z contains r ≤ n records with values on variables
Z1, ..., Zd. The variables Y0 correspond to unique identifiers and are never released in any
form.
We assume an intruder with access to the released data will attempt to link records in
Z using information available on a target t from external sources. The intruder is assumed
to compute the probability that record j in the released data set belongs to the target, con-
ditional on the information t that the intruder has on the target and information contained
in Z. This probability is denoted Pr(J = j|t, Z). The larger the probability, the more likely
the intruder would declare record j to identify the target. This notation is summarized in
Table 3.1 for easy reference in further reading.
The original data set contains records j = 1, 2, ..., n, with data on several variables,
k = 0, 1, ..., d. The agency may release n records or a sample of r records, r ≤ n. The
agency may release d variables or a subset of the variables. Directly identifying information,
recorded on variables in k = 0, is never released. These variables could include name, social
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Table 3.1 Notation for use in disclosure risk formulation.
Notation Description
Y original data set
Z released data set
t target’s original data
Pr(J = j|t, Z) conditional probability that record j belongs to target t
security number, exact address, etc. Remaining variables, k = 1, ..., d, are separated into
available and unavailable sets, denoted A and U , respectively. The sets describe the nature of
the data with respect to a potential intruder. Specifically, variables in A contain information
available from outside sources. Variables in U contain information that is unavailable to an
intruder except from the released data. Available variables are further divided into variables
that are perturbed Ap (available perturbed) and variables that do not get perturbed Ad
(available not perturbed) before being released by the agency. This division could also be
done for the variables in U . Further, variables in the released data set that the intruder
cannot match with 100% certainty belong to the set C, where C = (Ap, U). All variables in
C have been perturbed and/or are not known to the intruder before data are released from
the agency.
To clarify and for easy reference in further reading, expanded notation is presented in Ta-
ble 3.2.
Data on each record j in the original data set Y is denoted yj, with entries yjk on vari-
ables k = 0, 1, ..., d. The notation yAj is used to denote original data on available variables
and yApj to denote data on available perturbed variables in the j
th record. Similar notation
is used for Ad, U , and C, for data on records in the released data set Z, and in the target’s
data t. Some variables have equal values by definition. For example, tA = yA for all records,
since information on the target is assumed to include original data on available variables.
Also, tAd = yAd = zAd for all records since variables in the set Ad do not get perturbed.
However, even though tAp = yAp, tAp = yAp does not necessarily equal zAp since variables in
the set Ap are perturbed from their original values. In the next section we use this notation
to clearly describe the probabilistic framework presented and implemented by Duncan and
Lambert (1986, 1989) and Reiter (2005).
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Table 3.2 Extended notation for use in disclosure risk formulation.
Notation Description
Y original data set
yjk original data on record j, variable k
Z released data set
zjk released data on record j, variable k
t target’s original data
j record, j = 1, ..., n
n number of original records
r number of released records, r ≤ n
k variable, k = 0, 1, ...d
k = 0 directly identifying information, never released
A available variables
U unavailable variables
Ap available perturbed variables
Ad available not perturbed variables
C variables intruder cannot know with 100% certainty, C = (Ap, U)
3.1.4 Probabilistic risk measures
Using the notation and framework described in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, we procede to
discuss the methods proposed in Reiter (2005), based on the framework presented in Dun-
can and Lambert (1986, 1989). Recall, the agency has collected data set Y , performed some
masking or perturbation to protect respondents’ confidentiality, and released data set Z.
The intruder is assumed to have some information on a target (this can be one or several
respondents) available from external sources; this information is contained in t. The intruder
seeks to identify the record in Z that belongs to the target. The authors seek to quantify
the amount of information an intruder has both before data are released and after data are
released in order to compute the probability that the intruder will correctly identify a target
in the released data set.
Suppose an intruder has information on target t, and attempts to match record j in Z
when the unique identifying information (never released) in t and record j is equal, or when
t0 = zj0. The intruder simultaneously attempts to not match target t with record j when
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the unique identifying information is not equal, or when t0 6= zj0. It is assumed that the
intruder will compute the probability that record j belongs to the target given the available
information on the target, t, and information in the released data set, Z. It is also assumed
that t and Z contain some of the same variables, otherwise matching would be a moot point.
Using information in t and the released data set Z, the intruder might compute the condi-
tional probability Pr(J = j|t, Z), where J is a random variable taking value j when t0 = zj0
and r + 1 when the target record is in the collected data set Y but not in the released data
set Z. This could happen when the original data Y is sampled with sample size r strictly
less than the number of records in the original data set, n. When r < n, r+ 1 represents any
of the n− r records in Y not released in Z.
In order to compute Pr(J = j|t, Z), Reiter breaks the probability into manageable parts
reflecting information an intruder might have. Such information includes the number of
records in the released data set with values on unperturbed variables the same as those values
in the target’s data, the disclosure limitation methods used to perturb data, prior beliefs
about the data on unavailable variables, and multivariate relationships among variables in
the data set. Using Bayes’ rule, Reiter (2005) expresses the probability of identification as
Pr(J = j|t, Z) = Pr(J = j|t, ZAd, ZC)
= Pr(J=j,Z
C |t,ZAd)
Pr(ZC |t,ZAd)
= Pr(Z
C |J=j,t,ZAd)Pr(J=j|t,ZAd)∑r+1
j=1
Pr(ZC |J=j,t,ZAd)Pr(J=j|t,ZAd) .
(3.1)
This follows directly from Bayes’ rule if we consider the partition of variables into unavailable,
available perturbed, and available unperturbed. Recall, Z = (ZU , ZA) = (ZU , ZAp, ZAd). So
that if we write Pr(J = j|t, Z) = Pr(J = j|t, ZU , ZAp, ZAd), and also note that ZC =
(ZU , ZAp), we can write
Pr(J = j|t, Z) = Pr(J = j|t, ZC , ZAd). (3.2)
Further, using Bayes’ rule, we write the conditional probability that J = j given ZC , t, and
ZAd as the joint probability of J = j and ZC given t, ZAd divided by the marginal probability
of ZC given t and ZAd :
Pr(J = j|t, ZC , ZAd) = Pr(J = j, Z
C |t, ZAd)
Pr(ZC |t, ZAd) . (3.3)
The numerator in Equation 3 can be decomposed into
Pr(J = j, ZC |t, ZAd) = Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd)Pr(J = j|t, ZAd). (3.4)
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The marginal distribution of ZC in the denominator of Equation 3.3 can be computed by
summing the joint distribution of ZC and J over values of J. Since J takes discrete values
1, ..., r + 1 the summation is appropriate here. The expression in Equation 3.4 can also be
plugged in for the summand in the denominator of Equation 3.3. Finally, combining terms,
we obtain the expression in Equation 3.1.
Computing Pr(J = j|t, Z) using Equation 3.1 becomes a matter of computing its parts
for each record j.
1. Component Pr(J = j|t, ZAd)
First, consider estimating Pr(J = j|t, ZAd). The variables in ZAd are released unperturbed,
i.e. ZAd = Y Ad. Thus, any record in Z with zAd = tAd could potentially be identified as
the target’s. If nt = # records in Z with z
Ad
j = t
Ad, then based only on this information,
assuming the intruder knows the target is released in Z, the intruder has a 1/nt chance of
correctly identifying target t in Z. In other words, the probability of identifying record j as
the target given the target’s information and values in ZAd is
Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) = 1
nt
. (3.5)
Note, the result in Equation 3.5 depends on the assumption that the intruder knows the tar-
get is released in Z, i.e. Pr(J = r + 1|t, ZAd) = 0. We assume throughout that the intruder
knows the target record is released in Z, that is, j ≤ r. This is conservative as well as com-
putationally convenient and we assume this throughout the remainder of our discussion on
disclosure risk measurement. Details for computing Pr(J = r + 1|t, ZAd) ≥ 0 are discussed
in Reiter (2005).
2. Component Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd)
The probability Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) is the probability of observing values on variables ZC
in the released data set given the jth record belongs to the target, the intruder’s information
on the target, and the values on the variables that are released unperturbed. Variables ZC
are variables that the intruder cannot know with certainty. If we assume the records in the
released data set are independent, we can write the joint probability of ZC as a product of
its marginal probabilities, or
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Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) = Pr(zC1 , ..., zCr |J = j, t, ZAd)
= Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |J = j, t, ZAd)Pr(zCj |J = j, t, ZAd).
(3.6)
Further, if we break ZC into (ZU , ZAp) for the jth record and write the joint probability as
a marginal times a conditional, then we have
Pr(zCj |J = j, t, ZAd) = Pr(zUj , zApj |J = j, t, ZAd)
= Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd)
(3.7)
This allows us to write
Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) = Pr(zC1 , ..., zCj−1, zCj+1, ..., zCr |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd),
(3.8)
as expressed in Reiter (2005).
We can incorporate various assumptions about an intruder’s knowledge into our compu-
tation of the probability of identification and hence into our computation of disclosure risk
(Reiter 2005). Each term in the right hand side of Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) in Equation 3.8 can
be formulated using different assumptions of intruder knowledge and behavior, the particular
record an intruder can target, and various assumptions about the variables in the original
and released data sets.
Recall that ZC includes ZAp–available perturbed, ZUp–unavailable perturbed, and ZUd–
unavailable unperturbed variables. We incorporate knowledge about the SDL method used
into Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd) and Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd), since these are probabilities of ob-
serving released values that have had some SDL method applied to them. We can also incor-
porate various assumptions about the univariate and multivariate distributions of variables.
Formulations presented in Reiter (2005) are presented here. In Section 3.2, formulations
based on the proposed SDL method to generate synthetic data using quantile regression
and hot deck with rank swapping are introduced, with details on computing probabilities
associated with each component.
2a. Component Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd)
Recall that ZAp contains available perturbed variables. Reiter (2005) suggests that if SDL
methods are applied to variables independently, then the joint conditional distribution of
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zApj given J = j, t, Z
Ad is the product of the marginal conditional distributions and the prob-
ability can be written as
Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd) =
∏
k
Pr(zApjk |J = j, t, ZAd). (3.9)
Many SDL methods do generate perturbed values independently from variable to variable.
This approach could be taken, for example, using noise addition, with randomly selected
errors added to observed values on different variables coming from different distributions. If
random swapping of some variable values was performed, this could also be done indepen-
dently on the variables. Disclosure limitation methods used in the work of Duncan, Lambert,
and Reiter include data swapping and adding Gaussian noise. The authors provide examples
of formulating expressions for Equation 3.9.
In our proposed SDL method, however, synthetic values based on quantile regression are
generated using the conditional sequential models described in Section 2.1.3. Supopse quan-
tile regression is used to generate values on variables Z1, Z2, and Z3 from estimates for the
models Y1|X, Y2|Y1, X, and Y3|Y2, Y1, X, respectively. Using estimated quantile regression
parameters, values of X are used to generate values for Z1. Values of X and Z1 are used to
generate values for Z2. Values of X,Z1, and Z2 are used to generate values for Z3. This ob-
viously implies that the distributions of Z1, Z2, and Z3 are not independent. In the example
here, we consider writing the joint probability as the product of marginal probabilities and
conditional probabilities:
Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd) = Pr(zAp1,j |J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(zAp2,j |zAp1,j , J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(zAp3,j |zAp2,j , zAp1,j , J = j, t, ZAd)
(3.10)
Details on doing this in the context of our proposed SDL method are presented in Section 3.2.
2b. Component Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
Consider computing Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd) in Equation 3.8. Recall, variables in U are
unavailable, i.e. unknown, to the intruder before data set Z is released. The intruder does
not have corresponding values in t for any of the variables in U. The intruder may have prior
beliefs about yUj values and hence z
U
j . The extent and accuracy of these prior beliefs can
vary and resulting probability or risk can be compared among possibilities. If we rewrite
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this component of probability as suggested in Reiter (2005), we obtain
Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd) = (3.11)∫
Pr(zUj |yUj , zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)Pr(yUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)dyUj .
The second term of the integral reflects prior information on the distribution of variables
in U. The intruder can specify prior information based on knowledge from outside sources.
Examples in Reiter (2005) include using parameter estimates from a regression of Y Uk on
ZA, using partial information such as bounds on the target’s value of yjk, or even using a
uniform distribution over a reasonable range in the case that the intruder has no prior beliefs.
For any variable k in U that is not altered before the data are released, and assuming
the intruder knows which variables are not altered, Pr(zjk|zApj , J = j, t, ZAd) = 1. For any
variable k in U that is altered, Pr(zjk|yjk, zApj , J = j, t, ZAd) is specified to reflect the disclo-
sure limitation method applied to yjk. This can be done in the same manner described in
above from Reiter (2005) or using extensions presented in Section 3.1.3. Reiter offers three
suggestions for evaluating the integral in Equation 3.12.
First, we can set the entire probability to 1, which is what we do for a naive intruder.
Second, given specifications for the true distribution functions on the reight hand side of
Equation 3.12, one can approximate the integral numerically or, if possible, directly evalu-
ate it. For example, if yUj is related to z
Ap
j through an assumed linear regression equation
(yUj = α + βZ
Ap
j + ,  ∼ N(0, σ2y)) and if ZUj is related to Y Uj by additive Gaussian noise
(ZUj = y
U
j +e, e ∼ N(0, σ2z)), then, the distribution of ZUj is N(α+βZApj , σ2y +σ2z). Of course,
one needs to know or have an estimate for σ2y and σ
2
z . Third, one can approximate the inte-
gral by drawing valaues of yUj from Pr(y
U
j |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd), plugging those values into the
integral for a given value of ZUj , and taking an average. This method requires distributional
assumtptions as well.
2c. Component Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd)
Variables zCi , i 6= j include variables that are available to the intruder but are perturbed and
variables unavailable to the intruder on units that are not the target. Assuming independence
among pairs (zCi , y
C
i ) across records, Pr(z
C
1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd) is rewrittenj−1∏
i=1
∫
Pr(zCi |yCi , zAdi )Pr(yCi |zAdi )dyCi
 r∏
i=j+1
∫
Pr(zCi |yCi , zAdi )Pr(yCi |zAdi )dyCi
 ,
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as in Reiter (2005).
Note that assuming independence across records eliminates conditioning terms zCj in
the above probabilities corresponding to records i = 1, ..., j − 1, j + 1, ..., r. Further, when
Equation 3.13 is plugged into Equation 3.1, the entire term simplifies to
1/
∫
Pr(zCj |yCj , zAdj )Pr(yCj |zAdj )dyCj )
(Reiter 2005). The author again suggests procedures to approximate the integral in the
denominator of this expression. As before, one option is to replace the integral with a value
of 1. This is expedient, but likely losses some mathcing information. A second option is
numerical approximation or, if possible, direct approximation. As before, one must choose
distributions and values of some parameters. A third option involves drawing values of Y Cj
from Pr(yCj |zAdj )dyCj ) and plugging those values in into the integral for a given value of ZCj ,
and taking an average. This method also requires distributional assumptions. In most data
sets, the assumption of independence across records is reasonable. Most samples are chosen
randomly from a population or some subpopulation to obtain accurate information about
the population as a whole.
Summary
The framework and methods presented in Duncan and Lambert(1986, 1989) and Reiter
(2005) provide a framework in which to compute the probability of identifiying an individual
record. As discussed in Section 3.1.2, an agency wants to dissuade linking any records with
any target. This can be acheived if the intruder’s uncertainty about the target in teh re-
leased data set is high, i.e., if the probability of identifying any record as the target’s is low.
The agency controls this through the SDL method which influences the posterior predictive
distribution of the target’s values. Under this framework, disclosure risk is inversely propor-
tional to uncertainty, where high uncertainty is associated with lower risk. In fact, disclosure
risk is equated with the probability of identification, where a low probability of identifying
any record as the target’s implies a low disclosure risk. The probability of identification
includes the following two components:
1. Pr(J = j|t, ZAd)
2. Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd)
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The second component is further divided into three components:
2a. Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd)
2b. Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
2c. Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd)
Implications of the SDL method used and any distributional assumptions are incorporated
into the measure of disclosure risk through these components.
Whole data set risk
Under this framework, we can consider various levels of intruder knowledge and possible be-
havior. We can compare disclosure risk between disclosure limitation methods and between
records or targets with different levels of sensitivity. Using the probability of identification
for every record, we can measure the disclosure risk for the entire released data set. To
obtain a disclosure risk measure for the entire data set, Reiter (2005) assumes the intruder
has correct records for all units. This is a very conservative assumption, but that might be
necessary to provide adequate protection. The intruder is assumed to compute the probabil-
ity of identification for each record against all records in the original data set. If the agency
has determined a level or threshold of risk that any one record, or target, must have risk
less than this level, then the disclosure risk for the entire data set can be equated with the
number of records with disclosure risk greater than this threshold, the expected number of
true matches, and the number of units with unique true matches. We will not focus on com-
puting this for a synthetic data set generated using our proposed method. Such a measure
of disclosure risk for the entire data set is valuable for comparisons of methods.
In Section 3.2, we extend their work to assess disclosure risk associated with synthetic
data sets under this framework. We discuss details of assessing disclosure risk associated with
our proposed procedure of generating synthetic values using quantile regression predictions
and hot deck combined with rank swapping. We also suggest similar extensions that can be
used to measure disclosure risk associated with synthetic data generated using models with
known or estimated distributional properties.
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3.2 Disclosure risk for the proposed synthetic data method
In Section 3.1, we presented the framework for measuring disclosure risk as developed in
Reiter (2005). Disclosure risk in this framework is equated with the probability of identifica-
tion. That is, an intruder might compute the probabilities that released records match the
target in order to identify a respondent’s record in the released data. Previous formulations
for the components of this probability, or risk, are based on traditional statistical disclosure
limitation techniques such as re-coding, swapping, and noise addition among others. In this
section, we develop extensions to measure disclosure risk associated with synthetic data gen-
erated using the proposed statistical disclosure limitation procedure presented in Chapter
2 of this dissertation. The proposed method combines quantile regression predictions on
randomly selected quantiles with hot deck imputation and rank swapping to produce record
level synthetic data for release. In Section 3.2.1, we present the intruder’s decision tree and
introduce notation. In Section 3.2.2, we describe the formulation of each component of the
identification probability. In Section 3.2.3, we describe possible formulations of each compo-
nent to evaluate disclosure risk for synthetic data generated using our proposed method.
3.2.1 Intruder knowledge and decisions
In this section, we develop formulations for the components of the probability of identifi-
cation, Pr(J = j|t, Z), described in Section 3.1. We evaluate this probability under different
assumptions about intruder behavior and knowledge. We consider intruder behavior to re-
flect certain decisions an intruder might make based on knowledge of the original data,
released data, and disclosure limitation method used to generate the released data. A quite
sophisticated intruder will have knowledge about the disclosure limitation method, whereas
a less sophosticated intruder will have some knowledge of the data prior to its release. A
much less sophisticated intruder will only have knowledge about the data after it is released.
Based on the level of knowledge an intruder posesses, s/he can make one of several decisions.
Each decision corresponds to an approach the intruder can take to evaluate the probability
of identification in the released data corresponding to a particular target. We state the
possible decisions with respect to intruder knowledge in a diagram similar to a decision tree.
Assuming an intruder wishes to compute the probability of identification for each record, we
can follow one of several paths to determine how s/he might do so.
We examine intruders’ decisions under varying degrees of knowledge. An intruder’s
knowledge and behavior lies somewhere between naive and quite sophisticated. We as-
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sume the naive intruder is one whose knowledge is based on posterior information only. This
intruder knows nothing about the data except from what s/he learns from the released data.
We assume the sophisticated intruder has accurate information about the data before release
(prior information), information after release (posterior) information, and details about the
statistical disclosure limitation procedure method used (SDL information). We call this the
SDL intruder. We call the average intruder one who combines information s/he has before
release–prior information, and after release–posterior information. Some decisions will be
unavailable to an intruder based on assumptions about their knowledge. For example, a
naive intruder cannot incorporate knowledge about the SDL methods to evaluate the prob-
ability of identification because s/he does not have this knowledge. On the other hand,
an intruder with quite accurate details about the data set and SDL methods might choose
simpler approaches to compute the probability out of convenience.
Recall from Section 3.1.2, the probability of identification Pr(J = j|t, Z) can be written
as the product of four major components relating to available and unavailables variables
that are perturbed or remain unperturbed. These components can be seen in Equation 3.1
and Equation 3.8, rewritten below for convenience. To evaluate each component, we con-
sider possible ways an intruder would compute each based on assumptions about his/her
knowledge. The goal is to develop a measure that can be applied to the released data set to
measure its disclosure risk. This measure should be flexible to incorporate different levels of
intruder knowledge and behavior as well as different disclosure limitation methods used to
produce the data for release.
Recall from Section 3.1.2,
Pr(J = j|t, Z) = Pr(Z
C |J = j, t, ZAd)Pr(J = j|t, ZAd)∑r+1
j=1 Pr(Z
C |J = j, t, ZAd)Pr(J = j|t, ZAd)
and
Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) = Pr(zC1 , ..., zCj−1, zCj+1, ..., zCr |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd).
We refer to the components on the right-hand-side of Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) as A,B,C, re-
spectively, where
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A = Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd),
B = Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd), and
C = Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd).
As described above, we characterize intruder knowledge and behavior as naive, average,
or SDL. The naive intruder is one who only possesses posterior information, or information
available from the released data. S/he decides to use the posterior information to compute
the probability of identification. At the other extreme, an SDL intruder is one who has accu-
rate and fairly detailed knowledge of the statistical disclosure limitation procedure used and
decides to use this information to compute each component. The SDL intruder represents a
worst case scenario from an agency’s perspective. In between these two extremes is the av-
erage intruder who has some knowledge of the data prior to its release. The average intruder
might compute the probability of identification based on prior and posterior knowledge, but
with limited or no knowledge of the disclosure limitation methods used. In addition to naive,
average, and SDL intruders, we also consider a super naive intruder, who computes identifica-
tion probability using only information on the target and on released, unperturbed variables.
The super naive intruder computes Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) but sets Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) equal to 1.
Note that using this framework affords us flexibility in various assumptions about an
intruder’s behavior with respect knowledge. For example, the naive intruder with only pos-
terior knowledge can make one of two decisions about how to compute the probability of
identification. S/he can compute Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) and use formulations of Anaive, Bnaive,
Cnaive reflecting posterior knowledge to obtain a value for Pr(Z
C |J = j, t, ZAd) 6= 1. Al-
ternatively, the intruder can decide to compute Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) combined with the super
naive decision to set Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) = 1. The SDL intruder can combine the value
for Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) with ASDL, BSDL, CSDL reflecting the SDL method used, or combine
Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) with any other formulation of A, B, and C, including the super naive
approach to set these components to 1. The intruder with more knowledge can make several
possible decisions about how to procede, while the intruder with less knowledge has fewer
options.
Table 3.3 provides a summary of the framework under which disclosure risk is computed.
Details about levels of information that can be used to formulate each component, A,B,
and C, are discussed in the following section. Formulation of the components under varying
assumptions about the intruder’s knowledge and behavior are presented in Sections 3.2.3
through 3.2.6.
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Table 3.3 Intruder knowledge and decisions for disclosure risk formulation.
Goal = Pr(J = j|t, Z)
Pr(J = j|t, Z) = Pr(J = j|t, ZAd)Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd)
2 main components
Pr(J = j|t, zAd) = 1/nt
and
Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) = 1 super naive
Pr(ZC |J = j, t, ZAd) = ABC others
3 intruder types
naive: posterior knowledge
Anaive, Bnaive, Cnaive
average: prior and posterior knowledge
Aavg, Bavg, Cavg
SDL: prior and posterior knowledge, SDL method known
ASDL, BSDL, CSDL
A = Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd)
B = Pr(zUj |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
C = Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd)
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3.2.2 Component formulation
Formulations for each component of disclosure risk are discussed in this section. To
clearly convey how this measure of disclosure risk can be applied to a perturbed or synthetic
data set, we descirbe a generic data set. Our proposed SDL procedure is applied to this data
set to generate synthetic values. Using this hypothetical scenario, we present details of each
component.
Consider data set Y containing variables Y1, ..., Y7, Y
Ad, where Y Ad are the nonsensitive
demographic variables, Y Ap are the available perturbed variables, and Y U , are the unavail-
able variables. Each of Y1, ..., Y7 belongs to either Y
Ap or Y U . Table 3.4 shows the nature of
each hypothetical variable.
Table 3.4 Variable types in hypothetical data set.
original synthetic
Y Ad : Y Ad ZAd = Y Ad
Y Ap : Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4 Z
Ap
1 , Z
Ap
2 , (QR)
ZAp3 , Z
Ap
4 (HD+RS)
Y Up : Y5, Y6 Z
Up
5 , Z
Up
6
Y Ud : Y7 Z
Ud
7 = Y
Ud
7
Using our proposed SDL procedure, we produce Z for release. Specifically,
1. variables in ZAd remain unperturbed (possibly re-categorized), i.e. ZAd = Y Ad ⇒
tAd = ZAdt , where Z
Ad
t is the target’s record in the released data,
2. values for zAp1 are generated conditional on Z
Ad using quantile regression predictions
at randomly selected quantiles, i.e.
QzAp1j
(τ ∗|ZAd) = ZAdj β1(τ ∗1j)1,
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3. values for zAp2 are generated conditional on y
Ap
1 , z
Ap
1 , and Z
Ad using quantile regression
predictions at randomly selected quantiles, i.e.
QzAp2j
(τ ∗|ZAd, yAp1 ) =
 ZAdj
zAp1j
 β2(τ ∗2j) + 2,
4. values for zAp3 and z
Ap
4 are generated using hot deck imputation and rank swapping,
matching based on Mahalanobis distance between synthetic and original values of Z1
and Z2
5. values for zUp5 are generated conditional on y
Ap
1 , z
Ap
1 , y
Ap
2 , z
Ap
2 , and Z
Ad using quantile
regression predictions at randomly selected quantiles, i.e.
QzAp5j
(τ ∗|ZAd, yAp1 , yAp2j ) =

ZAdj
zAp1j
zAp2
 β5(τ ∗5j) + 5,
6. values for zUp6 are generated using hot deck imputation and rank swapping, and
7. and values for zUd7 are left unperturbed in the released data.
When conditioning is used in the proposed SDL procedure, this information can be incor-
porated to compute the probability of identification reflecting the dependence and indepen-
dence between variables in Z, resulting from the SDL procedure. If the proposed procedure
yields Z with high data ultility, these relationships are reflected in the original data Y . Obvi-
ously, quantile regression predictions, z1, z2, and z5, are dependent on conditioning variables
in their respective models. In the hot deck procedure we identify matching records in the
original data set in order to impute values of z3, z4, and z6, after further rank swapping.
Matching is based on the distance between z1, z2 in each record and all records y1, y2. With
a match identified in record i say, values on y3i, y4i, y6i are ranked, and ranks are swapped
with randomly selected ranks within some interval with center at the original rank and width
2δk. Values from the record with the swapped rank are imputed into Z. Swapping occurs
independently of other variables, except perhaps ZAd when swapping is performed within
categories. This implies that z3, z4, and z6 are dependent on z1, z2, Z
Ad but are independent
of one another.
First, we describe the formulation of Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) as presented in Reiter (2005).
Then we present details on formulating the components of disclosure risk or probability of
58
identications (A, B, and C) for an SDL, average, and naive intruder.
Formulation of Pr(J = j|t, ZAd)
For each type of intruder, we use the same formulation for Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) as presented
in Reiter (2005). Since this component of the probability is conditioned on information in t
and ZAd only, it is straightforward to set
Pr(J = j|t, ZAd) = 1
nt
, (3.12)
where nt is the number of records in Z with z
Ad
j = t
Ad.
3.2.3 Formulation of components for the SDL intruder
Details about possible formulations for the components that go into computing the prob-
ability of identication, or disclosure risk, for the SDL intruder are presented here. The
components are A, B, and C. In this section, assumptions and decisions an SDL intruder
can make are examined. The resulting forms of ASDL, BSDL, and CSDL are presented. The
SDL intruder is the most sophisticated intruder that we consider.
C: Formulation of CSDL = Pr(z
Ap|J = j, t, ZAd)
Under the SDL procedure outlined in Section 3.2.2, zAp = (zAp1 , z
Ap
2 , z
Ap
3 , z
Ap
4 ) and denotes
variables that are available to the intruder and are perturbed before release. Variables zAp1
and zAp2 are quantile regression predictions computed conditional on Z
Ad. Variables zAp3 and
zAp4 ) are hot deck imputations with rank swapping applied, matching is based on the Maha-
lanobis distance between (zAd, zAp1 , z
Ap
2 ) and (y
Ad, yAp1 , y
Ap
2 ).
An SDL intruder is assumed to know these details. We assume the SDL intruder uses
this knowledge to compute components of the probability of identification for each record.
To formulate CSDL = Pr(z
Ap
j |J = j, t, ZAd) using knowledge about the SDL method used,
the joint probability of observing z1, z2, z3, z4, given that the j
th record belongs to the target
and information in t and ZAd, is written as follows
59
CSDL = Pr(z
Ap
j |J = j, t, ZAd)
= Pr(z1j, z2j, z3j, z4j|J = j, t, ZAd)
= Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(z2j|z1j, J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(z3j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(z4j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd),
(3.13)
for every jth released record j = 1, ..., r. The variable z3j does not appear in the last line
because z3 was not used in the generation of z4.
In the following paragraphs, we evaluate Equation 3.13 by considering portions of the
SDL procedure relevant to each of the right hand side terms. For terms involving z1 and
z2, probabilitiy measures are based on quantile regression inference results. For terms in-
volving z3 and z4, probability measures are based on hot deck imputation and rank swapping.
C1: zAp1 and z
Ap
2
The variables zAp1 and z
Ap
2 are the variables that are available to the intruder and are per-
turbed before release using the regression quantile method. Initially, consider values for z1 to
be generated using quantile regression predictions from model estimates for a single quantile
τ. Using this simplification, we develop an expression for the probability, then expand it to
formulate an expression to incorporate unknown randomly selected quantiles used in the pro-
posed procedure. Results in Koenker (2005) indicate that, similar to least squares regression,
the regression parameter estimates at quantile τ are asymptotically Normal, centered at the
true parameter value, with variance dependent on τ. Assumming independent and identically
distributed errors, i.e.
√
n(βˆn(τ)−β(τ))→˜N(0, ω2(τ)), where ω2(τ) = τ(1−τ)f2(F−1(τ)) . For practi-
cal purposes, we assume βˆn ∼ N
(
β(τ), ω
2(τ)
n
)
, which implies Xβˆn ∼ N
(
Xβ(τ), ω
2(τ)
n
X ′X
)
.
For details, see Section 2.1 of this dissertation and Koenker (2005).
If the agency generates values using predictions
z1j = yˆ1j,τ1j = z
Ad
j βˆ1(τ1),
which the intruder is aware of, and the intruder knows the value of τ1j for every j = 1, ..., r,
then s/he can formulate Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd) for record j = 1, ..., r to be:
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Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd) = φ1j,τ1j
= φ
 z1j−t1j
ω(τ1j)
√
1
n
zAd
T
j z
Ad
j
 . (3.14)
We could also assume the intruder knows less. Suppose that s/he knows that the agency
generated z1j at one quantile for every j, but does not know the value of τ1j = τ1. The
intruder might decide to estimate τ1 or set it equal to some constant. To estimate τ1, the
intruder could use the released data to fit the quantile regression model z1,τ1 = Z
Adβˆ(τ1)
at several values of τ1 = τ˜ , compute predicted values zˆ1,τ˜1 at each τ˜1, and compare the
resulting predictions with the values of z1 in the released data. The intruder’s estimate of
τ1, τˆ1,intruder say, might be the value at which the intruder’s predicted values differ the least
from released values z1, according to some measure of closeness. If the intruder chooses to
set τ1 equal to some constant, c, such as the median, then τˆ1,intruder = c. The formulation for
Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd) for each record j = 1, ..., r is simply the expression in Equation 3.14,
with τ1j replaced by τˆ1,intruder.
We extend these ideas to compute Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd) for z1j generated at randomly
selected quantiles τ ∗1j, j = 1, ..., r. First suppose the intruder knows the values of τ
∗
1j for each
record j = 1, ..., r, then suppose the intruder estimates τ ∗1j or sets it equal to some constant,
cj.
If the intruder knows the value of randomly selected τ ∗1j for each j = 1, ..., r, then
Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd) can be expressed as in Equation 3.14 by replacing τ1j with τ ∗1j.
If the intruder does not know the values of τ ∗1j for each j, s/he can estimate it or set it equal
to c1j for each j = 1, ..., r. The intruder might estimate τ
∗
1j by fitting the quantile regression
model at several quantiles, computing predicted values for each record at each quantile, and
comparing z1j with his/her predicted values. The intruder might set τˆ
∗
1j,intruder equal to the
quantile at which his/her predicted value is closest to z1j on each record. Note that each
record would be associated with one (possibly distinct) value of τˆ ∗1j,intruder, estimated or set
equal to some constant, c1j. The intruder’s estimated quantile τˆ
∗
1j,intruder can be substituted
into Equation 3.14 for τ1j. In general, we write Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd) as in Equation 3.14, with
τ1j =
 τ
∗
1j intruder knows value of randomly drawn τ
∗
1j used to generate z1j
τˆ ∗1j,intruder intruder estimates value of randomly drawn τ
∗
1j used to generate z1j.
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Though the estimation of τ1j described above is possible, it may not be highly likely that
an intruder will expend the time and energy required to fit numerous quantile regression
models and make comparisons between the resulting predictions and the released values of
z1. Depending on the size of the released data set and the number of variables in Z
Ad, doing
so may be practically impossible, depending on computing resources. It would be interesting
to implement this approach to determine if it yields accurate and timely estimates of τ1j that
in turn produce high probability estimates for the target’s released record and low probability
estimates for other records, allowing the intruder to identify the target in the released records.
For the application in Section 4.3, we act as if the value of τ1j is known and equal for
all records, τ1j = τ for every j = 1, ..., n. Based on this, the probability of identification is
estimated.
Since values for z2 are also generated using predictions from a quantile regression model,
we use the same ideas to formulate Pr(z2j|z1j, J = j, t, ZAd). The quantile regression model
is:
z2j = yˆ2j,τ2 =
 ZAd
z1j
 βˆ2(τ2).
Thus, the formulation for Pr(z2j|z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) is also based on the asymptotic Normal
distribution of quantile regression parameters. For the intruder’s value of τ2j,
P r(z2j|z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) = φ2j,τ2j
=

φ
 z2j−t2
ω(τ2j)
√
1
n
(ZAdj z1j)(Z
Ad
j z1j)
T
 , tAd = zAdj
0 otherwise
(3.15)
for every j = 1, ..., r, where
τ2j =
 τ
∗
2j intruder knows value of randomly drawn τ
∗
2j used to generate z2j
τˆ ∗2j,intruder intruder estimates value of randomly drawn τ
∗
2j used to generate z2j.
C1: Alternative for zAp1 and z
Ap
2
In the Equations 3.14 and 3.15 for conditional probabilites of zAp1 and z
Ap
2 , we were willing to
assume the approximate asymptotic normality of quantile regression parameter estimates.
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This is generally acceptable in our applications, since the regression estimates are based on
a large number of records (over 10,000 and up to millions). Conditions D1, D2, and F in
Section 2.1.2 might not hold if the data base contains a small number of records or if too
many records contain all zeros or very small values. In this case, the knowledgable intruder
would not use the asymptotic normal distribution to compute Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd) and
Pr(z2j|z1j, J = j, t, ZAd).
Alternatively, the target’s t1 and t2 predicted values, tˆ1 and tˆ2, could be computed using
quantile regression estimates from the released data set and the target values of tAd. The
intruder could then compare the target’s predicted values tˆ1 and tˆ2 to values z1 and z2 re-
leased in Z. Among records with equal available and unperturbed variable values, tAd = ZAd,
it would be reasonable to consider identifying the target with any record containing z1 and
z2 values within some range of tˆ1 and tˆ2. If the intruder is willing to consider any records
within an amount γ1 > 0, say, of tˆ1, then all records within this distance to tˆ1 have equal
probability of belonging to the target. If the intruder simultaneously considers only records
with values of z2 within γ2 > 0 of tˆ2, then only the records with values z1 and z2 within the
intervals (tˆ1±γ1) and (tˆ2±γ2) are considered as potential matches with the target. Records
with z1 and z2 values within these intervals have equal probability of belonging to the target.
Suppose there are nt1,t2 such records, then the joint probability of observing z
Ap
1 and z
Ap
2
conditional on the jth record belonging to the target, the information in t, and the values in
ZAd can be formulated as
Pr(z1j, z2j|J = j, t, ZAd) = Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd)Pr(z2j|z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) (3.16)
=
1
nt1,t2
if tAd = ZAd, z1 = tˆ1 ± γ1, z2 = tˆ2 ± γ2.
= 0 otherwise.
In our applications, Conditions D1, D2, and F all seem reasonable due to the large num-
ber of records in potential applications, so we use the formulations in Equations 3.14 and
3.15 to compute the probability of identification in our applications. Details and results of
implementing this are presented in Section 4.3.
C2: zAp3 and z
Ap
4
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The variables zAp3 and z
Ap
4 are the variables that are available to the intruder and are per-
turbed using hot deck imputations with rank swapping before release. We can formulate
Pr(z3j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) and Pr(z4j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) based on details of the hot
deck and rank swapping procedures. Recall that in the proposed hot deck procedure, we
identify potential matches in the original data for each record in the synthetic data. Matching
is based on distance between values on variables for which we computed quantile regression
predictions. In our example, hot deck is used to identify the closest record i in Y to each
record in Z such that distance d
 y1i
y2i
 ,
 z1j
z2j
 is minimized. The sample ranks of y3i
and y4i, r3i and r4i, respectively, are computed and random ranks are drawn from discrete
Uniform distributions centered at r3i and r4i, each with width 2δk, δk > 0.
With this knowledge of the SDL procedure, the intruder is aware that values z3j and z4j in
record j are not likely imputed from the same original record. S/he is aware, however, that
imputation begins with computing the Mahalanobis distance between y1i, y2i and z1j, z2j.
Initially, it would seem that through replicating the distance calculations, the intruder could
identify the record from which values for z3 and z4 were swapped from. Here, we discuss
why this is not necessarily the case.
Suppose the intruder replicates the hot deck procedure by computing the Mahalanobis
distance between the target values t1 and t2 and values z1j and z2j in each record using the
distance to obtain d(t, j) for each released record. Each distance d(t, j) is the distance the
agency computes between the synthetic candidate record j and the donor that is the target’s
record. This may not be among the original records with the smallest distances to candidate
j. In fact, the target record may not have been identified as the closest donor to any of
the original records, i.e., even if d(t, j) is the smallest distance among all distances d(t, j),
j = 1, ..., r in the released data, d(t, j) may not have been among the smallest distances
d(i, j) for synthetic candidate record j and all donors i = 1, ..., n in the original data set. If
d(t, j) was not among the smallest d(i, j) for candidate record j and donors i = 1, ..., n, the
target record would never have been selected for imputation using the hot deck procedure.
Values t3 and t4 could have been imputed into the synthetic set through the rank swapping
procedure if those values had ranks within the range δ3 and δ4 of the ranks of values y3 and
y4 in the matching record.
This leads us to formulate the probability of observing z3 and z4 given z2j, z1j, J = j, t,
and ZAd independent of the distance between the target values and the values in Z. The
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argument above implies that the probability of t3 and t4 being imputed into the released
data set can be based on the rank swapping portion of the procedure alone. Recall, the prob-
ability Pr(z3j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) is conditional on the jth record belonging to the target.
If we assume that the jth record belongs to the target, then we can assume the values t3, t4,
were swapped with values y3, y4 having ranks that were randomly selected from a Uniform
distribution over the intervals (rt3−δ3, rt3 +δ3) and (rt4−δ4, rt4 +δ4), respectively. Therefore,
for observations z3j and z4j to have been imputed, the ranks in the original record r3i and
r4i must fall in the intervals, (rt3 − δ3, rt3 + δ3) and (rt4 − δ4, rt4 + δ4), respectively. If we
assume values in Z3 and Z4 have approximately the same ranks as values in Y3 and Y4, then
the ranks of values z3j and z4j, r
∗
3j and r
∗
4j, are also in that interval. We can formulate the
conditional probability of observing the z3j and z4j to be equal to the probability of selecting
their ranks r∗3j and r
∗
4j from the intervals (rt3 − δ3, rt3 + δ3) and (rt4 − δ4, rt4 + δ4) and 0 for
ranks not in these intervals. This can be written
Pr(z3j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) = 1
2δ3
if tAd = zAdj and r
∗
3j ∈ (rt3 ± δ3) (3.17)
= 0 otherwise (3.18)
and
Pr(z4j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) = 1
2δ4
if tAd = zAdj , r
∗
4j ∈ (rt4 ± δ4) (3.19)
= 0 otherwise. (3.20)
Since rank swapping is done independently to obtain values z3 and z4, we can simply multi-
ply the terms in Equations 3.18 and 3.20 to obtain the joint probability
Pr(z3j, z4j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) = 1
δ3
1
δ4
if tAd = zAdj , (rt3 − δ3, rt3 + δ3), and (rt4 − δ4, rt4 + δ4)(3.21
= 0 otherwise. (3.22)
Combining the components for z1j, z2j, z3j, and z4j we arrive at the following expression
for CSDL :
CSDL = Pr(z
Ap|J = j, t, ZAd) (3.23)
= φ1j,τ1jφ2j,τ2j
1
δ3
1
δ4
if tAd = ZAd, r∗3j ∈ (rt3 ± δ3), r∗4j ∈ (rt4 ± δ4) (3.24)
= 0 otherwise (3.25)
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We can use the ideas presented above to formulate components corresponding to addi-
tional available perturbed variables, ZAp, when conditional quantile regression predictions
and hot deck imputation with rank swapping are used to generate values in synthetic records.
When other SDL methods are used to generate synthetic data, it seems feasible to extend
the ideas presented here and in Reiter (2005) to formulate components of CSDL. In partic-
ular, it should be straight forward to extend the formulation of Pr(z1j|J = j, t, ZAd) and
Pr(z2j|z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) in Equations 3.14 and 3.15 to synthetic values that are generated
using predictions from any conditional model, provided distibutional properties of model
estimates and subsequent predictions are known or can be derived. Reiter (2005) presents
possible formulations of Pr(zApj |J = j, t, ZAd) when swapping, re-categorizing, and noise
addition are used.
B: BSDL = Pr(z
U
j |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
Variables zUj are variables that are unavailable before release. They include z
Up
5j which is
perturbed using quantile regression predictions before release, zUp6j which is perturbed using
hot deck and rank swapping before release, and zUd7j w hich is unperturbed before release.
Recall, an SDL intruder is assumed to know how values are generated for each variable
in Z. As for CSDL, we assume the intruder uses this knowledge to formulate BSDL. This
implies the intruder’s joint conditional probability of observing z5, z6, z7, will be formulated
using information about the statistical disclosure limitation procedure. In our hypothetical
data set, ZU is comprised of z5, z6, z7, the variables with values unknown to the intruder
prior to data release. We rewrite the joint distribution of z5, z6, z7, as a series of conditional
distributions. For every j = 1, ..., r,
BSDL = Pr(z
U
j |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
= Pr(z5j, z6j, z7j|zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
= Pr(z5j|z1j, z2j, J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(z6j|z1j, z2j, J = j, t, ZAd)
×Pr(z7j|J = j, t, ZAd).
(3.26)
In the proposed SDL procedure, z5 is generated using quantile regression predictions con-
ditional on z1j, z2j, and Z
Ad, z6 is generated using hot deck and rank swapping conditional
on z1j and z2j, and z7 is left unperturbed in the released data. Based on this, we divide the
variables in U into perturbed and unperturbed just as for available variables, i.e. z5, z6 ∈ Up
and z7 ∈ Ud. In the following paragraphs, we first consider Pr(z5j|zApj , J = j, t, ZAd), then
Pr(z6j|zApj , J = j, t, ZAd), and finally Pr(z7j|J = j, t, ZAd).
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B1: zUp5j
Variable zUp5j is unavailable to the intruder before release and is perturbed using quantile
regression predictions before release. We consider formulating the conditional probability
of observing z5 in a similar fashion as the conditional probability corresponding to z1. Un-
like the probability of observing z1, the intruder does not have information on z5 (or any
variables in U) prior to data release, i.e. s/he does not have values t5, t6, or t7. Therefore,
Pr(z5j|zApj , J = j, t, ZAd) = φ5j,τ5j cannot be evaluated as in Equation 3.14 using z5j and t5.
The intruder does know that z5j is generated using:
z5j =

ZAdj
z1j
z2j
 βˆ5(τ5j),
for every j = 1, ..., r, but does not know the value βˆ5(τ5j). This parameter estimate could be
estimated by the intruder by fitting the corresponding quatile regression model using values
in Z. The estimate of βˆ5(τ5j) could then be used to compute a predicted value for the target
on this variable, tˆ5, based on values of t1, t2, and t
Ad.
The SDL intruder’s predicted tˆ5 is not the exact value released by the agency on the
target’s record (due to estimated quantile regression estimates). How similar or different
these values are will depend on the accuracy of the intruder’s estimate and the value βˆ5(τ5j)
estimated by the agency using the original data set. In other words, if the relationship be-
tween z5 and z1, z2, and Z
Ad are preserved very accurately in the released data, this would
result in accurate estimated coefficients for the intruder, and an accurate predicted value
of the target’s released value. The intruder can either act as if tˆ5 is equal to the target’s
released value or account for additional error introduced by estimating the model coefficients
using Z rather than Y. We consider the former scenario, but recognize resulting probability
estimates may differ when considering the latter.
Using the estimated value of tˆ5, the intruder can choose to act as if this estimate is the
target’s value of t5 and procede as above for z1 and z2. Plugging tˆ5 in for t5 to evaluate the
Normal density, we obtain the following expression for the probability of observing z5j for
every j = 1, ..., r :
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Pr(z5j|z2j, z1j, J = j, t, ZAd) = φ5j,τ5j
=

φ
 z5j−t5
ω(τ5j)
√
1
n
(ZAdj z1j z2j)(Z
Ad
j z1j z2j)
T
 , tAd = zAdj
0 otherwise
(3.27)
where
τ5j =
 τ
∗
5j intruder knows value of randomly drawn τ
∗
5j used to generate z5j
τˆ ∗5j,intruder intruder estimates value of randomly drawn τ
∗
5j used to generate z5j.
Alternatively, the intruder may compare the target values of tAd and tˆ5 to values in Z.
Suppose there are nt5 records with t
Ad = ZAd and z5 = tˆ5 ± γ5, some γ5 > 0, then the
probability can be formulated as
Pr(z5j|zApj , J = j, t, ZAd) =

1
nt5
, tAd = ZAd and z5 = tˆ5 ± γ5
0, otherwise.
(3.28)
The size of γk depends on the amount of error the intruder attributes to estimating the
regression coefficient estimates. The intruder would likely be more willing to act more
certain about tˆ5 as an estimate of t5 if the model parameters are well estimated using the
released data set. However, the intruder might want to make computation reasonable and
choose γk so that nt5 is not too large or too small. Namely, if there are few observations
close to the predicted target value, then a value of γk that is somewhat large would ensure
nt5 is not too small. In particular, one would not want to take the chance of eliminating
potential matches that could be the target through a choice of nt5 that is too small.
B2: zUp6j
Variable zUp6j is unavailable to the intruder before release and is perturbed using hot deck and
rank swapping before release. Recall, hot deck and rank swapping are combined to generate
values for z6 in the released data. We consider formulating Pr(z6j|z1j, z2j, J = j, t, ZAd) in
a similar manner as the corresponding probability statements for z3 and z4. In the case of
z6, however, we do not have the target value t6 to use to compute the rank of this variable
in the target’s record. To use the previous formulation, the intruder would need to estimate
the rank of t6. This could be done by estimating the value of t6, according to some model,
then computing its rank relative to values of z6 in the relased data, or perhaps by modeling
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the ranks themselves, r∗6j, conditional on other variables in Z. Investigating the best way
to estimate the rank of t6 in the target’s record is left to outside research. In a simulation
study, we consider estimating t6 based on a model and computing the rank of the estimated
value with respect to values of z6.
Regardless of how this is done, if the intruder obtains an estimate of the rank of t6, rˆt6
say, then s/he can use this value to evaluate
Pr(z6j|z1j, z2j, J = j, t, ZAd) =

1
2δ6
, tAd = ZAd, r∗6j ∈ (rˆt6 ± δ6)
0, otherwise
(3.29)
for some δ6 > 0.
B3: z7j
Variable z7j is unavailable to the intruder before release and is unperturbed before release.
To compute Pr(z7j|J = j, t, ZAd), we rely on an argument presented in Reiter (2005). The
author presents the conditional probability as an integral of the joint probability of zUj and
yUj over values of y
U
j as follows:
Pr(zUj |J = j, t, ZAd) =
∫
Pr(zUj |yUj , J = j, t, ZAd)Pr(yUj |J = j, t, ZAd)dyUj .
The author points out that if variables in U remain unperturbed, i.e. U = Ud, then
Pr(zUj |yUj , J = j, t, ZAd) = 1, so the entire integral integrates to 1. For our purposes, we
set Pr(z7j|J = j, t, ZAd) = 1, for all j = 1, ..., r, assuming the intruder knows values on z7
are all left unperturbed from their original values.
A: ASDL = Pr(z
C
1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd)
Variables zCi are variables the intruder cannot know whit certainty after release. Variables
in zApi and z
U
i are in z
C
i , so these variables include z
Ap
1i , z
Ap
2i , z
Ap
3i , z
Ap
4i , z
Up
5i , z
Up
6i , and z
Ud
7i . This
component computes the probability associated with all records except the target’s. In
Section 3.2.2, we introduce ASDL as the third term in the right hand side of Equation 3.8,
where
ASDL = Pr(z
C
1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd).
Assuming records are independent, this expression simplifies to the product of conditional
probabilities (Reiter 2005):
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Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd) =
∏
i=1,...,r
i 6=j
Pr(zCi |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd) (3.30)
Since records are independent, then for i 6= j,
Pr(zCi |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd) = Pr(zCi |zAdi ).
Substituting this into Equation 3.30 and rewriting the product, we obtain
Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd) =
∏
i=1,...,r Pr(z
C
i |zAdi )
Pr(zCj |zAdj )
.
Substituting this into Equation 3.1 for Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd) results
in further simplifications that occur from summing over all records in the denominator of
3.1. As a result, the above substitution is equivalent to substituting 1
Pr(zCj |zAdj )
into 3.1 for
Pr(zC1 , ..., z
C
j−1, z
C
j+1, ..., z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd).
This implies that only Pr(zCj |zAdj ) is needed to compute ASDL. This probability is decom-
posed into conditional probabilities according to available perturbed, unavailable perturbed,
and unavailable unperturbed variables as in the preceding sections.
Pr(zCj |zAdj ) = Pr(zApj , zUpj , zUdj |zAdj )
= Pr(zApj |zAdj )Pr(zUpj |zApj , zAdj )Pr(zUdj |zApj , zUpj , zAdj ).
Recall that for unavailable, unperturbed variables zUdj , the corresponding probability is set
to 1, resulting in further simplification of Pr(zCj |zAdj ) to
Pr(zCj |zAdj ) = Pr(zApj |zAdj )Pr(zUpj |zApj , zAdj ). (3.31)
Under the SDL method of this section, the probability becomes
Pr(zCj |zAdj ) = Pr(zAp1j |zAdj )Pr(zAp2j |zAp1j , zAdj )Pr(zAp3j , zAp4j |zAp2j , zAp1j , zAdj )
×Pr(zUp5j |zApj , zAdj )Pr(zUp6j |zUp5j , zApj , zAdj ).
To evaluate this probability, consider the same SDL methods as those used as in the
previous sections. The probabilities in Equation 3.31 are no longer conditioned on target
information, t, or J = j. Therefore, instead of using values from the target information t,
values in each record are used. For j = 1, ..., r the probabilities are listed here, followed by
a brief discussion:
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zApj : Pr(z1j|zAdj ) = φ˜1j,τ1j = φ
 z1j−zˆ1j,τ
ω(τ2j)
√
1
n
ZAd
T
j Z
Ad
j

Pr(z2j|z1j, zAdj ) = φ˜2j,τ2j = φ
 z2j−zˆ2j,τ2j
ω(τ2j)
√
1
n
(ZAdj z1j)(Z
Ad
j z1j)
T

Pr(z3j|z2j, z1j, zAdj ) = 12δ3 , rˆ3j ∈ (r3j − δ3, r3j + δ3)
Pr(z4j|z2j, z1j, zAdj ) = 12δ4 , rˆ4j ∈ (r4j − δ4, r4j + δ4)
zUpj : Pr(z5j|z2j, z1j, zAdj ) = φ˜5j,τ5j = φ˜
 z5j−zˆ5j,τ5j
ω(τ5j)
√
1
n
(ZAdj z1j z2j)(Z
Ad
j z1j z2j)
T

Pr(z6j|z2j, z1j, zAdj ) = 12δ6 , rˆ6j ∈ (r6j − δ6, r6j + δ6)
(3.32)
The formulations of the components of ASDL are quite similar to the components for BSDL
and CSDL since the SDL method and intruder’s knowledge are the same. They differ in due
to conditioning only on observed values in record j, rather than on the target’s information
and on J = j, the jth record belonging to the target. The terms zˆkj,τkj are defined as before,
as the quantile regression predictions for variable k at the τkj quantile, computed using
released values and estimated parameter estimates obtained from the released data. The
probabilities associated with the variables that imputed using hot deck and rank swapping
remain at 1
2δk
when the rank of zˆkj, rˆkj, falls in the interval (rkj − δk, rkj + δk). The value of
δk is not likely released by the agency. The intruder trades off taking large values of δk to
cover the true match and a small value of δk that is more computationally feasible. Future
work could examine ways to estimate δk.
3.2.4 Formulation of components for the NAIVE intruder
The naive intruder is one who knows the values of the target’s available variables, but has
no other prior knowledge. Only after the data are released does the naive intruder gather
posterior information. The intuder is naive both in the sense that s/he only has posterior
knowledge of the data and in statistical sophistication to identify the target. This intruder
can use the released data and values on t to identify the target with records that have values
close to the values in t. This can be done in several ways. Here we consider a simple scenario
in which the intruder measures the distance between values in the released data and in t on
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available variables. The intruder can choose to identify the target with the closest values or
choose from among the closest.
C: Cnaive = Pr(z
Ap
j |J = j, t, ZAd)
The variables zApj are available perturbed variables that are perturbed using quantile regres-
sion prior to release. The intruder can choose to compute component Cnaive by assigning
equal probability to records with values on ZAd, ZAp within Euclidean distance η, say, of the
target values tAd, tAp. If the distance between the target and each record j in the released data
set must be less than ηk for each variable k ∈ Ap, then jointly, the probability of observing
zApj given the j
th record is the target’s and information on variables ZAd can be formulated as:
Cnaive,j =

∏
k∈Ap
1
ntk
, tAd = zAdj and zkj ∈ (tk − ηk, tk + ηk)
0, otherwise,
(3.33)
where ntk =number of records with zkj ∈ (tk−ηk, tk+ηk). Other distance measures and other
scenarios will lead to different formulations of Cnaive. Comparing accuracy of the probability
of identification, and hence the effect that any such formulation would have on disclosure
risk among formulations can be done.
B: Bnaive = Pr(z
U
j |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
Variables zUj are unavailable variables. They include both perturbed and unperturbed vari-
ables unavailable to the intruder before release. If the intruder uses the method described for
Cnaive, it seems reasonable this method would be used for unperturbed variables to compute
Bnaive as well. However, the intruder does not posess the target’s values for t5, t6, or t7.
The intruder can consider the associations between variables ZU and ZA in the released
data set to determine which records are more likely to belong to the target, among records
with values zApkj ∈ (tk−ηk, tk+ηk), k = 1, 2, 3, 4. The intruder can also attempt to characterize
the conditional distribution of ZU given ZA, J = j, and t using regression analysis and
inference to compute the conditional probability of observing zUj in record j. The intruder
might choose a plausible standard distribution s/he believes the values in ZU to belong to and
compute the probability of observing values zkj, though it could become rather complicated
to incorporate conditioning information. For simplicity, we set Bnaive equal to 1 for records
with zAdj = t
Ad and 0 otherwise.
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A: Anaive =
1
Pr(zCj |zAdj )
Variables zCj include those the intruder cannot know with certainty after the data are re-
leased. This probability is based on all records in the released data set except the target’s
record. Again, the naive intruder has knowledge of variables ZC only after the data are
released. Recall that for Anaive =
1
Pr(zCj |zAdj )
, the probability is not conditional on the SDL
method or the assumption that the jth record belongs to the target. In this context, the SDL
intruder can estimate the distribution that s/he believes the observations have on variables
ZC , assume observations belong to a well known distribution, or use some other empirical
method to assess the probability. In our application to Public Use Microdata Sample data
in Section 4.3, we suppose that the intruder computes this probability based on variables zCk
belonging to a normal distribution. Anaive can also be set to 1 if we assume the intruder will
not make any distributional assumptions about variables in the released data set.
3.2.5 Formulation of components for the AVERAGE intruder
An average intruder is one with some knowledge about the original data prior to its release
and the target’s values on available variables. This intruder does not have specific knowl-
edge of the SDL methods used to generate the synthetic data set. Posterior information is
gained after the synthetic data set is released. Prior knowledge is combined with posterior in-
formation to assist the average intruder’s attempt to identify a target in the released data set.
In order to assess the threat from an average intruder, the agency must consider what
information is available to the intruder prior to data release. Prior information could contain
specific variable values, including possible information on all of the variables on which the
agency intends to release synthetic data. It could also include more general information such
as bounds for the target on certain variables, or membership to a broader category. The
possibilities are too vast for us to consider exhaustively. In an application to a Public Use
Microdata Set in Section 4.3, we consider a scenario in which results from a regression anal-
ysis are available to the intruder prior to data release. An agency might publish regression
estimates in a report about the data base. A journal article or other report might describe
associations between variables or the result of a study. The measures of disclosure risk in
this section are based on this scenario. It would be useful for the agency to consider other
available prior information to fully assess disclosure risk, though we hope to cover a wide
range of scenarios by computing disclosure risk for an SDL intruder and a naive intruder in
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addition to the average intruder.
In this section, formulations for the components of disclosure risk, Cavg, Bavg, and Aavg
are presented.
C: Cavg = Pr(z
Ap
j |J = j, t, ZAd)
The variables zApj are variables that are available to the intruder prior to release and per-
turbed before release. Recall that the values of available perturbed variables are com-
pared with the target’s values on variables in Ap to formulate the conditional probability
Cavg = Pr(z
Ap
j |J = j, t, ZAd). Recall the scenario presented in Section 3.2.2. The available
perturbed variables we consider are y1, ..., y4 and the corresponding synthetic values z1, ..., z4.
In this section, we consider prior information to include parameter estimates from these lin-
ear models:
Y1j = Y
Ad
j β1 + 1,
Y2j = Y
Ad
j β2 + 2,
Y3j = Y
Ad
j β3 + 3, and
Y4j = Y
Ad
j β4 + 4.
(3.34)
The released estimates, βˆk, k = 1, 2, 3, 4, are computed by the agency using the original data
to fit these models. Assuming the errors are independent and identically distributed normal
random variables with zero mean and variance σ2k, models imply that given Y
Ad, each yk is
normally distributed with mean Y Adβk and variance σ
2
k, or yk ∼ N(Y Adβk, σ2k).
Since the synthetic data set is produced with the goal that values on Zk reproduce
marginal and conditional distributions of values on variable Yk, it is reasonable to extend
the distributional assumptions from yk to zk, keeping in mind extra variability may exist in
the values zk. Namely, normality can be extended to assume zk ∼ N(ZADβk, σ2kd). Notice
the variance of yk, σ
2
k, is multiplied by a constant d. The multiplier d can be thought of as
an SDL correction factor used to account for the variability in zk that results from the SDL
method. It implies that the variance of zk, is σ
2
zk
= σ2kd.
The SDL correction factor d is necessarily positive. If it is larger than 1, the variance of
values on zk is increased from the variance of values yk. This implies that the SDL procedure
introduced additional variability to the synthetic values of variable k. If d is equal to 1,
74
this implies there is no change in the variance due to the SDL method. If d is between 0
and 1, this implies the SDL method had the effect of reducing the variability. This could
happen if the SDL method were to use predicted values from a mean regression model to
generate values for synthetic data. Generated values would approximate the mean at any
given predictor value, likely decreasing the variability between generated values.
The value of d may be released by the agency as a measure of data utility, allowing users
to include the correction factor in their analyses. If the value of d is not released, but the
estimate σˆ2k, calculated from yk, is released, then d can be deduced by calculating the vari-
ance estimate in the released values to obtain σˆ2zk and using both variance estimates to solve
σˆ2zk = σˆ
2
kd to obtain an estimate dˆ. If neither σˆ
2
k or d is released, the variance estimate from
synthetic data on the released variables, σ2zk , can be used, keeping in mind that it differs by
an unknown factor d from σ2k. The value of d may be set to some constant based on SDL
literature discussing data utility in data sets generated using various SDL methods.
Initially, suppose that the true values of βk, σ
2
k, and d are known and released by the
agency. The average intruder uses this knowledge to compute each portion of Aavg. Because
this probability is conditional on the jth record belonging to the target, the distributional
assumption for zApkj becomes z
Ap
kj ∼ N(tAdβk, σ2kd), since tk ∼ N(tAdβk, σ2kd) is implied by the
linear model assumptions. This leads to formulating the conditional probability as:
Pr(zApkj |J = j, t, ZAd) =
 φ
(
zAp
kj
−tAdk βk
σk
√
d
)
, tAd = zAdj
0, otherwise.
(3.35)
Using this formulation, the average intruder’s prior knowledge is incorporated through values
of βk, σk, and d, while posterior knowledge is incorporated through the values z
Ap
kj .
Since it is unlikely that the agency has released the true parameter values βk or σk, it is
more likely that estimates βˆk and σˆk will be released. If an estimate of d, dˆ, is also released,
the estimated values can be substituted in to Equation 3.35 to obtain:
Pr(zApkj |J = j, t, ZAd) =
 φ
(
zAp
kj
−tAdk βˆk
σˆk
√
dˆ
)
, tAd = zAdj
0, otherwise.
(3.36)
The more statistically savvy intruder, however, can instead use inference on the estimated
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regression coefficients to formulate the probability as:
Pr(zApkj |J = j, t, ZAd) =

φ
 zApkj −tAdβˆk
σˆk
√
dˆ
n
tAdtAdT
 , tAd = zAdj
0, otherwise.
(3.37)
In both Equations 3.36 and 3.37, prior knowledge in the form of parameter estimates are
combined with posterior knowledge of the values zApkj to compute the conditional probability.
Using the same rationale for variables z2, z3, and z4, and assuming independence between
the variables in Ap, we formulate Cavg as:
Cavg = Pr(z
Ap
kj |J = j, t, ZAd) =

∏
k∈Ap φkj, tAd = zAdj
0, otherwise,
(3.38)
where φkj = φ
 zApkj −tAdk βˆk
σˆk
√
dˆ
n
tAdtAdT
 and σˆ2zk is substituted for σˆ2kdˆ. Alternatively, we could model
z1, z2|z1, z3|z2, z1, and z4|z3, z2, z1.
Note that many other possible scenarios of prior information can be used to compute the
disclosure risk for the average intruder. This one is used to illustrate formulation based on
released regression estimates. It is also possible that the same prior information can be used
in different ways to formulate Aavg.
B: Bavg = Pr(z
U
j |zApj , J = j, t, ZAd)
Variables zUj are unavailable to the intruder before data are released. These variables include
perturbed and unperturbed variables. Recall that the unavailable variables in U include
yUp5 , y
Up
6 , and y
Ud
7 , and corresponding synthetic values z
Up
5 , z
Up
6 , and z
Ud
7 . We formulate an
expression for Bavg supposing that, in addition to the models for Y
Ap, the intruder has prior
information about the regression coefficients and variance of values in these models:
Y5j = (Y
Ad Y Ap)β5 + 5,
Y6j = (Y
Ad Y Ap)β6 + 6, and
Y7j = (Y
Ad Y Ap)β7 + 7.
(3.39)
For ease of notation, we write Y A = (Y Ad, Y Ap) for the remainder of this section. Since
the models are assumed to represent relationships in the data accurately, yUpk is assumed to
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be normally distributed such that yUpk ∼ N(Y Aβk, σ2k). This implies that tUpk ∼ N(tAβk, σ2k)
and leads to zUpk ∼ N(Y Aβk, σ2k) through similar reasoning as presented for the formulation
of Cavg.
In the case of the SDL and naive intruders, formulating an expression for component B
could not follow directly from the expressions for component C because the target values on
unavailable perturbed variables t5 and t6 are unavailable and unknown to the intruder. In
the scenario here, however, values t5 and t6 are not necessary when prior information is from
the linear regression models. If the intruder possesses estimates βˆk, σˆk, and dˆ, the conditional
probability of observing zkj can be formulated as:
Pr(zUpkj |J = j, t, ZAd) = φ
 zUpk − tAβˆk
σˆk
√
dˆ
n
tAtAT
 . (3.40)
Recall that values of variables in Ud remain unperturbed, so the conditional probability
of observing zUd7 is set to 1. Therefore, using the expression in ?? and assuming independence
between z5 and z6, Bavg can be formulated as:
Bavg = Pr(z
U
j |J = j, t, ZAd) =

∏
k∈Up φkj, zAdkj = t
Ad
0, otherwise,
(3.41)
where φkj = φ
 zUpkj −tAβˆk
σˆk
√
dˆ
n
tAtAT
 and σˆ2zk is substituted for σˆ2kdˆ.
A: Aavg = Pr(z
C
1 , , z
C
j−1, z
C
j+, , z
C
r |zCj , J = j, t, ZAd)
Variables in this component include available perturbed, unavailable perturbed, and un-
available unperturbed variables on all records except the intruder’s. Recall from Section
3.2.3 that Aavg simplifies to
1
Pr(zCj |zAdj )
when plugged into Equation 3.1. This term is not
conditional on J = j or t, hence the component Aavg corresponds to the probability of ob-
serving zCkj given z
Ad
kj only. Since the distributional assumptions z
Ap
k ∼ N(ZApβk, σ2kd) and
zUpl ∼ N(ZAβl, σ2l d) are implied by the linear models in Equation 3.34 and ??, we use them
to compute Aavg as follows:
Aavg =
∏
k∈Ap
1
φkj
∏
l∈Up
1
φlj
, (3.42)
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where φkj = φ
 zApk −zˆApk
σˆk
√
dˆ
n
zAd
T
j z
Ad
j
, φlj = φ
 zUpl −zˆUpl
σˆl
√
dˆ
n
zA
T
j z
A
j
 , and σˆ2zk is substituted for σˆ2kdˆ.
3.2.6 Summary
Under the framework for computing disclosure risk presented in Duncan and Lambert
(1986, 1989) and Reiter (2005), components of disclosure risk were formulated based on
various levels on intruder knowledge and decisions. A summary is presented in this section.
Results from implementing these measures of disclosure risk are presented in an application
to a Public Use Microdata Sample from the Census Bureau in Section 4.3.
The framework for measuring disclosure assumes that an intruder computes the proba-
bility of identifying a target in the released data set, which is expressed as Pr(J = j|t, ZAd).
Disclosure risk is equated with the probability of identification. If the agency can control
the probability of identification to be low for a target, then the disclosure risk is also low.
Alternatively, if the probability of identication is the same accross a large number of records,
this may prevent the intruder from identifying any record as the target’s, resulting in low
disclosure risk as well.
To assess disclosure risk, we consider the various types of information or knowledge an
intruder has before data release, information gained after release, and various decisions the
intruder can make about how to calculate the probability of identification. Such decisions are
based on the level of information s/he possesses. Refer to Table 3.3 in which the framework
under w hich disclosure risk is formulated based on knowledge and decisions an intruder can
make to identify a target record. Disclosure risk is divided into extreme cases based on an
SDL intruder and a naive intruder. An average intruder is also considered to give insight
into a possibly more common type of intruder. By computing disclosure risk for each type
of intruders, we hope to cover a wide range of possibilities, enabling the agency to evaluate
risk in a worst case scenario, a best case scenario, and a more common scenario. We have
also included something like a best best case scenario using the super naive intruder, who
bases the probability of identification only on the number of records with matching available
unperturbed variables.
Disclosure risk can also be computed for the intruder that makes decisions to compute
the components in a simpler manner than s/he has information for. For example, an intruder
with accurate and detailed information about the SDL method used can choose to compute
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CSDL, BSDL, and ASDL to obtain the probability of identification. Alternatively, an SDL in-
truder can choose to compute CSDL, but use Bavg and Aavg, or even set these components to
1, to compute the probability of identification. The average intruder has options too. S/he
can compute all components using the average formulations (Cavg, Bavg, and Aavg), or can
compute any of these components at the naive level or set any of them equal to 1. The naive
intruder can only choose to compute Cnaive, Bnaive, and Anaive or set these components equal
to 1. The naive intruder, however, cannot choose to increase the amount of prior knowledge
used to compute any component. In total, there are 33 options of combinations of A,B, and
C available to the SDL intruder, or 43 options if we include setting any component to 1.
There are 23 (or 33) options for the average intruder, and one option (or 23) for the naive
intruder.
Intruders with other levels of knowledge exist and can make choices to formulate the
probability of identification in a different way than we have. We hope to account for the
best and worst case scenarios based on SDL knowledge, average knowledge, and naive knowl-
edge by using the formulations presented in this section.
3.3 Data utility
Synthetic data methods are designed to protect confidential data and simultaneously
provide useful microdata to data users. In Section 3.1, disclosure risk was discussed. It
is necessary to formulate methods for measuring the disclosure risk under various assump-
tions about intruder knowledge and behavior. Likewise, to assess data utility, various user
behaviors can be assumed. User behaviors reflect the potential uses of the released data
set. Uses can include hypothesis testing, linear regression or analysis of variance on a set
of variables, the goodness of fit for models used, or other measures of association between
variables (Shlomo and Young 2006).
For certain users who frequently request data from an agency for a specific purpose, it
might be possible to tailor the SDL method to provide data of high utility for the specific
purpose. For synthetic microdata sets to be released for general use, however, this is not
likely possible. Therefore, general measures of data utility are considered to asses the syn-
thetic data set’s utility.
Winkler (2006) discusses data utility as whether or not released data are “fit for use.”
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Fitness for use is measured by the extent to which the first two moments agree between the
original and synthetic data sets. If moment estimates approximately agree, this implies that
regression estimates for both data sets will approximately agree as well.
Shlomo and Young (2006) measure data utility using information loss measures. Their
work focuses on assessing the data utility of released tables. The authors have developed a
software tool in SAS to assess disclosure risk and information loss associated with summary
statistics, bias estimates, hypothesis testing, distance metrics, and many more analyses. To
implement measures of utility, assumptions are made about how a user will manage the
released data. In terms of tables, assumptions include various methods a user might use to
replace values of suppressed cells. To measure the difference between original and released
data, distance metrics are used to compare values from the original and released data tables.
Values include counts in specific cross-classification cells and cell count variance estimates.
Karr et al. (2006) discuss measuring confidence interval overlap and ellipsoid overlap as
two narrow measures of utility that capture the difference or similarities between regression
results from the original and synthetic data sets. As a broad measure of utility, the authors
discuss using a Kullback-Liebler divergence measure applied to the estimated densities from
each data set. Further, the utility measures described in this article provide quantitative
measures of utility that can be used in the RU Confidentiality Map, discussed in the open-
ing to this chapter, to balance risk and utility of proposed SDL methods. Several reports
available through the NISS website (www.niss.org/dgii/techreports.html) discuss measures
of data utility, including the mean squared error of estimates from the orginal and synthetic
data sets, for use in the RU Confidentiality Map.
A collection of tools is presented here that can be used to assess broad data utility in a
released synthetic set. In Section 3.2.1, a collection of plots is suggested to compare distribu-
tions in the original data with distributions in the released data to assess general data utility.
In Section 3.2.2, comparisons are made between original and synthetic data using regression
analysis. While the measures presented here do provide insight into how the synthetic data
compare to the original data overall, there remains much work to be done if a quantitative
utility measure is desired.
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3.3.1 Visual measures
Data utility can be measured in terms of the marginal and conditional distributions of
values on variables in the original and synthetic data sets. Empirical plots of the densities
and cumulative distributions provide a good visual tool for the agency to assess how well
an SDL method preserves univariate distributions from the original to the synthetic data
set. Such plots can also provide insight to where the method fails to preserve distributions,
allowing the agency to update the SDL method to perform better in this respect.
To visually compare conditional distributions, we consider comparing conditional dis-
tributions using boxplots of continuous variables within categories formed by categorical
variables. The cumulative distributions can also be compared within categories defined by
discrete variables.
In Chapter 4, plots of empirical ditributions, densities, and box plots are used in appli-
cations of the proposed SDL method to three confidential data sets.
3.3.2 Quantitative measures
In addition to the visual diagnostics described in the previous section, comparing point
estimates, standard errors, and confidence intervals from the original and synthetic data
sets provides a measure of data utility. This can be implemented to assess how well statis-
tics are preserved both marginally and conditionally on variables in the synthetic data set.
Another tool to assess utility in conditional relationships is to perform regression analyses
and compare regression coefficient estimates, their standard errors and confidence intervals.
Goodness of fit measures such as the R2 values can also be compared between the origi-
nal and synthetic data sets. If the agency is aware that a particular user will attempt to
make a decision based on analyses such as hypothesis testing or likelihood ratio testing to
compare estimates or models, the agency can perform both analyses and compare the results.
In Chapter 4, results from a regression analysis are presented and discussed to assess
data utility in the synthetic data set generated using the proposed SDL method.
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CHAPTER 4. APPLICATIONS
4.1 Iowa Department of Revenue application
The initial motivation for research in the area of disclosure limitation and confidentiality
protection was originally brought to Professor Vardeman at Iowa State University by the
Tax Research and Program Analysis Section of the Iowa Department of Revenue (IDR). The
section’s hope was that we could help them to produce a method for generating synthetic
or artificial tax return records for use in the Iowa Legislative Services Agency (LSA) tax
calculators for determining tax revenue and burden. The end goal has been to provide a
tool that will allow IDR to produce a dataset for release to LSA who in turn explore various
changes to the Iowa tax code by assessing revenue implications of those potential changes.
With a synthetic data set, this can be done without requiring direct IDR involvement with
each calculation. A description of the individual income tax reurn data base is presented in
Section 4.1.1. Details about the method as applied to individual income tax returns at IDR
are presented in Section 4.1.2. Results are described in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1 Individual income tax return data set
The Iowa Department of Revenue (IDR) collects tax returns annually from all tax payers
in Iowa. The individual income tax returns contain data on over 1 million tax payer records.
The records contain variables that can be found on individual income tax returns. These
include tax payer name, social security number, address, date of birth, tax payer filing status
(single, filing jointly, etc.), number of dependents, and other demographic variables describ-
ing the tax payer. Income variables include wage income, rent income, retirement income,
etc. Adjustments include payments to a retirement account, moving expense deductions,
and others. Each variable in the data base corresponds with an entry on the Iowa individual
income tax return such as the IA-1040, IA-1040EZ, and others. Data are also borrowed from
the federal Internal Revenue Department, so some additional variables from the US-1040
and other forms appear in the Iowa data base. A detailed account of the individual income
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tax return data base can be found in Huckett (2006).
Work done with the Iowa Department of Revenue focused on the development of meth-
ods for creating a synthetic surrogate of the large individual income tax return database (90
variables, 1.3 million records) for a single year. Data summaries are not sufficient due to the
complex nature of the tax rules and the need to be able to experiment with subtle changes in
them. Thus, a set of record level data containing all necessary variables derived from state
and federal tax forms is necessary.
Quantile regression can be used effectively to estimate quantiles of conditional distribu-
tions that can in turn be used to simulate values for age and wages given a collection of
demographic and tax variables. Realistically reproducing tails of distributions is of partic-
ular concern and requires further investigation and development of methodology. Hot deck
imputation can be used to associate values on other variables (both discrete and categorical)
with partially constructed synthetic records. Rank swapping is also applied.
4.1.2 Models and procedure
In the application for the Iowa Department of Revenue (IDR), we consider using quantile
regression methods to simulate income tax return data by computing a predicted response
for randomly selected quantiles of dependent variables age and wages conditional on key
demographic predictors corresponding to the number of dependents (dep), state filing status
(sfs), and county (county) reported on an individual income tax return. Synthetic values
of age are generated conditional on the demographic predictors. We impose the following
transformation on wages, since the range of values is considerably large:
l.wages =
 log(wages), wages 6= 00, wages = 0. (4.1)
Synthetic values of wages are generated conditional on the demographic predictors and age
values using parameter estimates in the following quantile regression models:
ageτ (τ |x) = ξ(county, sfs, dep, βˆ) + age,τ
and
l.wagesτ (τ |x) = ξ(county, sfs, dep, age,βˆ) + l.wages,τ .
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Using quantile regression we estimate parameters in these models for randomly selected
quantiles τ = τ ∗age and τ = τ
∗
l.wages. At each value of τ
∗
age, the predicted value âgeτ∗age is com-
puted, given values of the demographic predictors. At each value of τ ∗l.wages, the predicted
value ̂l.wagesτ∗
l.wages
is computed, given values of the demographic predictors and values of
predicted ages, âgeτ∗age , on corresponding records. In this application, we randomly selected
the quantiles τ ∗age and τ
∗
l.wages from a uniform distribution over the interval (0, 1).
Practically, it is infeasible to compute quantile regression estimates for unique quantiles
drawn for two variables, each with over 1 million records. Therefore, we compute predicted
age and wages values at randomly drawn quantiles τ ∗age and τ
∗
l.wages by interpolating be-
tween the predicted responses at quantiles directly above and below τ ∗age and τ
∗
l.wages from
the set {0.001, 0.01, ..., 0.99, 0.999}. In other words, we actually compute quantiile regression
estimates at each quantile in the set {0.001, 0.01, ..., 0.99, 0.999}, then interpolate between
predicted values at these quantiles given the demographic predictors in each record to obtain
predicted ˆageτ∗age and
ˆl.wagesτ∗
l.wages
values.
Since the distribution of wages is so extremely skew right in the upper tail, in addition
to quantile regression techniques, we supplement simulation for wages with sampling from a
shifted exponential distribution in the upper tail of the distribution.
At the initial stages of this work with the IDR, we found that performing quantile re-
gression on the entire database of individual income tax returns for any given year to be
computationally intensive, if not impossible. At that time, we proposed performing hot deck
imputation on remaining sensitive variables as a method to impute other variable values from
records with similar values on demographic predictors and synthetic values. We introduced
additional perturbation using rank swapping. The result in each synthetic record is original
values for key demographic predictors, synthetic values for wages and age via quantile re-
gression, and imputed values for additional variables.
Hot deck imputation is performed using the methods described in Chapter 2. We im-
pute federal tax and deductions amond several other variables. Hot deck matching is done
within demographic categories defined by levels of the demographic predictors. We match
on wages first and select the 20 closest candidates. Among the 20 closest, we match on both
age and wages values and select the closest record with respect to age and wages values as
the matching record. Then we perform rank swapping to further perturb federal tax and
deductions. We compute the sample rank of federal tax, r, in the matching record and draw
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random rank r∗ from the Uniform distribution centered at r, or Uniform(r− 20, r+ 20). We
impute the value of federal tax that has rank r∗ in the original records. Following the same
procedure for deductions, we compute the sample rank of deductions, q, in the matching
record and draw random rank q∗ from the Uniform(q − 20, q + 20) distribution. Finally, we
impute the value of deductions with rank q∗ from the original records.
The procedure described above is an application of the proposed method presented in
Chapter 2. In this application, we retained the original values on demographic predictors:
number of dependents, state filing status, and county. We generated synthetic values for
variables age and wages using quantile regression models, and we imputed and perturbed
values for variables federal tax and deductions (among others) using hot deck and rank swap-
ping. In Section 4.1.3, we present results from implementing this procedure using individual
income tax records for tax payers in the state of Iowa. Depending on agency and department
interest, future work could investigate further applications of the method.
An individual income tax return contains up to 100 or more variables. In order to pro-
duce a synthetic data set for use by the LSA, values for many more variables need to be
generated so that the agency can investigate tax policy changes.
4.1.3 Results
As a preliminary check we assess how well the distributions in the synthetic data approx-
imate the distributions in the original data. For work done at the IDR, we examine plotted
empirical cumulative distributions of original and synthetic age and log(wages) values. Plots
can be seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
Values on age and log(wages) in the synthetic data match the distribution of values in
the original and very precisely. Checks were also performed conditional on values of the
independent variables (dependents, filing status, and county). Results are very promising
(Huckett 2006). In Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the distribution of values in the original and synthetic
records for variables federal tax and deductions are plotted.
We are able to maintain the distributions for several variables using the proposed method.
It remains to assess how well we maintain joint distributions in the synthetic set. We take
steps to do so in another application at the U.S. Census Bureau. It also remains to generate
85
Figure 4.1 Empirical cumulative distribution of age values from original and
synthetic Iowa income tax return data.
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Figure 4.2 Empirical cumulative distribution of log(wages) from original
and synthetic Iowa income tax return data.
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Figure 4.3 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of log(federal tax)
from original and synthetic Iowa income tax return data.
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Figure 4.4 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of log(deductions)
from original and synthetic Iowa income tax return data.
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values on all variables, to create an entire synthetic set.
4.2 U.S. Census Bureau application
The U.S. Census Bureau collects and maintains data collected in surveys and censuses.
To achieve its goal of simultaneously disseminating information while protecting confiden-
tiality, the Census Bureau takes several approaches. Published statistics and summaries,
tables, and subsamples with a limited number of variables and geographic information are
among them. Users who wish to compute other statistics and perform their own analyses can
apply for access to microdata through a Research Data Center or at the site of the Census
Bureau itself. The process requires a proposal of research, oaths and contracts to protect
confidentiality, and restriction to the physical location where research can be performed if
proposals are accepted and access is granted. We suggest that the SDL methods described
in this dissertation can be implemented on a number of data sets to produce releasable data
to users, lessening the burden on users and on the Census Bureau itself.
Results from an application of generating synthetic values using quantile regression for
veterans data in the American Community Survey at the U.S. Census Bureau are presented.
In Section 4.2.1 we provide a description of the American Community Survey. The procedure
used, including details on the quantile regression models used to generate synthetic data, is
presented in Section 4.2.2. Initial results and some concerns are presented in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 American Community Survey
The U.S. Census Bureau administers a decennial census to provide population counts
consistent with a constitutional mandate to apportion seats in the House of Representatives.
The long form, which is sent to a random 1
6
subsample of the households, has historically
accompanied the decennial census to collect data on the social, economic, housing, and de-
mographic characteristics of the population. With a growing population and increased needs
for current and more frequent information about these characteristics, the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) was designed. It is administered yearly and will replace the long form
starting in 2010, thereby enabling the Census Bureau to provide pertinent and timely data
products every year about communities with larger populations and every three years and
about communities with smaller populations every 5 years. More detailed information is
available in the ACS Handbook and a document describing the design and implementation
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of the ACS (U.S. Census Bureau 2007).
4.2.2 Models and procedure
We apply the methods presented in Section 2.1 of this dissertation to ACS data on veter-
ans. Specifically, we simulate synthetic values for age and wages using conditional quantile
regression models. The values of age and wages in the data have distinct distributions for
female and male respondents, so we consider separate models for the two groups. Based on
discussions with members of the Statistical Research Division at the Census Bureau, some
variables are included in the models to maintain important conditional distributions. Others
are included based on empirical plots and correlations that indicate they help to characterize
the distributions of age and wages.
We use a conditional model containing variables that reflect education levels (educ), cur-
rent employment in the military (mil), social security income (ss), and fertility (fer) for female
respondents. Define x = {educ, mil, ss, fer} for male respondents and x = {educ, mil, ss}
for female respondents. The quantile regression model is
Qage(τ |x) = ξage(x, βage,τ ) + age,τ , (4.2)
where ξage is a linear function of x and βage,τ , and age,τ represents independently and iden-
tically distributed random errors.
Values of wages are simulated using a conditional model containing age, commute time
(commute), race group (race), retirement income (retire), social security income (ss), and
two variables reflecting the amount of time spent at work (work1 and work2). Two consider-
ations are made for wages. The first is due to a large number of records with recorded wages
of zero. Rather than include all records in the estimation procedure, we first perform logistic
regression to predict whether wages> 0 or wages= 0 in corresponding synthetic records. For
records with predicted wages of zero, we assign a zero value to the corresponding synthetic
record. Then we estimate parameters in a quantile regression model for wages using only
data on records with the synthetic value of wages predicted to be positive.
The second consideration is due to the very wide range of values for wages. As in the
Iowa Department of Revenue application, we apply a modified log-transformation to lessen
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the effect of the highest values in the estimation:
l.wages =
 log(wages), wages 6= 00, wages = 0. (4.3)
With x = { age, commute, race, retire, ss, work1, work2} for both female and male respon-
dents, the quantile regression model for log wages, or l.wages, is
Ql.wages(τ |x) = ξl.wages(x, βl.wages,τ ) + l.wages,τ , (4.4)
where ξl.wages is a linear function of x and βl.wages,τ , and l.wages,τ are independently and
identically distributed random errors.
For both age and wages, we simulate values using the method described in Section 2.1.3.
Values for τage,j and τl.wages,j are randomly selected for each record j from a Uniform(0, 1)
distribution. Due to computational contraints, rather than fit a quantile regression model
for each randomly selected quantile, we first fit the models in Equations 4.3 and 4.4 for
quantiles in the set τ = {0.001, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.98, 0.99, 0.999}. Predictions for the randomly
selected quantiles are interpolated using predictions for these quantiles.
For record j, we desire the predicted age at randomly selected quantile τage,j. If predicted
values yˆτage,a and yˆτage,b are computed at quantiles τage,a and τage,b from the set τ directly
above and below the randomly selected quantile, then we can interpolate between the pre-
dicted values to obtain the desired synthetic value as follows:
yˆτage,j = τage,j yˆτage,a + (1− τage,j)yˆτage,b . (4.5)
A similar method is used to obtain synthetic values for l.wages. Synthetic values for wages
can be obtained by taking the exponential of the computed synthetic wages. Results are
presented in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.3 Results
Recall, the procedure was implemented separately on records for female and male respon-
dents. We compare marginal distributions of age and wages in the original and synthetic data
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Figure 4.5 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of age in original
and synthetic American Community Survey (ACS) veterans
data.
using plots of their empirical cumulative distributions in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. Marginally,
the distributions of age and l.wages in the data are fairly well preserved in the distribution
of the synthetic values. This occurs when all records are lumped together and also within
female and male groups.
In an effort to assess the extent to which this method preserved the conditional distribu-
tion of l.wages given age, commute time (commute), and two variables reflecting the amount
of time spent at work, work1 and work2, linear regression estimates, standard errors, and R
2
values from the model l.wages = f(age, work1, work2, commute,γ) +  are presented in Ta-
ble 4.1. Parameter estimates for the linear regression model are similar. However, standard
errors of the estimates computed using the synthetic data set are higher than in the original
data set. This makes sense, since the method used to generate synthetic values introduces
extra randomness to both age and l.wages values which affects the accuracy, or standard
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Figure 4.6 Empirical cumulative distribution functions of log(wages) from
original and synthetic American Community Survey (ACS) vet-
erans data.
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Table 4.1 Linear regression results for predicting l.wages from synthetic and
original American Comunity Survey veterans data sets.
coefficient estimate s.e.(γˆ)
Original data γˆage 0.0027 0.00036
γˆwork1 0.0304 0.00027
γˆwork2 0.0432 0.00027
γˆcommute 0.0033 0.00014
R2 0.46
Synthetic data γˆage -0.0007 0.00033
γˆwork1 0.0289 0.00037
γˆwork2 0.0411 0.00036
γˆcommute 0.0033 0.00018
R2 0.30
errors, of estimates based on those values. The coefficient of age actually is far (in terms of
standard errors) from the original estimated coefficient. The value of R2 is also a lot smaller.
One could ask what happened to these coefficients. One possibility is that the statistical
disclosure limitation method was not applied to all the variables used in the model used to
assess data utility. As a result, the simulated ages and wages (or l.wages) do not necessarily
match well with other variables that were not generated conditional on their values. As a
consequence, a recommendation can be made to fully create the synthetic data set for all
variables to be released or to only release variables created in a consistent manner.
A practical concern that the Census Bureau has about releasing synthetic data main-
taining the consistency of values in individual records. Consider age and Veteran Period of
Service (VPS), for instance. An example of one such inconsistency is a record containing
a synthetic value of 17 for age, say, and a value corresponding to World War II for VPS.
We examine the distributions of values for age within VPS categories. Synthetic age values
rarely fall outside the range of data values, thus few inconsistencies exist. To ensure the
resulting synthetic age values fall within the range of values in the data, age values were
generated using the quantile regression method within VPS categories. The box plots in
Figure 4.7 show the ranges of age values within VPS categories in the original and synthetic
data. If synthetic age values that fall outside of the range of values in the original data are
truly nonsensical, then further work needs to be done to correct for this. If values outside the
range in the data are plausible, then it might be acceptable to allow them in the synthetic
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Figure 4.7 Box plots of age within Veteran Period of Service (VPS) from
original and synthetic American Community Survey (ACS) vet-
erans data.
data set. Further investigation to this topic should be considered.
The results presented in this section highlight the appeal of quantitative measures of
data utility as well as disclosure risk. How similar or different should point estimates be
between the synthetic and orginal data sets? How much added variability is enough? How
much is too much? These are questions that can be answered by comparing risk and utility
of the data set that results from applying different SDL methods. While we do not have
quantitative measures to compare the synthetic and original data sets, we can see that such
measures would be very helpful in assessing any SDL method used to protect confidential
data.
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In Section 4.3, the proposed method is applied to a public use microdata sample available
through the Census Bureau’s website. In this application, we study the entire proposed SDL
method in order to implement our developments to measure disclosure risk in the resulting
synthetic data for different types of intruders and targets.
4.3 Public Use Microdata Sample application
The U.S. Census Bureau makes microdata sets available through what are called Public
Use Microdata Samples (PUMS). PUMS include microdata files from the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS). Identifying information is removed, geographic locations are reported
in broad regions. Because of the limitations due to confidentiality, we could not continue
to work on the ACS data set described in Section 4.2 outside of the Census Bureau facility.
We substitute a similar data set taken from the PUMS data for an application in measuring
disclosure risk.
Access to PUMS can be gained through the Census Bureau website (www.census.gov)
and through an application called DataFerret, available for download through the Census
website (dataferrett.census.gov) as well. Ferret is an acronym for Federated Electronic Re-
search, Review, Extraction and Tabulation Tool. The application is free and easy to use. It
provides access to samples of data from surveys that are collected by the Census Bureau.
Included is the ACS among several others. To use the DataFerret application, a user must
submit information including name and email address. Once access is granted (almost im-
mediately) the user may select which survey to download data from and which variables
from the survey s/he wants information on. Geographical information is limited to broad
regions (northeast, midwest, south, west, Puerto Rico), divisions (Puerto Rico, New Eng-
land, Middle Atlantic, etc.), and states. Other variables include information on housing and
population characteristics as well as replicate weights for variables.
We use a PUMS data set as a test bed to implement the SDL procedure proposed in
Chapter 2, compute risk as formulated in Chapter 3 for three types of intruder and three
targets, and to evaluate the data utility in the resulting synthetic data set. The PUMS data
has already had SDL methods applied to it to protect confidentiality before being released
to the public. Hence, in our application, we assume some hypothetical situations in which
records would be sensitive if more detailed information was known. We also ignore any po-
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Table 4.2 Variables in the U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Sam-
ple (PUMS) sample.
SCHL educational attainment
VPS veteran period of service
AGE age
RET retirement income
SS social security income
SSI supplemental social security income
TAX property tax paid
WAGE wages earned.
tential SDL methods that have been applied to the data set prior to our using it and assume
values on records are the orignial data.
The PUMS sample used here includes over 30,000 records on respondents in Iowa with
the following variables: age, retirement income, social security income, supplemental security
income, property tax paid (categorized), wages earned, educational attainment, citizenship,
sex, and veteran period of status. The are presented in Table 4.3.1. We suppose the scenario
is that a researcher wants access to the agency’s original data set to study income relative
to age, educational attainment, and veteran period of service. Other relationships are im-
portant to maintain as well.
4.3.1 Models and procedure
In this section the proposed procedure is implemented to create synthetic data. Measures
of disclosure risk presented in Chapter 3 are applied.
Educational attainment and veteran period of service are considered nonsensitive and
available to the intruder. Their values are released essentially unperturbed. Educational
attainment (SCHL) has 17 levels. The value 0 is recorded for respondents who are less
than 3 years old, 1 is recorded for respondents with no education, values increase from 1
to 16 with grade levels and degrees. Level 16 corresponds to a doctorate degree. Veteran
period of service (VPS) has 13 levels with values 0 through 12. A value of 0 corresponds
to a respondent who is not a veteran. The majority of respondents have recorded value 0.
Levels from 1 to 12, correspond to veteran respondents who are veterans of the Gulf War
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Table 4.3 Recode variables Veteran’s Period of Service (VPS) and ed-
ucational attainment (SCHL) from U.S. Census Bureau Pub-
lic Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data set into new variable
SCHL/VPS.
SCHL/V PS V PS SCHL
1 0 0
2 0 1
3 0 2
4 0 3
5 0 4
6 0 5
7 0 6
8 0 7
9 0 8
10 0 9
11 0 10
12 0 11
13 0 ≥ 12
14 ≥ 1 ≤ 8
15 ≥ 1 9, 10, 11
16 ≥ 1 ≥ 12
(1), the Gulf War and Vietnam (2), Vietnam only (3), etcetera, to before World War II
only (12). Detailed variable definitions are available through the PUMS data dictionary at
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/PUMSDataDict06.pdf.
When VPS greater than 0, unique records exist with respect to SCHL and VPS levels.
Thus, prior to release, these variables are recategorized. There are 16 resulting categories
listed in Table 4.3. The resulting categories contain a sufficient number of records to be
released safely. Again, since this is a public use microdata sample, there is not enough iden-
tifying information for the records to actually be sensitive. However, we can imagine that if
these records were from a specific geographic location, and if that information was released
with the data set, then the unique records would be sensitive.
Synthetic data for release is generated for AGE, RET, and SS using quantile regression
predictions at randomly drawn quantiles. Hot deck imputation and rank swapping are used
to generate values for SSI, TAX, and WAGE. The illustration in Figure 4.8 represents the
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Figure 4.8 An illustration of the original U.S. Census Bureau Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS) data set and STEP ONE of the cre-
ation of the synthetic data set. The original data set contains
variables Y. In step one, the nonsensitive variables YSCHL and
YV PS are recategorized to ZSCHL/V PS before being copied into
the synthetic data set.
first stage of the procedure, in which values on SCHL and VPS are recategorized and copied
into the synthetic data set. Details about the quantile regression models and predicted values
follow in Section 4.3.1.1. Hot deck imputation and rank swapping details are presented in
Section 4.3.1.2.
4.3.1.1 Quantile regression models for PUMS application
Synthetic values for AGE, RET, and SS are generated using conditional quantile regres-
sion models. Models and predicted values are estimated in a sequential fashion in order
to retain the joint conditional distribution of AGE, RET, and SS, given SCHL and VPS.
First, models for AGE are estimated from the original data, given SCHL and VPS. Pre-
dicted values ÂGEτAGE are computed using values of SCHL and VPS on each record and the
regression coefficients estimated at quantiles τAGE. Second, models for RET are estimated
using the original data, given AGE, SCHL, and VPS at quantiles τRET . Predicted values
R̂ET τRET are computed using synthetic values ÂGEτAGE and original values of SCHL and
VPS on each record. Third, models for SS are estimated from the original data, given RET,
AGE, SCHL, and VPS. Predicted values ŜSτSS are computed using regression estimates at
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quantiles τSS, synthetic values ÂGEτAGE and R̂ET τRET , and original values SCHL and VPS.
The conditional quantile regression models are written as:
YAGE,τAGE = (YSCHL YV PS)βAGE,τAGE + AGE,τAGE
YRET,τRET = (YSCHL YV PS YAGE)βRET,τRET + RET,τRET
YSS,τSS = (YSCHL YV PS YAGE YRET )βSS,τSS + SS,τSS .
(4.6)
with errors k independently and identically distributed with a normal distribution at quan-
tile τ with zero mean and variance ω(τk)
2 = τk(1−τk)
f2(F−1(τk))
, for variable k = AGE,RET, SS.
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the quantile regression models in Equation 4.6 of this ap-
plication are fit at each quantile in the set τ = {0.001, 0.01, ..., 0.99, 0.999}. Predicted values
at randomly drawn quantiles from the interval (0, 1) are interpolated using predicted values
at quantiles from this set. Specifically, a random quantile τ ∗AGE,j is drawn for each record
j = 1, ..., n. Values τa,j and τb,j from the set τ are directly above and below τ
∗
AGE,j. The
synthetic predicted value, yˆAGE,τ∗AGE , is obtained by interpolating between predicted values
at τa,j and τb,j, yˆAGE,τa and yˆAGE,τb . This can be written as follows:
yˆAGE,τa,j = (ySCHL,j yV PS,j)βˆAGE,τa and
yˆAGE,τb,j = (ySCHL,j yV PS,j)βˆAGE,τb .
(4.7)
Using these two predicted values, the predicted value yˆAGE,τ∗AGE,j is computed using the
following interpolation:
yˆAGE,τ∗AGE,j = τ
∗
AGE,j yˆAGE,τa,j + (1− τ ∗AGE,j)yˆAGE,τb,j . (4.8)
This is done to generate a synthetic value of AGE for each record in the synthetic set.
Interpolation is also used to generate synthetic values for RET conditional on SCHL,
VPS, and AGE, and similarly, to generate synthetic values for SS conditional on SCHL,
VPS, AGE, and RET. Expressions for this are shown here:
yˆRET,τ∗RET,j = τ
∗
RET,j yˆRET,τa,j + (1− τ ∗RET,j)yˆRET,τb,j and
yˆSS,τ∗SS,j = τ
∗
SS,j yˆSS,τa,j + (1− τ ∗SS,j)yˆSS,τb,j ,
(4.9)
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Figure 4.9 An illustration of the original U.S. Census Bureau Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS) data set and STEP TWO of the cre-
ation of the synthetic data set. In step two, the sensitive vari-
ables YAGE, YRET , and YSS are replaced in the synthetic data set
using quantile regression predictions for variables ZAGE, ZRET ,
and ZSS.
where
yˆRET,τ∗RET,j = (ySCHL,j yV PS,j yˆAGE,τ∗AGE,j)βˆRET,τ∗RET,j and
yˆSS,τ∗SS,j = (ySCHL,j yV PS,j yˆAGE,τ∗AGE,j yˆRET,τ∗RET,j)βˆSS,τ∗SS,j .
The illustration in Figure 4.9 reflects the SDL procedure and values in the synthetic data
set up to this point with original values shaded in blue and synthetic quantile regression
predicitons shaded in yellow.
4.3.1.2 Hot deck and rank swapping procedure for PUMS application
Hot deck imputation and rank swapping are used to generate values for supplemental
security income (SSI), property tax (TAX), and wage income (WAGE) for the synthetic
data set. In the hot deck portion of the procedure, matching between each synthetic record
j and all original records i = 1, ..., n is performed using the Mahalanobis distance based on
AGE and RET values. Original record i with the smallest distance d(i, j) to synthetic record
j is selected as the matching record. In practice, to add more variablility to the synthetic
data set, we randomly choose from among records with distance in the lowest ten percent of
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matching records.
Rather than impute all values for SSI, TAX, and WAGE into synthetic record j, further
perturbation is introduced by performing rank swapping on the matching original record
i. We compute the sample rank of values YSSI,i, YTAX,i, and YWAGE,i from the matching
recrod i, and call them rSSI,i, rTAX,i, and rWAGE,i. These ranks are swapped with random
ranks r∗SSI,i, r
∗
TAX,i, and r
∗
WAGE,i. Values on records with the random ranks are imputed into
synthetic record j. Ranks r∗SSI,i, r
∗
TAX,i, and r
∗
WAGE,i are randomly selected from uniform
distributions over intervals centered at the sample ranks of values in matching record i, i.e.
r∗SSI,i ∼ Uniform(rSSI,i − δ, rSSI,i + δ1),
r∗TAX,i ∼ Uniform(rTAX,i − δ2, rTAX,i + δ2), and
r∗WAGE,i ∼ Uniform(rWAGE,i − δ3, rWAGE,i + δ3).
The values of δ1, δ2, and δ3 in this application were set to 20. As discussed in Section 2.3,
increasing the value of δ would increase distortion from the original data causing an unde-
sireable decrease in data utility but a simultaneous decrease disclosure risk. It would be an
interesting study to determine how much of a change in δ would correspond to a practical
change in both data utility and disclosure risk. This is out of the scope of the work done in
this application.
At this point, the synthetic data set is complete. The illustration in Figure 4.10 shows
that the variables YSCHL and YV PS have been recategorized into ZSCHL/V PS, synthetic
values for YAGE, YRET , and YSS have been generated using quantile regression predictions
ZAGE, ZRET , and ZSS (shaded in yellow), and hot deck imputation and rank swapping have
been used to produce values ZSSI , ZTAX , and ZWAGE as synthetic versions (shaded in red)
of YSSI , YTAX , and YWAGE.
4.3.2 Results
Results from implementing the proposed procedure are presented in this section. First,
empirical plots and regression analyses are presented to assess data utility. Then disclo-
sure risk is assessed using the framework and formulation for risk measures presented in
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Figure 4.10 An illustration of the original U.S. Census Bureau Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS) data set and STEP THREE of the
creation of the synthetic data set. In step three, the sensitive
variables YSSI , YTAX , and YWAGE. are replaced in the synthetic
data set using hot deck imputation and rank swapping for vari-
ables ZSSI , ZTAX , and ZWAGE.
Chapter 3. Risk is assessed for three types of intruders and three targets. The results are
summarized in the next sections.
4.3.2.1 Data utility
In this section, empirical plots of densities are presented to assess the degree to which
marginal distributions are preserved in the synthetic data set. Regression analyses are useful
to assess conditional distributions.
Marginal distributions
Densities of synthetic and original values of AGE, RET, SS, SSI, TAX, and WAGE are
presented in Figure 4.11. Synthetic values on AGE, RET, and SS were generated in step two
of the procedure using the quantile regression models in Equations 4.10 and 4.11. Values
of SSI, TAX, and WAGE were generated in step three of the procedure using hot deck
imputation and rank swapping. Plots of empirical densities for each of these six variables
allow us to assess data utility with respect to the marginal distributions of each variable in
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the original and synthetic data sets.
The plots in Figure 4.11 show that the distribution of synthetic values of AGE, RET,
SS, and SSI look similar to distributions in the original data. There are discrepancies in
the frequency of -1 and 0 values in SS and SSI. There are obvious discrepancies between
the distribution of TAX and WAGE between the original and synthetic data sets. To better
visualize the differences in these variables and also to allow a closer look at the distributions
of RET, SS, and SSI, the distributions of log values are plotted. Values on RET, SS, SSI,
and WAGE have a lower bound of 0, with -1 values indicating the respondent’s age is less
than 15. This log transformation assigns the following values to log(variable) :
= −1 when variable = −1
log(variable) = 0 when variable = 0
= log(variable) when variable > 0.
Densities of the log values can be seen in Figures 4.12 through 4.15. Since the magnitude
of AGE and TAX values are relatively small and neither distribution has a huge density of
values around -1 or 0, we do not transform these values.
In Figures 4.12 through 4.15, the marginal distributions of variables are presented in the
density plots of log values. They show that RET, SS, and SSI distributions in the original
and synthetic data sets are similar. Though, in the right tail of SS, plots show a lower
frequency of records with values of log(SS) between 8 and 10, corresponding to SS values
between 3,000 and 22,000. A notable difference between original and synthetic distributions
is found in the density plot of WAGE values in Figure 4.15. Prior to the log transforma-
tion, the density curve implies that there is a large discrepancy between the distribution of
WAGE values in the original and synthetic data sets, roughly at WAGE values of 0, 3,000,
and 13,000. When the density of the log values is plotted, it seems that the discrepancies of
frequencies are not as extreme as they appear in the original plot. However, when the 0 and
-1 values are eliminated, the synthetic data show extra peaks in the upper end of the distri-
bution, with peaks at log(WAGE) vlues around 8 and 9. These values correspond to WAGE
values of almost 3,000 and about 13,000. Also, the right tail of the WAGE distribution in
the synthetic data set does not extend as far as in the original data set. The implications of
this will depend on the purpose intended by the data user.
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Figure 4.11 Empirical densities for AGE, RET, SS, SSI, TAX, and WAGE
from original and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS) data.
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Figure 4.12 Empirical densities for RET on the original and log scale from
original and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Micro-
data Sample (PUMS) data.
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Figure 4.13 Empirical densities for SS on the original and log scale from
original and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Micro-
data Sample (PUMS) data.
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Figure 4.14 Empirical densities for SSI on the original and log scale from
original and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Micro-
data Sample (PUMS) data.
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Figure 4.15 Empirical densities for WAGE on the original and log scale
from original and synthetic U.S. Census Bureau Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS) data.
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Conditional distributions
To assess the conditional distributions in the synthetic data set compared to those in the
original data set, we compare linear regression results. In particular, we examine the distri-
bution of responses conditional on SCHL/VPS category to assess how well the conditional
relationships in the original data set are represented in the synthetic data set. Other analyses
and models can be considered. If an agency had an idea of specific analyses of interest to
a user, results from those particular analysis could be compared between the original and
synthetic data sets to assess data utility.
The regression estimates and standard errors from the linear regression model of AGE
on SCHL/VPS category are presented in Table 4.4. These results show that the synthetic
values of AGE provide essentially the same estimates and standard errors when regressed
on SCHL/VPS category as the original data do. Notice that the standard errors of each
estimated coefficient are slightly lower for the synthetic data than for the original data. This
could be due to synthetic AGE values being quantile regression estimates conditional on
SCHL and VPS values. At particular values of SCHL and VPS, similar quantile regression
predictions of AGE will have been made, decreasing the variation among values in each
SCHL/VPS category. Notice also, that the R2 value for the synthetic data is slightly lower,
so although the variation of AGE values within SCHL/VPS categories is slightly lower, the
added variability (from predictions being made at random quantiles) in the overall data may
not be accounted for by this linear regression model.
The results in Table 4.4 show that the synthetic data for AGE values retain the con-
ditional relationship with SCHL/VPS categories that appears in the original data. In Ta-
bles 4.5 through 4.8, we present results from regression models of RET, SSI, TAX, SS, and
WAGE on SCHL/VPS category. Figures 4.16 through 4.21 provide plots to visualize the
estimates and standard errors using “standardized intervals.” The standardized intervals
are centered at each parameter estimate βˆ divided by its standard error s.e.(βˆ), with form
(βˆ/s.e.(βˆ)−2, βˆ/s.e.(βˆ) + 2). In each plot, the points corespond to the value (βˆ/s.e.(βˆ) esti-
mated using the original, or real data (r) and the synthetic data (s). Intervals surrounding
r and s of the same color belong to estimates of the same parameter.
The tables and plots show that relationships in the data are maintained to a varying
degree. By examining the tables we see that, oddly, in some cases, the R2 increases in the
synthetic set. This may not be as odd as an initial reaction though. The response variables
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Table 4.4 Linear regression results: YAGE = YSCHL/V PSβAGE + AGE.
ORIGINAL SYNTHETIC
SCHL/VPS estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
(intercept) 1.00 0.540 0.98 0.533
2 7.65 0.767 7.45 0.756
3 7.45 0.651 7.07 0.642
4 15.14 0.784 14.62 0.774
5 33.76 0.703 35.56 0.694
6 28.04 0.841 28.89 0.829
7 33.59 0.814 35.34 0.803
8 32.93 0.807 34.38 0.796
9 48.50 1.092 47.27 1.077
10 50.24 0.577 48.12 0.569
11 44.32 0.697 43.82 0.688
12 41.50 0.625 42.42 0.617
13 43.75 0.585 43.96 0.577
14 72.70 1.085 61.62 1.070
15 60.19 0.674 61.59 0.665
16 57.58 0.859 56.68 0.847
R2 = 0.4679 R2 = 0.4622
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we have regressed on SCHL/VPS category all have values generated using values of those
categories. Thus, in the synthetic data set, as an artifact of the synthetic data method,
SCHL/VPS categories directly account for more of the variation in the response variable
values. By looking at the tables alone, it seems the situation is somewhat dire–that the syn-
thetic data do not produce the same regression estimates as the original data. Most of the
plots, however, show that the standardized intervals overlap. For instance, in Figure 4.16, we
see that r and s pairs are close and that their intervals overlap. Most of the intervals do not
contain 0 (vertical line at 0 on the x-axis), indicating parameter estimates are significant in
both data sets. This gives us confidence that the synthetic data set, used in such an anlysis,
will lead to similar conclusions as the original data.
We noted earlier that densities of TAX and WAGE in the synthetic data do not align
nicely with those from the original data. Discrepancies can be seen in the conditional rela-
tionship of both of these variables with SCHL/VPS categories too. For the most part, in
Figures 4.19 and 4.21, standardized intervals from the synthetic and original data sets do
not overlap. For TAX, the implications may be severe since most estimates from the original
data are not signifcantly different from zero but corresponding estimates from the synthetic
data set are. This warrants further investigation, especially if the agency is aware that a
user of this synthetic data set is interested in studying property tax values with respect to
these SCHL/VPS categories.
In further analyses, we compare results from regression analyses between AGE and the
other variables. The results are presented in Table 4.9. Results for each of five regression
analyses are contained in this table and in Figures 4.22 through 4.25.
4.3.2.2 Disclosure risk assessment for synthetic PUMS data set
Using the developments presented in Chapter 3, we assess disclosure risk in the synthetic
PUMS data set. Disclosure risk is considered for an SDL intruder with detailed knowledge
of the SDL procedure used, an average intruder with prior knowledge including regression
estimates from the original data set, and a naive intruder with knowledge only from the
released synthetic data set. Each intruder knows the original values on particular target
records. These include a target record that is unique in the data set, a target record that is
rare, and a target record that is common with respect to the SCHL/VPS category.
Values on the target records are provided in Table 4.10. The left column in the table
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Table 4.5 Linear regression results: logYRET = YSCHL/V PSβRET + RET .
ORIGINAL SYNTHETIC
SCHL/VPS estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
(intercept) -1.00 0.074 -1.00 0.086
2 0.13 0.105 0.19 0.122
3 0.03 0.089 0.01 0.103
4 0.15 0.108 0.24 0.124
5 0.95 0.097 1.20 0.112
6 1.28 0.115 1.83 0.133
7 1.46 0.112 2.16 0.129
8 1.42 0.111 2.16 0.128
9 1.93 0.150 2.41 0.173
10 1.82 0.079 2.30 0.091
11 1.75 0.096 2.24 0.111
12 1.53 0.086 2.18 0.099
13 1.70 0.080 2.25 0.093
14 3.66 0.149 4.18 1.172
15 3.41 0.093 3.21 0.107
16 3.83 0.118 3.01 0.136
R2 = 0.1219 R2 = 0.1013
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Table 4.6 Linear regression results: logYSSI = YSCHL/V PSβSSI + SSI .
ORIGINAL SYNTHETIC
SCHL/VPS estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
(intercept) -1.00 0.032 -1.00 0.020
2 0.18 0.045 0.09 0.028
3 0.02 0.038 0.01 0.023
4 0.18 0.046 0.12 0.029
5 0.66 0.041 0.60 0.026
6 1.25 0.049 0.97 0.031
7 1.28 0.048 1.11 0.030
8 1.28 0.047 2.98 0.030
9 1.27 0.064 1.00 0.040
10 1.20 0.034 1.00 0.021
11 1.14 0.041 1.00 0.026
12 1.08 0.037 1.00 0.022
13 1.04 0.034 1.00 0.021
14 1.24 0.064 1.00 0.040
15 1.09 0.039 1.00 0.025
16 1.05 0.050 1.00 0.032
R2 = 0.1386 R2 = 0.3860
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Table 4.7 Linear regression results: YTAX = YSCHL/V PSβTAX + TAX .
ORIGINAL SYNTHETIC
SCHL/VPS estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
(intercept) 18.22 0469 17.55 0.257
2 1.01 0.666 1.80 0.365
3 3.19 0.565 10.76 0.310
4 3.42 0.681 -17.55 0.373
5 0.01 0.611 11.75 0.335
6 -0.17 0.730 -15.44 0.400
7 -0.73 0.707 23.77 0.388
8 -1.88 0.701 8.10 0.384
9 -2.03 0.949 -4.58 0.520
10 0.15 0.501 26.54 0.275
11 -0.41 0.605 7.68 0.332
12 -0.59 0.543 27.61 0.298
13 6.58 0.508 -17.55 0.278
14 -1.53 0.942 8.72 0.517
15 1.64 0.585 -3.36 0.321
16 7.39 0.746 3.43 0.409
R2 = 0.0334 R2 = 0.8159
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Table 4.8 Linear regression results: YTAX = YSCHL/V PSβTAX + TAX .
ORIGINAL SYNTHETIC
SCHL/VPS estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
(intercept) 18.22 0469 17.55 0.257
2 1.01 0.666 1.80 0.365
3 3.19 0.565 10.76 0.310
4 3.42 0.681 -17.55 0.373
5 0.01 0.611 11.75 0.335
6 -0.17 0.730 -15.44 0.400
7 -0.73 0.707 23.77 0.388
8 -1.88 0.701 8.10 0.384
9 -2.03 0.949 -4.58 0.520
10 0.15 0.501 26.54 0.275
11 -0.41 0.605 7.68 0.332
12 -0.59 0.543 27.61 0.298
13 6.58 0.508 -17.55 0.278
14 -1.53 0.942 8.72 0.517
15 1.64 0.585 -3.36 0.321
16 7.39 0.746 3.43 0.409
R2 = 0.0334 R2 = 0.8159
Table 4.9 Linear regression results: Y = YAGEβ + .
ORIGINAL SYNTHETIC
SCHL/VPS estimate s.e. R2 estimate s.e. R2
(intercept) -898.041 54.701 0.0513 47.720 49.156 0.0174
RET 47.838 1.171 24.899 1.064
(intercept) 4.820 9.536 0.0033 41.147 4.688 0.0426
SSI 2.074 0.204 -0.206 0.102
(intercept) 18.987 0.171 0.0014 22.468 0.216 0.0061
TAX 0.025 0.004 0.065 0.005
(intercept) -2585.007 40.517 0.36 -35.505 46.729 0.0981
SS 114.320 0.867 58.658 1.012
(intercept) 10,887.794 307.445 0.0126 1109.428 78.385 0.0809
WAGE 130.545 6.581 88.522 1.697
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Figure 4.16 YAGE = YSCHL/V PSβAGE + AGE: standardized intervals for
βˆAGE.
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Figure 4.17 YRET = YSCHL/V PSβRET + RET : standardized intervals for
βˆRET .
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Figure 4.18 YSSI = YSCHL/V PSβSSI + SSI : standardized intervals for βˆSSI .
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Figure 4.19 YTAX = YSCHL/V PSβTAX + TAX : standardized intervals for
βˆTAX .
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Figure 4.20 YSS = YSCHL/V PSβSS + SS: standardized intervals for βˆSS.
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Figure 4.21 YWAGE = YSCHL/V PSβWAGE + WAGE: standardized intervals
for βˆWAGE.
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Figure 4.22 YRET = YAGEβRET + RET : standardized intervals for βˆRET .
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Figure 4.23 YSSI = YAGEβSSI + SSI : standardized intervals for βˆSSI .
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Figure 4.24 YTAX = YAGEβTAX + TAX : standardized intervals for βˆTAX .
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Figure 4.25 YSS = YAGEβSS + SS: standardized intervals for βˆSS.
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Figure 4.26 YWAGE = YAGEβWAGE + WAGE: standardized intervals for
βˆWAGE.
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Table 4.10 Target records in the original and synthetic U.S. Census Burea
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data sets. Values for the
unique, rare, and common targets are give. Original values are
on the left. Synthetic values are on the right.
UNIQUE RARE COMMON
SDL set variable original synthetic original synthetic original synthetic
Ad SCHL 16 - 3 - 9 -
VPS 11 - 8 - 1 -
SCHL/VPS 16 16 14 14 15 15
Ap z1 = AGE 73 80 90 42 32 50
z2 = RET 69,000 0 0 0 0 0
z3 = SSI 0 0 0 0 0 0
z4 = TAX 47 0 14 24 28 0
Up z5 = SS 20,200 0 15,700 10,799 0 5952
z6 = WAGE 0 28,000 0 4,100 287,000 34,500
includes values from original records for each target. The unique target is the only record in
the data set with recorded values corresponding to the respondent having attained a doctor-
ate degree (SCHL=16) and veteran period of service occuring during the peace-time between
the Korean War and World War II (VPS=11). The unique target contains high values of
RET at $69,000 and SS at $20,200 in the original data set. The rare record is one of three
with educational attainment of 5th or 6th grade (SCHL=3) and veteran period of service dur-
ing World War II (VPS=8). From these three records, the one chosen as the target contains
recorded AGE and SS values higher that the other two rare records. The common record is
one of 112 records containing educational attainment of high school graduation (SCHL=9)
and veteran period of service during the Gulf War (VPS=1). The record chosen as the target
has an exceptionally high value of WAGE at $287,000 compared to the other 111 records in
which all recorded WAGE values are less than $100,000.
Values on the synthetic records that result from the SDL procedure are presented in the
right columns in Table 4.10. None of the target’s synthetic records correspond very closely
with the original records. Variable SCHL/VPS was not perturbed, so it matches exactly.
The other variables were perturbed. This indicates that disclosure risk is low for each of the
targets. To quantify this, we compute disclosure risk according to the procedure outline in
Chapter 3.
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Table 4.11 Disclosure risk for the synthetic U.S. Census Burea Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS) data set for three targets (unique,
rare, and common) for three intruders (SDL, average, naive).
Pr(J = j|t, Z)
UNIQUE RARE COMMON
SDL 0.00259 7.5× 10−13 0.00058
intruder average 0 0 0
naive 0 0 0
naive∗ 0 0 0.11217
Recall from Equation 3.1 that the disclosure risk for each record j is written:
Pr(J = j|t, z) = AjBjCj
1
nt∑n
i=1AiBiCi
1
nt
,
for ever j = 1, ..., n, where nt is the number of records with t
Ad = zAdj . The resulting dis-
closure risk for each target and intruder is presented in Table 4.11. Disclosure risk is set
to 0 for any released record with SCHL/VPS category not equal to the target’s value on
this category. For records released with the same category as the target, disclosure risk is
computed. The results are summarized for each intruder type below.
SDL intruder
To compute the disclosure risk attributed to the SDL intruder, we assume that specific
knowledge of the SDL procedure is available to the intruder and that the intruder chooses to
use this information to compute the probability of identification. The SDL intruder knows
the original values on the targets for variables SCHL, VPS, AGE, RET, SSI, and TAX. S/he
knows that SCHL and VPS are recategorized into broader categories defined in Table 4.3,
and thus knows the released value of VPS/SCHL for each target. It is known that values for
AGE, RET, and SS were generated using quantile regression predictions from the models in
Equation 4.6. The SDL intruder also knows that values in the released set, zApSSI,j, z
Ap
TAX,j,
and zUpWAGE,j, were generated using hot deck imputation and rank swapping.
Recall that SDL risk is computed component-wise according to the form of components
CSDL, BSDL, and ASDL, as presented in Equations 3.25, 3.28, 3.29 and 3.32. The resulting
disclosure risk presented in Table 4.11 is promising. The disclosure risk from the SDL in-
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truder for the unique target is only 0.259 percent. The disclosure risk for the common target
and the rare target are even less. Given the information and knowledge available to the
SDL intruder, it seems fortunate that the risk is not higher. It seems that the discrepancies
between the synthetic variables and the targets values confuse the SDL intruder and decrease
the disclosure risk.
To examine disclosure risk overall, we can examine the values of PrSDL(J = j|t, Z) com-
puted for every record. Records with a different value of SCHL/VPS category as the target
are set to zero, since SCHL/VPS categoryy are the variables in Ad, or those available to the
intruder that do not get perturbed. For records with the same value of SCHL/VPS category
recorded as each of the unique, rare, and common targets, the disclosure risk or probabilitiy
of identification PrSDL(J = j|t, Z) is computed. In Figure 4.27, three plots represent risk
associated with each of the three targets. The top plot shows the disclosure risk, or proba-
bility of identification computed for records in SCHL/VPS category with the unique target.
To link the unique target, it is assumed that among records with SCHL/VPS equal to the
target’s value, the probability of identification for each record is computed conditional on the
record belonging to the target. High values of probability would indicate a high probability
of a record belonging to the target.
To determine the likelihood of linking a record to the target, the value of its identification
probability is considered relative to the other record in the category. For example, if the
identification probability associated with a particular record is computed to be 0.25, this
may be too high in an absolute sense, but if all of the records in the categrory are computed
to have the same probability of belonging to the target, then the intruder may be no more
inclined to choose this record over any other. The purpose of the plot in Figure 4.27 is to
show that the identification probability, or risk, for the unique target is not only low on an
absolute scale at 0.00259 or 0.259%, but that its risk is also low relative to the other records
an intruder is attempting to link with the unique target.
It may be of interest to the agency to examine records with high disclosure risk, condi-
tioning on the record belonging to the target, even when the record is not the target’s record.
In the uniqe’s SCHL/VPS category, the record corresponding to the largest probability of
identification has a value of 0.00911 or 0.91%. Although this record is not the synthetic
version of the target’s record, the agency may want to examine the record to determine if a
false identification with the target would be likely and the effects that a false identification
would have. The agency may decide to further alter such a record in order to decrease its
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disclosure risk to the level of the other records.
The center plot of Figure 4.27 displays the disclosure risk associated with the 345 records
in the same SCHL/VPS category as the rare target. Recall that the rare target shares
original values of SCHL and VPS with two other records. The probability of identification
associated with those two records is indicated in green on the plot. The probability associ-
ated with the rare target’s record is indicated in red. The rare target has a low disclosure
risk both absolutely (nearly 0) and relative to the other two rare records as well as all of the
records in the released SCHL/VPS category.
The bottom plot in Figure 4.27 displays the disclosure risk associated with all of the
records in the same SCHL/VPS category as the common target. These points are shown
in black. The common target has the same original values on SCHL and VPS as 112 other
records, whose disclosure risk is plotted in red, and has the same SCHL/VPS category as
1,884 other records, whose disclosure risk is plotted in black. The common target’s disclosure
risk is plotted in green. The common target has a low disclosure risk of 0.00058 or 0.058%
which is also low relative to the disclosure risk associated with other records in the same
VPS/SCHL category. Again, there are a number of records with relatively high risk values
which the agency may want to examine to determine if further perturbation is necessary
before releasing the data set.
Naive intruder
The naive intruder is assumed to have no prior knowledge about the data set except
for the target’s values on available variables in Ad and Ap. We use the formulation in Sec-
tion 3.2.4 for Cnaive =
∏ 1
nk
, for record j when tAd = zAdj and z
Ap
kj ∈ (tk − ηk, tk + ηk). We set
Bnaive = 1 and Anaive =
1∏
φkj
, for every j, where φkj = φ
(
zkj−zkj
σk
)
. Disclosure risk associated
with the naive intruder is presented in two lines of Table 4.11. In the line labeled naive, dis-
closure risk is 0 for each target. To compute this, Cnaive is computed, with nk set equal to the
number of records where the released value zApkj is in the interval (tk− ηk, tk + ηk) for records
in the same SCHL/VPS category as the target record, and is set to 0 for other records. We
set ηk equal to the standard deviation of released values on variable z
Ap
k , corresonding to
AGE,RET, SSI, and TAX. For each of the targets, this was quite restrictive. In fact, none
of the records in the targets’ categories had values within one standard deviation of all four
variables simultaneously. Thus, all records have disclosure risk 0 when risk is computed in
this way.
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Figure 4.27 Risk for SDL intruder for records with SCHL/VPS value equal
to the target.
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Imagining that an intruder might take another approach, so do we. We determine that
none of the records have a value of RET within one standard deviation of the common tar-
get’s RET value. Instead of setting Cnaive to 0, we loosen the restrictions and essentially
set nRET equal to 1. Then, component Cnaive is computed using nAGE, nSSI , and nTAX
only. This produced the disclosure risk of 0.112, or 11.2% in Table 4.11 in the row labeled
naive∗. Similarly, loosening restrictions for the unique and rare targets allowed records in
their SCHL/VPS category to have non-zero disclosure risk as well. However, the synthetic
records corresponding to each target did not contain values simulatneously within the inter-
vals for remaining variables.
To assess the disclosure risk associated with the entire synthetic data set and associated
with the target records relative other records, plots similar to those in Figure 4.27 can be
examined. Many records have disclosure risk of 0 though, so such a plot is not very infor-
mative. Further investigation into the disclosure risk associated with 112 records with the
same original SCHL and VPS values show that the minimum risk for any of these records is
computed to be 0 and the maximum risk is 0.2586. This indicates that the common target’s
record is not identified with the highest disclosure risk among these records. Thus, while a
value of 0.112 seems like a fairly high value for disclosure risk. Relative to other records in
the common target’s category, it is less than half of the risk calculated for at least one other
record.
Average intruder
The average intruder possesses some knowledge of the data set prior to its release, though
no specific information about the SDL procedure. In this application, we assume that pa-
rameter estimates from the following regression models are provided to the intruder.
YAGE = YSCHL/V PSβAGE + AGE
logYRET = YSCHL/V PSβRET + RET
YSSI = YSCHL/V PSβSSI + SSI
YTAX = YSCHL/V PSβTAX + TAX
logYSS = (YSCHL/V PS YAGE logYRET )βSS + SS
logYWAGE = (YSCHL/V PS YAGE logYRET )βWAGE + WAGE
Further, we assume that the intruder uses this information to compute the probability of
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identification for each target in the released data set. The components are formulated as in
Section 3.2.5, Equation 3.38, 3.41, and 3.42. Disclosure risk associated with the average
intruder is computed to be 0 for each target, as presented in Table 4.11.
While values released in the synthetic versions of the target records, may be close to
predicted values based on estimates from the above models, this does not occur for all six
variables simultaneously. In fact, predicted values on one or more variables are quite far
from the target’s original values. The result is a very small probability associated with these
variables. This small (nearly zero) value is multiplied with the probabilities associated with
the other variables, leading to a very small (nearly zero) probability for the entire record.
This occurs for all three targets under assumptions for the average intruder.
It should be noted that the models above do not necessarily represent conditional rela-
tionships in this data set well. It would be in the agency’s best interest to consider what
type of good analytical information will be available to the intruder and how s/he could
incorporate that information into the probability calculation in an attempt to identify the
target.
To assess disclosure risk in the entire data set under assumptions of the average intruder,
similar plots to those in Figure 4.27 can be examined. Since all records with the same
SCHL/VPS value as the target’s have disclosure risk at almost zero, the plots are rather
uninformative. Components of this risk associated with variables AGE, RET, SSI, and TAX
are nearly zero for all records in each target’s VPS/SCHL category. This implies that compo-
nent Cavg is zero for each record. A small number of records contained non-zero probabilities
for SS and WAGE, producing non-zero values of Bavg for some records. Further investigation
into this could be informative.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This chapter summarizes the work presented in this dissertation. Comments and sug-
gestions for future work are included. Discussion on the proposed synthetic data method,
disclosure risk measures, and data utility of the resulting synthetic data set are presented in
this chapter.
5.1 Proposed method
In this dissertation an approach to generating synthetic data for statistical disclosure
limitation is proposed. The method combines quantile regression, hot deck imputation, and
rank swapping. Quantile regression estimates are used to compute predicted values for some
sensitive variables. Hot deck imputation is used to identify records in the original data set
with values close to the quantile regression predictions. From the closest record, values on
additional variables are identified. Before imputing these values into the synthetic record,
rank swapping is done to further perturb the values. The method is designed to produce a
data set with high inferential validity and low disclosure risk. This combination of methods
represents a unique approach to generating synthetic data for data sets with diverse variable
types.
5.2 Disclosure risk measures
In order to assess the proposed method and to ensure confidentiality of respondents in
the released synthetic data, disclosure risk in the resulting synthetic data set must be mea-
sured. Disclosure risk is dependent on three main components: the statistical disclosure
limitation (SDL) method and resulting synthetic data, the intruder, and the records that
might be targeted for identification. The extent to which the SDL method perturbs the data
directly influences the disclosure risk. At two extremes, if data remain unperturbed they
have high risk of disclosure. If data are perturbed beyond recognition, their disclosure risk
may be close to zero, but their utility is likely too low. An agency that wishes to protect
136
sensitive data can assume an intruder will attempt to identify a target respondent in the re-
leased data. The agency should account for various assumptions pertaining to an intruder’s
knowledge about the SDL method used, knowledge about the data both before and after
its release, and methods the intruder will use to identify respondents in the released data set.
In this dissertation, methods to measure disclosure risk are developed to address a range
of intruders. The intruder with insider knowledge may have accurate information about
the SDL method used and can decide to use that information to identify a target in the
released data set. Working under a disclosure risk framework developed in Duncan and
Lambert (1986, 1989) and Reiter (2005), we have extended risk measures that were devel-
oped to evaluate the situation when SDL methods such as noise addition, swapping, and
recoding are used. Our extensions include a formulation of disclosure risk when the SDL
method is to generate synthetic values using quantile regression, hotdeck, and rank swapping.
We present details on formulating disclosure risk when the intruder possesses no prior
knowledge except for some of the target’s original values. We call this the naive intruder and
assume the such an intruder will base the probability of identifying a target in the released
data on information gained after data are released only.
We also present a possible formulation for an average intruder with knowledge between
that of the SDL and naive intruders. The average intruder’s probability of identifying a
target in the released data set is based on combining information available prior to the data
release with information gained after the data are released. The assumptions about this
intruder’s knowledge and decisions are flexible to span the range between the naive and SDL
intruders. Details of computing disclosure risk developed for these intruders for a data set
generated using our proposed SDL method are a novel contribution to this area of study.
5.3 Data utility
In order to assess the utility of synthetic data generated using the SDL procedure pro-
posed, we use a set of standard tools. Helpful visual tools include empirical plots of cumu-
lative distributions and densities. We also consider comparisons of regression analysis. To
compare results from several regression analyses, we present tables with parameter estimates
and standard errors and using plots of standardized intervals.
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5.4 Applications
The proposed SDL procedure has been applied in three settings. The first was at the Iowa
Department of Revenue. There the purpose was to protect income tax return data for release
to legislative researchers who investigate tax law changes and their effects on the revenue for
the state of Iowa. The second application was at the U.S. Census Bureau. The purpose here
was to protect veterans data from the American Community Survey database for release to
researchers interested in studying various characteristics about the population of veterans.
In our third application, we apply the proposed method to a Public Use Microdata Sample
available from the U.S. Census Bureau. The purpose of this application is primarily to
implement the disclosure risk measures developed in Chapter 3 to measure risk in a synthetic
data set that was generated using the SDL method.
5.5 Future work
Each area of this research can be enhanced and improved by further work and research.
In general, the SDL method can be further developed for application to a particular data
set, possibly with known purposes once released to researchers and the public. Perhaps a
particular portion of one of the surveys collected by the U.S. Census Bureau is in high de-
mand by researchers interested in particular characteristics of the database. It is plausible
that the proposed SDL method can provide a tool to generate high quality synthetic data
for researchers studying those characteristics. With known uses, the data utility can be
measured against specific standards and the method can be molded to best suit the purpose
of the resulting synthetic data set.
Over the course of this research, tools to reduce computational effort were learned and
used to make the implementation of quantile regression on one hundred quantiles feasible
in a large data set. Perhaps with more investigation, efficiency can be improved so that
quantile regression can be done for quantiles on finer divisions of the (0,1) interval.
Suggestions from other researchers in synthetic data have included ideas to better main-
tain conditional relationships in the data by selecting quantiles in an alternative way. Rather
than selecting quantiles randomly for each record and each variable independently, perhaps
modeling the quantiles could provide more consistency with the original data set.
Finally, one could investigate the use of ideas from multiple imputation with this method
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of generating synthetic data. Theoretically, users with access to multiple replicates of a data
set could better quantify uncertainty associated with inferences.
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